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Abstract
This dissertation explores individuals’ investment in human capital and how that
interacts with public policy interventions. I focus on two forms of investment in
human capital: investments in skills and health. First, I focus on parents’ investment
in children and parental labor supply and asset accumulation decisions as they interact
with private schooling. Second, I investigate whether individuals rely on outside
sources of information, such as expert reviews and word-of-mouth, when making
investments in their health.
In the first chapter, “Dynamic Female Labor Supply, Investment in Children and
Private Schooling”, I explore how the private schooling investment decision for the
child affects maternal labor supply and savings over the life cycle. Women with
children face a well-known trade-off between working, which allows greater monetary
investments in children, and spending more time with the child. I build and estimates
a dynamic model of female labor supply to investigate how the option of private
schooling affects this trade-off. The model extends existing work on female labor
supply and children by incorporating private versus public schooling choice, allowing
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for risk aversion and savings, and nesting within the model a child ability production
function. Results of the structural estimation show that mother’s time with the child
and private schooling are complements, and that the availability of private schooling
leads to more work and more saving among less educated women. However, more
educated women drop out of the labor force and increase the time they spend with
their child when the child is going to private elementary school. In addition, I estimate
the price elasticity of private school enrollment to be -0.25. Policy simulations show
that targeted private school subsidies to low income and less educated mothers can
reduce inequality in children’s outcomes. Moreover, by inducing women to increase
their labor supply to be able to top up subsidies and send their children to private
schools, targeted subsidies can help women at the margin accumulate higher assets
and experience wage growth of up to 20 percent over the life cycle.
The second chapter of the dissertation, titled “Housing Demand and Private
Schooling ”, studies the effect of house price increases on the choice to enroll children
in private schools. I exploit cross-city variation in local housing booms during the
2000s, which increased net worth of households and allowed them to borrow using
home equity lines of credit. To establish a causal relationship between the housing
boom and the demand for private schooling, I employ instrumental variables tech-
niques used in the literature studying the effects of the house price boom on different
facets of the economy. Results show that a one standard deviation larger increase in
local housing demand shock of 2000-2006 increased average private school enrollment
iii
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by 18%. However, this increase was counteracted by an equal decline in private school
enrollment during the subsequent housing bust starting in 2007. This indicates that
changes in parental income can have significant effects on the choice of schooling and
that the housing boom of 2000s can potentially have lasting positive effects on the
human capital of the next generation.
In the third chapter, “Positively Aware? Conflicting Expert Reviews and De-
mand for Medical Treatment”, which is joint work with Nicholas Papageorge and
Jorge Balat, we study the impact of expert reviews on the demand for HIV treat-
ments. Reviews are provided by both a doctor and an activist in the HIV lifestyle
magazine Positively Aware, which we merge with detailed panel data on HIV-positive
men’s treatment consumption and health outcomes. To establish a causal relationship
between reviews and demand, we exploit the arrival of new drugs over time, which
provides arguably random variation in reviews of existing drugs. We find that when
doctors and activists agree, more positive reviews increase demand for HIV drugs.
However, doctors and activists frequently disagree, most often over treatments that
are effective but have harsh side effects, in which case they are given low ratings by
the activist but not by the doctor. In such cases, relatively healthy consumers favor
drugs with higher activist reviews, thus defying the doctor, which is consistent with a
distaste for side effects. This pattern reverses for individuals who are in worse health
and thus face stronger incentives to choose more effective medication despite side
effects. Findings suggest that consumers demand information from experts according
iv
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to the trade-offs they face when making health investments in the presence of adverse
treatment side effects.
Primary Reader: Robert A. Moffitt
Secondary Reader: Nicholas W. Papageorge
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CHAPTER 1. DYNAMIC FEMALE LABOR SUPPLY, INVESTMENT IN
CHILDREN AND PRIVATE SCHOOLING
1.1 Introduction
An extensive literature in economics recognizes the importance of early childhood
investments, including schooling, parental time and other goods, in the development of
cognitive and non-cognitive skills.1 One such investment is private schooling. Roughly
11% of all students in the United States (or about 5.4 million children) attend private
school, and much research has examined its impacts, showing positive returns for
students along a number of dimensions.2 However, private schooling is expensive.
While research has focussed on showing considerable returns to private school, the
literature is silent on the fact that it must be paid for. Given the magnitude of costs
(between $5,000 to $40,000 per annum), the private school investment may lead to
shifts in labor supply and savings of parents, particularly mothers, both during private
school, but even before, including prior to a child’s birth. Seen this way, the private
schooling decision constitutes an important additional dimension to the typical time
investment trade-off that mothers face. In particular, mothers must choose between
time investments versus working to afford private schooling investments in an effort
to develop their children’s skills. More broadly, adding this dimension to the mother’s
decision illustrates how policies affecting the provision of schooling can have impacts
not only on children but also on the economic behavior of mothers, even before
children are born.
1See [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]
2See [8] for a comprehensive summary of the literature on the effects of private schooling on child
outcomes.
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In this paper, I build and estimate a dynamic model of female labor supply, sav-
ings and child’s schooling decision to study the role of private schooling in shaping
women’s career path and asset accumulation. The effect of private schooling on fe-
male labor supply is theoretically ambiguous and depends on the interaction between
woman’s observed characteristics such as education and household resources, her un-
observed characteristics such as preferences and productivity at home and in the labor
market, and the cost of private schooling. To empirically investigate this theoretical
ambiguity, the structural model captures the following key features. First, it incorpo-
rates private schooling choice for the child into a framework linking child-related costs
to female’s career trajectories ([9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]). By incorporating private
schooling into the mother’s decision problem, I explicitly account for the trade-off
between working to afford high tuition and spending time with the child, that also
increases child ability. Second, the model incorporates risk-aversion and savings to
capture how forward-looking mothers can plan for child’s schooling in advance and
smooth their consumption after childbirth when the value of mothers’ time at home
is higher. Third, the structural model characterizes selection by allowing for per-
manent unobserved heterogeneity to affect child’s schooling choice as well as all the
endogenous decisions in the model.
In studying how female labor supply links to private schooling, this paper con-
tributes to two main literatures. The first one is on parental investment and child
3
CHAPTER 1. DYNAMIC FEMALE LABOR SUPPLY, INVESTMENT IN
CHILDREN AND PRIVATE SCHOOLING
development [16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22].3 One area receiving considerable attention
is daycare for the child. The literature has generally found negative effects on child
development of mothers increasing their labor supply [23, 24, 25, 26, 27]. This effect
presumably arises because of low quality child care outweighing any reductions in
maternal time investments but increases in goods investments. However, the existing
analysis leaves out a critical dimension of investment in children: the quality of mon-
etary investments. I add to this literature in two significant ways. First, I add private
schooling choice for the child in the mother’s optimization problem, which allows me
to examine the role of different qualities of investments. Second, I cast this deci-
sion in a dynamic setting which endogenizes female’s time allocation choice, human
capital accumulation, wages and savings decision. The setting allows me to quantify
the career costs of children for mothers who make different choices for their child’s
schooling, and study how preference for private schooling for children manifests itself
in women’s work decisions even before the child starts school.
Second, this paper contributes to the literature on the returns to private schooling,
which finds that private schooling increases the probability of graduating high school
and attending college as well as improve test scores and non-cognitive outcomes [28,
3[16] and [17] are the seminal papers this literature, in which parents can affect child ability
through monetary and time investments. More recent papers jointly estimate parent’s time allocation
decision and child ability production function to address the endogeneity of inputs in child ability.
Joint estimation of mother’s time allocation decision and child ability production function alleviates
concerns about the endogeneity of the work decision. The endogeneity can arise due to two reasons:
(1) women who work more may be systematically different from those who do not work, which may
be correlated with the ability of the child, and (2) mother’s work decision may depend on the child’s
ability itself, in that mothers may compensate a “low ability” child by spending more time with
him, or she may choose to spend more time with a “high ability” child for reinforcement of skills.
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29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35]. These studies only look at the ceteris paribus impact
of private schooling. However, the impact of private schooling does not occur in
isolation. The cost associated with private schooling can affect parental behavior
and other investments. I add to this literature by linking private schooling choice
for the child with the mother’s optimization problem. This allows me to capture
the mechanisms through which private schooling can positively affect child ability,
taking into account not just the direct impact of schooling but also the effect on
investments working through women’s work choices and asset accumulation. This
also means I can tie schooling policies to female decisions even before a child is
born. In particular, the private schooling choice for children can affect mothers’
work decisions even before the child starts school, which will in turn affect monetary
and time investments that mothers make in their children. Moreover, I am able to
capture possible complementarities between inputs into the child ability production
function, that can help explain why some children gain more from private schooling
than others.4
I begin my analysis by presenting descriptive results on who sorts into private
schools, and how the labor supply of women who send their children to private school
differs from public school mothers over the life cycle. Using data from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) and NLSY79 Child and Young Adult
4This paper also adds to the literature on schooling and household decisions, which is not well-
developed, though a few papers look at housing choices and school quality, showing that school
quality affects household decisions in profound ways [36]. In a companion paper, I find that an
increase in parents’ wealth due to increases in house prices leads to a 22% increase in children’s
private school enrollment [37].
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Survey, I show that more educated and high-income women are more likely to choose
private schooling for their children. Additionally, I find that before childbirth, women
who eventually select private schooling for their children work more, both at the
extensive and the intensive margin, compared to public school mothers. However,
this gap reverses after childbirth. Moreover, there is considerable heterogeneity across
education and income groups in how private schooling interacts with labor supply. In
particular, private school mothers with less education and lower levels of non-labor
income work more than public school mothers throughout the child’s life cycle. On
the other hand, women with higher education and non-labor income who send their
child to private school work substantially less than public school mothers of similar
education and income after childbirth.
These data patterns motivate the specification of the dynamic structural model.
The results of the structural estimation show that mother’s time with the child and
private schooling are complements, and that mother’s time is most productive when
the child is less than six years of age. The availability of private schooling leads
to less educated women working more to afford private schooling for their children.
However, due to the complementarity between private schooling and mother’s time
with the child, more educated mothers, who also have high non-labor incomes from
their husbands, are able to drop out of the labor force and increase their time with the
child when the child starts elementary school. Using geographic and time variation
in private school cost, I estimate the price elasticity of private school enrollment to
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be -0.25. Moreover, a one standard deviation decrease in private school costs leads to
incumbent mothers decreasing their work hours by less than 1%. However, mothers
who select private schooling after the price decrease switch from part-time to full-time
work to afford the private school tuition.
Finally, I conduct policy simulations to assess the impact of policies that subsidize
private schooling. Most of the studies evaluating vouchers have focussed on its impact
on student achievement. In contrast, my model allows me to study how subsidizing
private school affects women’s career paths and asset accumulation. I study two
subsidy schemes. First, I simulate the impact of a subsidy with an asset test to
explore if credit constraints affect investments in children’s schooling.5 Subsidizing
private schooling for women with low assets increases private school enrollment, and
allows credit constrained women to afford private schooling for their child. However,
the effect on labor supply differs for incumbents and new entrants.6 The subsidy acts
as a work disincentive for incumbents, who reduce their work hours and see wage
losses of 30% over the life cycle, while new entrants increase their labor supply to
afford subsidized private schooling, which results in wage gains of 2%. Next, I give
targeted subsidies of 25% to different education groups.7 Results show that after
the subsidy, less educated women switch from unemployment or part-time work to
full-time work to afford the subsidized private schooling. Children of these women
5See [38] for a review of the importance of credit constraints on human capital accumulation.
6I define incumbents as mothers who were already selecting private school and new entrants as
mothers who choose private school after the subsidy
7A 25% subsidy amounts to a one standard deviation decrease in private school costs.
7
CHAPTER 1. DYNAMIC FEMALE LABOR SUPPLY, INVESTMENT IN
CHILDREN AND PRIVATE SCHOOLING
see large gains in ability, and as a result of human capital accumulation over the life
cycle, these women see wage gains of up to 20%. The higher wage income also allows
these women to accumulate higher assets over the life cycle. These results show that
targeted re-distributional policies can reduce inequality in children’s outcomes, and
can help women at the margin in the labor market.
1.2 Background, Data, and Descriptive Ev-
idence
In this section, I give a brief background of private schooling in the US and present
a simple two-period model to discuss the theoretical implications of the availability
of private schooling on female labor supply and savings. I then introduce the data set
used in the analysis and show how child’s schooling choice interacts with maternal
labor supply and asset holdings.
1.2.1 Private Schooling in the US
Data from the National Center for Education Statistics shows that private school
enrollment in the United States has been fairly constant over the last decade 10%,
which translates to 5.4 million children. Private schools constitute 25% of all US
schools (30,861 schools in 2011-2012 school year). Within grades, a higher percentage
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of students are enrolled in private schools offering Pre-K through grade 8 (12.8%)
than in schools offering grades 9 through 12 (8.0%). Private schools are also a more
popular choice in the Northeast, where 14% of all enrolled students went to private
school, as compared to the West, where only 8.0% of all enrolled students went to
private school in 2011-12. Most private school students (79%) attend religiously-
affiliated schools. While private school enrollment has not changed dramatically in
the past decade, private school costs have risen substantially. Figure B.1 shows how
the national average inflation-adjusted tuition has been evolving over the years for
different types of private schools. The average tuition across all grades was $6,820
in the 1999-2000 school year and $10,940 in the 2011-2012 school year, which is an
increase of around 60% in a little more than a decade. The bar chart also shows that
the average tuition charged for all types of school has been increasing over the years,
with the steepest rise for non-sectarian private schools. Schools associated with a
religious congregation charge, on average, less than non-sectarian private schools. In
the 2011-2012 school year, the cost of Catholic schooling was $7,020, as compared
with $21,910 for non-sectarian private schools. These figures show that private schools
are charging a non-trivial amount and that these costs have been rising at a higher
rate than inflation in the past decade.
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1.2.2 Theoretical Framework
In Appendix A.1, I present a simple stylized model of the effect of private schooling
on maternal labor supply, savings and child outcomes which illustrates the trade-off
women face between working and spending time with the child, and how that is af-
fected by the availability and cost of private schooling. Theoretically, the introduction
of private schooling into an environment where private schooling is not available as
an option for child’s schooling can lead to two possible labor supply responses from
mothers. Mothers who choose to send their children to private school have to fund the
additional cost of schooling, which would result in an increase in their labor supply.
However, we could observe a decrease in mother’s labor supply after the introduction
of private schools if mother’s time with the child and private school are complements,
and if the marginal disutility from lower consumption is less than the marginal utility
from higher child ability when the child goes to private school.
The trade-off women face can be expressed as follows: mothers will choose to
work full-time and send their children to private school over not working and sending
their children to public school if the marginal utility from the change in consumption
– which includes monetary investments in the child – is greater than the marginal
utility from the change in child ability. Simply put, the mother is more likely to
increase her labor supply and select private schooling for the child if private school
quality is considerably better than that in public school, so that the better school
quality is enough to compensate for low maternal time investments. The female’s
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time allocation decision also depends on the productivity of her time with the child.
If mother’s time with the child is not very productive, so that the drop in child ability
is not large when the mother increases her labor supply, then the likelihood of working
and selecting private school for the child would be higher. This effect is likely to be
different for different women – for example, if we assume that mother’s time with the
child may be less productive for less educated females, we would expect to see these
women work more when they send their child to private school, since the opportunity
cost of staying at home for them is the highest (loss of wage earnings without a
comparable boost in child ability). On the other hand, more educated mothers, who
may be more productive at home with their child, might be more likely to stay at
home with the child as the drop in child ability due to the mother spending less time
with the child will be higher.
As for the the causal effect of a decrease private school fee, theoretically, a decrease
in private school fee would unambiguously increase private school enrollment. How-
ever, the effect on maternal labor supply is different for incumbent mothers (mothers
who were already selecting private schooling) and new entrants (mothers who select
private schooling after the fee decrease). For incumbents, a decrease in school fee
should unambiguously result in a decrease in labor supply. However, the effect on
labor supply of new entrants is again theoretically ambiguous. These mothers will
increase their labor supply if the marginal utility from higher child ability (due to
the child attending good quality private school) is enough to compensate for the
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marginal disutility from lower net consumption. The direction of labor supply for
new entrants will therefore depend on the magnitude of the fee decrease, as well as
the complementarity between their time with the child and private schooling.
1.2.3 Private School and Maternal Labor Supply
I conduct a life cycle analysis with panel data to understand how mother’s work
decisions respond to child’s school choice. The descriptive analysis reveals three key
facts. First, we learn that women who send their children to private school are
more educated and wealthier than women who send their children to public school.
Second, I find that prior to childbirth, women who eventually select private school for
their children work more, both at the extensive and the intensive margin, compared
to public school mothers. However, a new and unexpected empirical fact is that
this gap reverses after childbirth. Third, there is considerable heterogeneity across
education and income groups in how private schooling interacts with labor supply.
Low income and less educated mothers who send their children to private school
work more throughout the life cycle, but for all other income and education groups,
private school mothers work more in the years prior to their child’s birth, but work
substantially less than public school mothers after the child is born and starts school.
For my descriptive analysis, I use data from two main sources: NLSY79 and
NLSY79 Child and Young Adult, and supplement it with time use data from the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and private school fee data from privateschoolreview.com.
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Details on the variables constructed from the various data sources are presented in
Appendix A.2. I restrict my sample to ever married women in NLSY79.8 I match the
mothers in NLSY79 Child and Young Adult survey with the female respondents in
NLSY79, so that my sample consists of all women in NLSY79 who have a child. I drop
observations for which child’s year of birth and schooling choice are not available, and
only follow women after 18 years of age. The unit of analysis is a mother-child pair
followed over time, and my sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 3,610 unique
child-mother observations, 2,208 unique mother observations, and 76,143 total child-
mother-year observations.9 I am also able to extract demographic and labor market
information about the females’ spouses. Since NLSY79 does not have information
on what type of private school the child goes to, the private school variable includes
Catholic schools, schools with other religious affiliations, as well as non-sectarian pri-
vate schools.10 Out of the 3,610 children in the sample, 770 (21.3%) go to private
school.
Summary statistics presented in Table B.1 show how private school mothers are
observationally different from public school mothers. A higher proportion of mothers
who send their children to private school are white and reside in urban areas. Private
school mothers are also composed of more Roman catholics than public school moth-
8I drop cohabiting mothers from the sample. There are 545 single or cohabiting mothers in the
sample, which constitutes 12.4% of total mothers.
9I treat children born to the same mother independent of their siblings.
10For my analysis, I construct a dummy variable P ∈ {0, 1}, which takes the value 1 if the female’s
child goes to private school and 0 otherwise. See Appendix A.2 for a detailed description of how
this variable is constructed.
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ers. As expected, mothers of private school going children are more educated, earn
more wage and salary income and have more annual non-labor income at their dis-
posal, with average non-labor income for private school mothers being approximately
1.7 times that of public school mothers.11 These women also hold higher assets, as net
worth of families with children going to private schools is approximately 2 times that
of public school families. In Figure A.2, I plot the real net worth, defined as assets net
of debt of the household, separately for mothers who send their children to private
and public school. Consistent with the summary statistics, I find that throughout
the child’s life cycle, private school mothers have higher net worth than public school
mothers. This reflects the difference in the savings and asset accumulation behavior of
the two groups of women. There is also some evidence of positive assortative mating
among private school parents, since spouse’s annual earnings are higher, on average,
for private school mothers.12 The key variables of interest is mothers’ employment
rates and work hours. On average, private school mothers work more hours annually
than public school mothers, an effect not being driven solely by a few women working
more, since the annual employment rate of the former is 2% higher as well. Breaking
up employment into full time and part time work reveals that 45% of private school
mothers work full time, while in comparison, 43% of public school mothers work full
time. Lastly, the standardized PPVT, PIAT-M and PIAT-R scores, as well as the
11Non-labor income is constructed by subtracting female’s annual real wage income from annual
real net family income.
12See [39] for a description of trends in private elementary school enrollment by family income
from 1968-2013.
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composite Test Score is higher for children who go to private schools.13
I study the direction of correlation between private school choice and labor supply
of women in exploratory regressions presented in Table A.2. First, in Table A.2,
Column (1) I report the predictors of private schooling. The probability of choosing
private school for the child increases with mother’s age, education level and non-labor
income, but goes down with child age. Hispanic and white women are also more likely
to choose private school for their children, as compared to African American women,
with a higher proportion of white women choosing private schooling than hispanic
women. Consistent with previous research [40], I also find that women who report
some religion have a higher probability of choosing private school. Columns (2) and
(5) show how annual hours and the probability of being employed are affected by
key demographic variables. Annual hours worked and employment increase at a
decreasing rate with age, and increase with female’s education level. Married women
and women with higher non-labor income work less hours annually, and both the
extensive and intensive margin labor supply response also decreases with number
of children in the household. All women who report a religion, other than Jewish
women, work more hours annually. In Columns (3) and (6), I add the private school
dummy as a regressor in the labor supply regressions and find that private schooling
negatively impacts mothers’ labor supply, both at the extensive and the intensive
margin, even after controlling for demographic variables. Note that this is opposite
13The composite test score for each child is calculated by averaging the test scores available for
each child. This ensures that I don’t lose observations due to missing values of either test for any
child.
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in sign to the raw differences in annual hours worked and employment rates of private
and public school mothers.
The regression results seem to suggest that women who choose private schooling
for their children work less than public school mothers. However, labor supply pat-
terns of females may differ over the life cycle because the value of female’s time at
home varies around childbirth, and as child starts school. Before the child is born,
the opportunity cost of working is just foregone leisure. After childbirth, we would
expect the mother’s labor supply to drop due to two possible reasons: (1) there is
an additional opportunity cost of working due to daycare costs, and (2) mother’s
time input directly impacts child ability, due to which mothers may decrease labor
supply and spend time with the child. Once the child starts school, mother’s time
input is not as important to the child’s development process, and school costs may
drive up labor supply. Alternatively, mother’s time and child’s school quality may
be complements, in which case mothers may decrease labor supply so that they can
spend more time with their child to help with homework etc.
To see how labor supply patterns of private and public school mothers evolve, I
estimate life cycle profiles of women who send their children to the two different types
of schools over the age of the child.14 In particular, I compare employment rates and
average annual work hours of mothers over three phases of the life cycle: (i) till up to
6 years before childbirth, (ii) after childbirth but before child starts school and (iii)
14I run a kernel-weighted local polynomial regression of the dependent variable on child’s age, and
then present a non-parametric graph of the smoothed values.
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after child starts school till age 12. Figures A.3 (a) and (b) plot employment rate
and annual hours worked.15 A higher percentage of mothers who send their children
to private schools are employed 6 years before childbirth, with the employment gap
between private and public school mothers around 7 percent. However, employment
rate declines sharply around two years before childbirth, reaching the lowest point
one and a half years after birth.16 The gap between the employment rates for public
and private school mothers then reverses when the child is approximately one and
half years old. While employment rate for both groups of women is increasing, the
increase is much steeper for public school mothers. Similarly, at the intensive margin,
private school mothers work 400 hours more than public school mothers 6 years before
birth, with the gap reversing when the child is approximately a year and a half.
These patterns suggest that there are dynamic interactions between private school-
ing and maternal labor supply. However, it is possible that observed differences in
labor supply of private and public school mothers can be explained by selection on
observables, notably, differences in education and non-labor income. Figures A.4 and
A.5 present a comparison of hours worked by the two groups of women belonging to
four education and non-labor income groups.17 I find that high school dropouts who
15To formalize all results presented in the graphs, I also conduct a regression analysis that is
presented in Appendix A.3.
16The drop in employment rates before childbirth may be explained by timing of marriage; when
females get married, they quit work or reduce hours of work. The sample includes mothers with
multiple births, so labor supply patterns will be affected by the number of children and spacing
between births.
17I divide non-labor income into four quartiles. In my sample, non-labor income is distributed as
follows: Quantile 1: ≤ $6,207, Quantile 2: Between $6,208 and $21,384, Quantile 3: Between 21,385
and $36,731, and Quantile 4: Between $36,732 and $1,167,736.
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eventually send their children to private school work more than public school mothers
with the same level of education before and after child birth. Similarly, among women
whose non-labor income belongs to the bottom quartile of the distribution, private
school mothers work more than public school mothers throughout the life cycle. For
all other education and non-labor income groups, private school mothers are work-
ing more six years before the child is born, but work substantially less than public
school mothers after the child is born and starts going to school. In particular, college
graduates who send their children to private school drop their labor supply the most
after child birth, particularly after the child starts school. This is informative about
the trade-offs women with different levels of education face. For more educated and
high income women, the value of female’s time at home is higher, and is apparently
higher for private school mothers after childbirth. This, coupled with the fact that
these women have higher household income means that they can decrease their labor
supply after childbirth and still afford expensive schooling for their children. For less
educated and low income mothers who choose private schooling for their child, the
marginal returns from working and affording private schooling for the child must be
higher than the marginal returns from spending time at home.
Note that the observed choices different women make in the data could be due to
differences in the budget constraint variables (wages, non-labor income, and school
fee), differences in initial child ability, the child ability production function or a dif-
ference in preferences. To disentangle these channels and empirically investigate the
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effect of private schooling on women’s career trajectories, I build a dynamic structural
model in the next section which takes as ingredients the key lessons we learn from the
descriptive analysis. In particular, the model allows for dynamics through asset and
human capital accumulation, characterizes selection on observable and unobservable
characteristics of the mother, and incorporates child’s schooling decision in a standard
life cycle model of female labor supply.
1.3 Dynamic Structural Model
I now present a dynamic structural model of female labor supply, savings and
private school choice to empirically investigate the effect of the availability of private
schooling on child ability and female life cycle outcomes. The model follows the spirit
of standard structural models of female labor supply as in [41, 42, 43, 44, 13, 45].
As in these papers, I take women’s fertility decisions to be exogenous. The novel
ingredient in my framework is the introduction of child’s schooling choice in the
woman’s problem. This allows me to capture the trade-off women face between
working more to afford monetary investments in their children, or spending more
time with the child. Additionally, it explicitly implements risk aversion and savings,
thus taking into account the trade-off between building up assets before childbirth and
take time off from work after childbirth. The key benefit of estimating the parameters
of the structural model are that the model can be used to conduct counterfactual
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experiments that can be used to inform policy about private school subsidies and its
effect on female labor supply and savings.
1.3.1 The Set-Up
The unit of analysis in the model is a single mother and child pair. However, to
allow for the fact that women have more than one child, I allow for an exogenous
process for fertility and let the number of children affect woman’s utility and budget
constraint. The model begins six years before the birth of a child and ends when the
child finishes high school i.e. eighteen periods after childbirth. Time is discrete, with
each period representing one year, so that I follow women for twenty-five periods.
Entry into and exit out of marriage, and fertility are exogenous, as is husband’s labor
supply. In each period before childbirth, females choose consumption (and savings)
and labor supply. If the woman works, she has to send her child to a daycare.
In the sixth period, the females have a child, who is born with initial ability k0,
and child ability enters the female’s utility function. In the initial five years of the
child’s life the child ability production function only takes in mother’s time and goods
investment as inputs. Five years after childbirth (in the twelfth period) mothers decide
between private and public schooling for their child. Following that, the child ability
production function takes as inputs mother’s time, goods investment and schooling.
Note that before childbirth females only have to allocate time between work and
leisure, but after the birth of a child mother’s time is allocated between work, leisure
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and time with the child. As in the descriptive analysis, I label the time periods before
childbirth as phase 1, periods 6 till 11 as phase 2, and the time after child starts school
as phase 3.
1.3.2 Choice Set
From periods 1 till 6, females make decisions about how much to consume (c ≥ 0)
and how to allocate time between work (hit) and leisure (lit). After childbirth, mothers
allocate time between work, leisure and time with the child (τit). If the woman works
when a child is present, she sends her child to daycare, which costs $cch per hour.
In the twelfth period, five years after childbirth, in addition to the consumption and
time allocation decisions, mothers make a decision about child’s schooling, sit, and
chooses between private (sit = 1) or public school (sit = 0). Private and public
schooling differ not just in terms of their price, but also in terms of their quality,
which directly affects child ability. In each subsequent period, females continue to
make consumption, time allocation and schooling choices.
In particular, the work alternatives for the female dhit ∈ Ch are defined as:
dhit =

0 if hit = 0 hours
1 if hit = 1040 hours
2 if hit = 2080 hours
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where dhit is an indicator variable for hours worked. Before childbirth, the female’s
time allocation choices must satisfy the following constraint:
hit + lit = H̄ ≡ 2080 (1.1)
After childbirth, the female’s time constraint is given by:
hit + lit + τit = H̄ ≡ 2080 (1.2)
The mother now chooses her time at work, and the time spent with the child, for a
total of 6 feasible time allocation choices:
dhit =

0 if hit = 0 hours, τit = 0 hours
1 if hit = 1040 hours, τit = 0 hours
2 if hit = 2080 hours, τit = 0 hours
3 if hit = 0 hours, τit = 1040 hours
4 if hit = 1040 hours, τit = 1040 hours
5 if hit = 0 hours, τit = 2080 hours
In order to make the choice set entirely discrete, I discretize the net savings choice
dait ∈ Ca so that the woman chooses one of 10 discrete alternatives ∆ait+1 = Ait+1 −
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(1 + r)Ait = {∆a, . . . ,∆a} [46].18 Finally, dsit ∈ Cs is an indicator variable for the
child’s schooling choice which is 1 when child goes to private school, and 0 otherwise.
The choice set C in each period is constructed by the Cartesian product of the set
of discrete alternatives (Ch × Ca in phases 1 and 2, and Ch × Ca × Cs in phase 3).
This means that the woman has 30 choices in phase 1, 60 choices in phase 2, and 120
choices in phase 3.
1.3.3 State Space
At the start of each period, agents take as given the variables that form their state
space. For ease of writing the value functions, I define three state vectors, one for











where Ait is the asset stock available at the start of the period, Hit is the stock of
human capital up till period t, and nkit is the number of children at period t. The
state space vector also includes time-invariant unobserved type, a vector of iid shocks
to preferences affecting female’s decisions, collected in Ψ, and shocks to the female’s
wage and husband’s earnings process, ξit and ξ
h
it.
In the second phase of the life cycle, child ability enters the utility function so
18I set ∆a = −$5, 000 and ∆a = $20, 000 and evenly distribute the rest of the net savings
alternatives between these extremes. Through her choice of net savings, the woman also decides her
consumption level in period t.
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that the state vector during this phase is defined as:
Ω2it =
{
Ait, Hit, kit, n
k





where kit is child cognitive ability in period t and ηit is an iid shock to child ability.
In the third phase, schooling choice also enters the optimization problem, and
private school fee pit is added to the state space:
Ω3it =
{
Ait, Hit, kit, n
k





See Table A.3 for a list of all state space variables in the three phases.
1.3.4 Preferences
I assume that utility is intertemporally separable, and that per period utility
defines the woman’s preferences over lit, cit, kit and sit, given her information set at
time period t, Iit. The woman’s instantaneous utility is given by:












+ f s(Xit, µi)1{at ≥ 5}1{sit = 1}
(1.6)
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Instantaneous utility is separable between consumption and leisure. The equivalence
scale for consumption is given by eit, which depends on the age and number of children
in the household. I use the McClements scale to determine e [11].19 The utility from
consumption has an augmented CRRA form, with the constant relative risk-aversion
parameter given by 1− α1, while f c reflects how the marginal utility of consumption
is affected by differences in observable and unobservable characteristics of the females
[46, 11, 15, 45]. Specifically, the function is defined as



















where at is child’s age at time period t, e represents the education group the female
belongs to, with e = 1 if the woman is a high school dropout, e = 2 if she finished high
school, and e = 3 for some college or above, and nkit is the number of children individ-
ual i has at time t. Permanent unobserved heterogeneity enters the model through
woman’s latent type µ ∈ {1, . . . , L}, and captures individual’s preference for leisure
and saving.20 The second component of instantaneous utility represents the utility
from leisure. The function fh represents how the marginal utility of leisure/marginal
19According to the McClements scale, a childless couple is equivalent to 1.67 adults. A couple
with one child is equivalent to 1.9 adults if the child is under the age of 3, to 2 adults if the child is
between 3 and 7, 2.07 adults if the child is between 8 and 12, and 2.2 adults if the child is between
13 and 18.
20The latent type affecting the marginal utility from consumption, leisure and private schooling
essentially captures the correlation between unobserved preferences and labor market skill.
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disutility of working changes with female’s observed and unobserved characteristics.


















1{µi = l}+ εhit,
(1.8)
where εhit ∼ N (0, σ2εl) is an iid preference shock for the relevant time allocation de-
cision. The third component of instantaneous utility is child’s cognitive ability, kt.
Note that child’s cognitive ability enters the utility function only after the child is
born i.e. when child’s age is non-negative. The mother gets utility from child ability
according to a CRRA function with parameter λ, while fkt captures differences in
the marginal utility from child ability due to differences in mother’s observed and
unobserved characteristics [23]. In particular,



















where mit is the female’s marital status with mit = 1 if she is married and 0 other-
wise. Finally, I introduce heterogeneity in the utility from private schooling through
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f s(Xit, µi, ε
s
it), which is specified as:









1{educ = e}+ γs2nkit + γs3l
L∑
l=1
1{µi = l}+ εsit, (1.10)
where εsit ∼ N (0, σ2εs) is an iid preference shock for private schooling.
1.3.5 Child’s Cognitive Ability
I assume that a child is born with initial ability endowment of k0, which is a








1{educ = e}+ γk02 race + γk3l0
L∑
l=1
1{µi = l}, (1.11)
where child ability endowment is affected by mother’s unobserved type, µi, as well as
observed characteristics such as education and race.
Given the initial ability endowment of the child, I can now define the cognitive
ability production function, which is a function of child ability stock till last period,
mother’s time with the child, goods inputs and schooling. I assume a modified translog
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for the child ability production function [47], specified as:
ln kit+1 = β0 + β1 ln kit + β2(Xit, µi) ln τit + β3 lnGit
+ 1{akt ≥ 6}β4sit + β5(ln kit × ln τit) + β6(ln kit × lnGit)
+ β7(ln τit × lnGit) + 1{akt ≥ 6}
(
β8(ln kit × sit) + β9(ln τit × sit)
























In equation (1.12), kt is the child ability stock at time t, τit is mother’s time investment
in period t and Git is the goods investment by parents. Since goods investment is not
observed in the data or modeled as a choice, I assume that Git is a fixed proportion
αG of family income (woman’s wage income plus husband’s income if married) which
is estimated within the model. After five years of age, the child starts school and
a dummy for private schooling is added to the production function as an input.
The interaction terms between sit, Git and τit capture static complementarity i.e.
returns to current investments should depend on other investments. By modeling
the interaction between maternal investments and private schooling, I am also able
to show how the effect of private schooling on student achievement found in the
28
CHAPTER 1. DYNAMIC FEMALE LABOR SUPPLY, INVESTMENT IN
CHILDREN AND PRIVATE SCHOOLING
literature work through mechanisms involving women’s labor supply. The technology
of child ability production also exhibits dynamic complementarity, which suggests
that returns to current investment depend on ln kit−1. β0 is a total factor productivity
parameter and ηit ∼ N (0, σ2η) is a time-varying idiosyncratic shock to ability that is
realized after the woman has made all her decisions. I allow the coefficient on ln τit to
be a function of female’s observed and unobserved characteristics, which means that
the productivity of mother’s time with the child varies across females. The function
β2(Xit, µi) is specified in equation (1.13) and shows that mother’s productivity with
the child depends on her latent type, her education level, child’s age, number of
children and marital status.
1.3.6 Number of Children
Fertility is treated as an exogenous process in the model, with one child entering
deterministically in period 6. The other children in the household can enter the
household at any time, and the transition in the number of children is modeled to
match the dynamics in the data. To limit the size of the state space I cap the
total number of children a woman can have to 2 (including the child that enters
deterministically). The transition in the number of other children is specified as
follows:
P (nkit+1 = 1|nkit = 0) =
exp(δn0 + δ
n
1 ageit + δ
n




e=2 1{educ = e}+ δn4mit)
1 + exp(δn0 + δ
n
1 ageit + δ
n




e=2 1{educ = e}+ δn4mit)
, (1.14)
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where the probability of having a child in the next period is a function of the woman’s
age, marital status, education and race.
1.3.7 Marriage and Divorce
The probability of marriage in each period is a function of the woman’s demo-
graphics X̃it which includes the woman’s age, race, education and child’s age and is
defined as:
P (mit = 1|mit−1 = 0) =
exp(δm0 + δ
m
1 (ageit) + δ
m




e=2 1{educ = e}+ δm4 1{at > 6})
1 + exp(δm0 + δ
m
1 (ageit) + δ
m




e=2 1{educ = e}+ δm4 1{at > 6})
,
(1.15)
Conditional on being married, the probability of divorce is given by:









e=2 1{educ = e}+ δd41{at > 6})












The female maximizes her utility subject to a budget constraint that keeps evolv-
ing over the three phases of the woman’s life cycle. The budget constraint can be
described in terms of the following asset evolution equation:
Ait+1 = (1 + r)Ait + hitwit +mit(earn
h
it × 52)− cit − CCknkit




− 1{sit = 1}p
(1.17)
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cit ≥ c (1.18)
Ait+1 ≥ b (1.19)
where At is the accumulated savings from last period, r is the risk-free interest rate,
wit is the wage rate of the woman, while earn
h
it denotes husband’s weekly earnings.
Equation 1.18 imposes the borrowing constraint which requires assets to stay above
a non-positive number, b, every period. The woman incurs childcare costs after
childbirth and before child starts school. cch is the hourly childcare rate, so that her
total childcare cost depends on total hours worked in the year. CCk is the annual
cost associated with other children in the household and includes goods investment,
schooling costs (if any), as well as psychic costs.21 Finally, p is private school fee,
which is incurred only if the child goes to private school. I also assume that there




it) is feasible only if
household consumption is above c.
The woman’s wage process can defined as an exponential function of the woman’s
ability, work status (part-time versus full-time), age, race, education and experience
21Since I do not have data on expenditure on children, or have data on schooling for every sibling,
I am allowing for number of children to affect the budget constraint faced by the woman without
explicitly modeling the school choice for each child. The current model explicitly models only one
child and sidesteps the issue of mother’s time allocation and schooling decisions for multiple children
in the same household. The time the mother decides to spend with a child, and the type of school the
child goes to, can be affected by the presence of other siblings in the household, which is captured by
adding the number of children as utility and productivity shifters in the current model. A natural
extension of the above model would be to model fertility and time allocation and schooling decisions
across each child in a family explicitly.
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1{educ = e}+ γw2 racei + γw3 ln(Hit + 1)it







1{µi = l}+ ξit, ξit ∼ N (0, σ2ξ )
(1.20)
Hit = Hit−1 + hit (1.21)
where Hit is the accumulated stock of experience and ξit is an iid shock to log wages.
γw3 and γ
w
4 captures the returns to experience, γ
w
7 reflects the impact of female’s
innate skill on her wage earnings and γw4 captures differences in wage due to racial
discrimination. The experience accumulation process is defined in equation (1.21).
I model the husbands’ weekly earnings, earnhit as an exogenous process that cap-
tures both their labor supply and wages. I assume that husband’s earnings depends
on the wife’s observed and unobserved characteristics, as in [15], [10] and [43]. This
allows me to keep the state space small, yet also capture the essential ingredients of
a model with marriage market, which would predict positive assortative mating and








1{educ = e}+ γy
h











1{µi = l}+ ξhit, ξhit ∼ N (0, σ2ξh)
(1.22)
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2 capture assortative mating on woman’s education and race, γ
wh
3
captures assortative mating on unobserved type, t is a time trend, and ξhit is husband’s
earnings shock.
1.3.9 The Woman’s Problem
I can now write down the woman’s maximization problem given her choice set
and preferences. The woman maximizes her expected lifetime utility, starting 6 years
before birth at time period t0, and ending 24 periods later when the child completes
high school. Since the state space changes after childbirth, the woman’s maximization
problem can be written separately for the three phases of the female’s life cycle:
before childbirth, after childbirth and before child starts school, and after child starts
primary schooling. The value function for individual i in period t, before the birth of
the child, can be defined as:
Vt(Ω
1







where β is the discount factor and Et is the expectation operator conditional on
information in period t. The expectation is taken over the vector of preference shocks,
Ψit+1, future wage and earnings shocks ξit+1 and ξ
f
it+1, and shocks to child ability ηit.
22
In the sixth period, the child is born, and the woman’s state space changes to Ω̃it as
22All preference shocks follow Normal distribution with mean 0.
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child ability enters her utility function. The value function for individual i in period











Finally, in period 11, the female has to make a choice about child’s schooling, so that
from period 11 till the terminal period, she has to make three choices: cit, hit and sit.
Formally, the value function after period 11 can be written as:
Vt(Ω
3







The model ends when the child leaves high school at age 18, T = 25. The terminal




iT ) = UiT (ciT , hiT , kiT ) + γ
T
1 AiT + γ
T
2 kiT . (1.26)
where γT1 captures the value from accumulated assets in period T and γ
T
2 captures
the utility from child cognition in period T .
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1.3.10 Unobserved Heterogeneity
Permanent unobserved heterogeneity among females, denoted by µ, affects the
utility from leisure, consumption and private schooling as well as returns to work
and time spent with the child. µ captures the persistent heterogeneity that drives
otherwise identical women to persistently behave differently across their choices and
outcomes over time.23 The heterogeneity is modeled as discrete mass points [48],















e=2 1{educ = e})





1.4 Estimation and Results
In this section, I first outline the estimation procedure for the dynamic optimiza-
tion problem, and then present the identification arguments. Next, I discuss the
parameter estimates and show how child’s schooling choice affects life cycle female
labor supply, asset distribution and the evolution of child ability.
23The latent types capture both unobserved differences in productivity and unobserved differences
in preferences.
24I assume that educational attainment of a woman is exogenous conditional on her latent type.
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1.4.1 Estimation Method and Moments
I use a two-step procedure to estimate the parameters of the structural model.
In the first step, I estimate the probability of entry and exit into marriage and the
transition in the number of children using data from NLSY79. In addition, I set the
discount factor to 0.98, the risk-free interest rate to 0.02, and the hourly daycare cost
to the national average obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, $9.77. In the
second step, I estimate the remaining 107 parameters of the model using the Method
of Simulated Moments (MSM). In this approach, the model is solved by backwards
induction (value function iterations) based on an initial set of parameters, and then
simulated for individuals over their life cycle.
In particular, I first estimate the exogenous processes of marriage and fertility from
the data and set the discount factor, interest rate and hourly daycare cost. Given these
parameters and an initial guess of the remaining model parameters, I solve the life
cycle optimization problem of the woman by backward recursion. Backward recursion
entails solving the model as a function of the entire state space for each period. More




at each point on
the state space, which is computationally burdensome. To reduce the computational
burden, I discretize the continuous state variables Ait, Hit, kit and pit and use linear





also requires the calculation of multivariate integrals
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which is done by Monte Carlo integration.25 While discretization makes the state
space finite, it still remains large, making the estimation computationally infeasible.
In order to further reduce the computational burden associated with the iterative
process, I implement a computationally feasible Bayesian approach for solving the
model developed by [50] and [51] that relies on Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
methods.26 The details of the algorithm are presented in Appendix C.3.
After solving the model, I simulate choices for 15,000 women (5 paths for each
mother-child pair in the sample), reproducing the structure of the data, and calculate
moments using the simulated data.27 I then calculate the weighted average distance
between the simulated moments and moments constructed from the sample data.
This iterative process is repeated till the distance is minimized. Formally, let Θ
denote the parameter vector, MS(Θ) denote the vector of moments calculated using
the simulated data and MN denote the vector of moments from the observed data.
Then, the estimated parameter vector Θ̂ solves the following objective function
Θ̂ = arg min
Θ
(MN −MS(Θ))′WN(MN −MS(Θ)), (1.29)
where WN is a positive-definite, symmetric weighting matrix.
25See [49] for details on various methods of obtaining approximate solutions to DDCP in labor
economics.
26The traditional Bayesian approach is typically intractable for dynamic discrete choice problems
[52].
27The estimation sample is a subset of the sample used for the descriptive and reduced form
analysis. To construct the estimation sample for the structural estimation, I only keep mother-child
pairs who I can follow for the entire 25 periods i.e. from six years before childbirth till the child is
18 years of age. This condition leaves me with a total of 3000 mother-child pairs.
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As shown in [53], method of simulated moments yields consistent estimates, though
its finite distance properties depend on the choice of moments, the number of simu-
lations, and the weighting matrix and that conditional dynamic moments are crucial
to identify the parameters of dynamic models such as the one specified in this pa-
per. Therefore, I follow [53] and weight the moments with a diagonal matrix that
contains the inverse of the variances of the observed moments.28 The moments used
for estimation include the proportion of women employed in each time period, across
child schooling groups and woman’s education groups, work experience accumulated
by private and public school mothers, and the proportion of women working full-time
and part-time in each time period. The returns to private schooling parameters are
identified by matching moments on the proportion of women sending their child to
private school at each child age group by women’s education, and the ratio of test
scores of private and public school children. Mother’s time with the child parameters
are identified by matching the proportion of mothers spending full-time, part-time or
no time with their children, for different education and child age groups. Dynamic
moments include transition rates between labor market status by child’s schooling and
phase, the correlation between wage at the start of each phase and an OLS regression
of log wage on past and future wages.
28The vector MN consists of a total of 448 moments that are used to identify 107 parameters.
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1.4.1.1 Initial Conditions and Measurement Error
The initial conditions of the model consist of values of woman’s education, race,
the number of children she has, her state of residence, the level of net assets she holds,
and the experience accumulated at t0, which is six years before the birth of the child.
Values of woman’s education, race, state of residence, experience accumulated and
level of net assets are taken as given in the data. For women whose net assets are
missing six years before childbirth, I draw a value for net assets from the distribution
of real net assets conditional on the woman’s education level.
Data on private school costs faced by women is only available at the state level.
However, due to the availability of financial aid as well as variation within a state in
the sticker price for private schooling, the state level averages are not a good measure
of the actual cost of private schools that mothers face. Therefore, I assume that
tuition data I have is measured with error, so that the true tuition faced by mothers
is given by:
ptrueit = α




it ∼ N (0, σ2p) (1.30)
where αp is the location parameter, βp is the scale parameter and ηp is an iid shock
that follows a Normal distribution with mean 0 and variance σ2p. Any measurement
error in wages and in child ability is assumed to be captured by the idiosyncratic
shocks ξit and ηit.
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1.4.2 Identification
This section discusses sources of identification in the model. The identification of
the parameters of the model rely on a combination of functional form and distribu-
tional assumptions, exclusion restrictions delivered by the structure of the model and
arguably exogenous cross-sectional variation in private school fee.
One source of identification relies on exclusion restrictions delivered by the struc-
ture of the model. The first set of exclusion restrictions require that there must be
at least one variable that enters the selection equations (e.g. work, private school,
consumption), but does not affect the outcome equations (e.g. wages, child ability).
An example is the number of children a woman has, which shifts the marginal utility
from leisure but does not enter the wage equation.29 The second set of exclusion
restriction necessitates that there must be one variable in the outcome equation that
does not affect selection into certain states. In the model, experience, which enters
the wage equation but does not affect the utility from leisure, serves as an example of
the second set of exclusion restrictions. A similar argument can be made for the bud-
get constraint parameters. Experience and race affect wage and husband’s earnings,
therefore affecting the budget constraint and the child ability production function,
but does not affect the marginal utility from consumption, private schooling and child
ability.
The coefficient of relative risk aversion, α1, which determines the curvature of the
29While the number of children the woman has is endogenous, the arrival rate of children is
exogenous.
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utility function and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, is identified through
differences in the net saving-child age profiles of women who are otherwise identical.
I also specify the marginal utility of consumption as an exponential function, that
aids in identification. Similarly, the CRRA parameter for child ability λ is identi-
fied through differences in maternal time investment in their children for women who
have similar observed and unobserved characteristics. To identify the effect of pri-
vate schooling on maternal labor supply and savings, I use cross-sectional variation
in private school fee to instrument for private school enrollment. Figure A.6 plots
the cross-sectional variation in private school fee and shows that, as expected, pri-
vate school enrollment decreases as private school fee increases.30 The identification
argument relies on the assumption that variation in private school fee should affect
private school enrollment but should not be correlated with women’s work decisions
i.e. private school fee should affect female labor supply and savings only through
its affect on private school enrollment. I also use the cross-sectional variation in pri-
vate school fee to help identify λ and the unobserved preference for private schooling.
Suppose two observably identical women are living in different geographic area with
different private school tuition, with one woman living in a high cost area, and the
other living in a low cost area. If the woman living in the high cost area is observed
choosing private schooling yet the woman living in the low cost area does not choose
private schooling for her child, the difference in choices must be driven by difference
30Reduced form results for the effect of private schooling on female labor supply and assets using
private school fee as an instrument for private schooling are available upon request from the author.
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in preferences for private schooling and child ability.
The distribution of latent types and type-specific parameters are identified through
the panel structure of the data. In particular, differences in choices and outcomes of
observationally identical women over time identifies latent types. In order to identify
the proportion of individuals in each latent type, I follow [15] and first regress log
wages on experience and education and compute wage residuals for each individual.
This residual contains information on unobserved skill or ability. I then use the cross-
sectional variance of these wage residuals as a moment. As types cannot be identified
without a normalization, I impose a ranking on the latent types in estimation. I
assume type 1 women have the lowest latent ability endowment while type 3 women
have the highest.
1.4.3 Parameter Estimates
I present estimates for the preference parameters in Table A.4.31 The CRRA
parameter is estimated to be 0.354, which implies that the coefficient of relative risk
aversion is 1 − α1 = 0.65, and the coefficient of relative prudence is 2 − α1 = 1.65
which is in line with other papers in the literature with borrowing constraints ([46];
[54]).32 Estimates also show that higher number of children and having a child greater
31Estimates from the first step of the estimation procedure outlined in Section 3.4 are presented
in Appendix A.4.2. Predicted probabilities based on these estimates are then used as an input for
the second step of the estimation in which the life cycle optimization problem is solved by value
function iterations.
32The literature on the estimation of consumption Euler equation has estimated α1 = −2 [55, 56],
which implies a lower willingness to substitute intertemporally and higher degree of prudence than
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than six years of age increases the marginal utility from consumption. Having more
children also increases the marginal utility from leisure. Estimates for the leisure
preference parameters also show that mothers with older children value leisure more
than mothers with younger children. Lastly, the private school preference parameters
show that women with college degree or more gain 3.5 times as much utility from
choosing private schooling for their child as women with only a high school degree.
Table A.5, panel (a) shows the results for the wage equation. The parameters
for the wage equation are consistent with those reported in the female labor supply
literature. If females have some college, college or graduate degree, they earn approx-
imately 46% higher wages than high school dropouts. Estimates for the polynomial
in experience show that the returns to experience are increasing at a decreasing rate.
Therefore, for a woman with 5 years of full-time experience, the returns to a 1%
increase in experience stock is 0.061%, while the returns to a 1% increase in experi-
ence for a woman with 10 years of full-time experience is 0.062%. This implies that
a woman who has worked full-time for 10 years will be offered a wage that is 6.2%
higher than a woman who has worked part-time for 10 years. The estimates also
show that black women earn 11% lower wages than women of other racial groups,
which could be due to racial discrimination in the labor market or due to unobserved
differences in black women’s skill endowment not captured by the latent type. Panel
that estimated in this paper. [46] rationalize different estimates from the literature by noting that
in models with income uncertainty and no borrowing constraints, a higher degree of prudence is
required to explain why individuals with steep age-earnings profiles do not borrow when they are
young.
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(c) of Table A.5 shows that women cannot borrow more than $41,520, and that they
must maintain at least $164 in consumption. The average cost of additional siblings
in the household (including both monetary and psychic costs) is $3,903 and house-
holds spend 3% of their income on their child, which is in addition to expenditure on
child’s school tuition.
1.4.3.1 Child Ability
The CRRA parameter for child ability is estimated to be 0.49, which is in line with
an estimate of 0.46 presented in [23]. The parameter estimate implies that mothers
get diminishing marginal utility from child ability and therefore have an incentive
to make investments to compensate children born with low ability endowments. The
preference parameters for child ability show that the marginal utility from child ability
is higher when the child is less than six years of age (the first and formative phase of
development), and that more educated mothers value higher child ability more than
mothers who are high school dropouts. The presence of a husband also increases the
marginal utility of children, while having more children decreases the utility from
having a child.
Panel (f) of Table A.4 shows the estimates of the child ability production function.
Estimates show that the net effect of attending private school on child achievement
is positive and depends on lagged ability, mother’s time with the child and the level
of goods investments. In particular, mother’s time and private schooling are com-
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plements, which suggests that mothers may have to spend time with their children
to help them with the private school curriculum. Using the estimates of the child
ability production function, I can calculate the effect of private schooling on twelfth
grade scores, and compare the results to those reported in [29]. On average, mothers
spend no active time with their child when the child is in twelfth grade. Therefore,
using the sample averages of test scores and log family income from [29], the twelfth
grade test score for a child with eleventh grade test score of 53.5 and whose par-
ents have household income of $36, 316 would be 7.8% higher if he attends private
school.33 Increasing goods investment by 1% increases next period ability by 0.99%
while increasing current period ability by 1% increases next period ability by 0.01%.
The interaction terms between ln kt and investments show evidence of dynamic com-
plementarity for mother’s time with the child and private schooling i.e. mother’s
time and private schooling are more productive for higher ability children. However,
lagged cognition and goods investment are substitutes. Table A.4 panel (g) shows
how the productivity of mother’s time is affected by her demographic characteristics.
Mother’s time is 1.9 times more productive when the child is less than six years of age
than when he is older. More educated mothers are also more productive at home, and
the presence of a husband and having siblings also increases mother’s productivity
33This estimate is higher than the effect of private schooling on students’ math scores found in
[29], who find that math scores increase by 1.14 points, which translates to a roughly 2.1% increase.
I find larger effects of private schooling, which can be attributed to the fact that I am not just
focussing on Catholic schools, as in [29], but looking at the overall impact of all types of private
schooling. This suggests that the positive effect of non-sectarian and other religious private schools
is higher than the effect of just Catholic schools.
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with the child. These results imply that mothers would make greater investments
of their own time in producing child quality prior to and concurrent with schooling,
which is consistent with the results reported in [57].34
1.4.3.2 The Role of Unobserved Heterogeneity µ
Latent heterogeneity plays an important role in the model, even after controlling
for a rich set of observable characteristics. I allow for 3 types and impose an ordinal
ranking on the types, ascending from type 1. Estimates imply that more educated
mothers are more likely to be of type 3 while low education negatively predicts the
probability of belonging to the highest type. On the other hand, being a high school
graduate increases the probability of belonging to type 1. In the simulated data 47.1%
of the females belong to type 1 (low type), 26.7% belong to type 2 (medium type)
and 26.2% belong to type 3 (high type). Types differ substantially across various
dimensions. Preference parameters show that the marginal utility from sending their
child to private school is positive for women belonging to the high type and negative
for the low and medium type. Low and medium type women derive the highest
utility from leisure but the lowest utility from higher child ability. Initial ability
endowment of children born to low type women is more than 5 times lower than the
initial endowment of children born to high type women. These differences persist as
child ability evolves since mother’s type also affects her productivity with the child.
34[57] found stronger results for Jewish women, who are more educated, on average, than non-
Jewish women.
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Increasing time with the child positively affects child ability for high type mothers,
but has a negative effect for medium and low type mothers.
Women’s latent type also affects the wage they earn. Estimates for the wage
equation show that women belonging to the high type earn wages that are roughly
80 percent higher than wages earned by type 1 and 48 percent higher than wages
earned by type 2. Husband’s earnings are also affected by the woman’s observed
and unobserved characteristics, and capture positive assortative mating on woman’s
education level and type. The labor market returns for a man married to a low type
woman are higher than a man married to a high and medium type woman, indicating
negative assortative mating on latent type (assuming that men don’t earn lower wages
just because they are married to high type women, but there is in fact a correlation
between the man’s latent type and his wife’s type which is being captured by the
type parameters). Husband’s earnings are also higher for women with a high school
and more than a college degree, and lower for black individuals.
1.4.3.3 Goodness of Fit
I evaluate the model’s ability to reproduce the life cycle wage profile and asset
evolution observed in the data. These moments are not targeted directly in esti-
mation, and provide an informal test of the model’s ability to reproduce key data
patterns from the data. Figure A.7 plots the results. Figure A.7 (a) shows that the
model matches the average life cycle wage profile of women very well qualitatively.
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Quantitatively, the model over-predicts wages in the first five periods. However, the
concave profile of wages over time is well-matched by the model. Figure A.7 (b) shows
asset accumulation over the life cycle in the data and model. The model matches the
overall profile of assets over time very well.
In Table A.16 of Appendix A.4.2, I present results for the within sample fit of the
simulated model to the life-cycle profile of females’ work experience, private school
choice, and the evolution of child ability. Results show that private school enrollment
is slightly overestimated in the model, particularly for ages 6-11, however, the model
does a good job of matching the ratio of private and public school students’ cognition
(as measured by test scores in the data) and the experience profiles of private and
public school mothers. This shows that the model can reproduce key data features
showing relative returns to private schooling and females’ life cycle work decisions by
child’s schooling type.
1.5 Quantifying the Impact of Private School-
ing
I now use the model to assess the impact of private schooling on female labor
supply, asset accumulation, wages and its effect on child ability. I evaluate this
impact by simulating life cycle outcomes under two scenarios. In the first scenario, I
simply use the estimated parameters to simulate life cycle choices and outcomes for
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women and treat that as the baseline. Second, I simulate life cycle outcomes under
the scenario in which preference shocks and all parameters associated with private
schooling are set to zero. Under this scenario, no one chooses private schooling. I
present differences in female’s decisions for the two scenarios along various dimensions
to quantify the impact of private schooling on key life cycle outcomes.
Time Allocation, Assets and Child Ability: Figure A.8 (a) plots the difference
in employment rate over the life cycle between the two scenarios. Private schooling
does not affect female labor supply in phase 1 (before child birth), however, there is a
decrease, on average, in the employment rate of mothers of up to 1.4% when we shut
down the private schooling channel, which suggests that after childbirth, particularly
after the child starts school, private schooling induces women to work more.35 Figure
A.8 (b) shows that the decrease in employment is matched by an increase in the time
mothers spend with their child, particularly at age 6, when the child starts school.
In the absence of the choice to send your child to better quality private schooling,
mothers choose instead to increase their time with the child on average.
As a result of the drop in annual hours worked and because women do not face the
cost of private schooling in the future, thereby eliminating the precautionary saving
motive, women accumulate lower assets over the life cycle, as shown in Figure A.8 (e).
Lastly, Figure A.8 (f) shows how child ability will be affected under the no private
35There is also a decrease in women’s labor supply in phases 2 and 3 at the intensive margin when
the private schooling channel is shut down. Results for the intensive margin are available upon
request.
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schooling scenario. At age 6 and 7, child ability increases by 0.35%, primarily due to
mothers spending more time with the child to compensate for the non-availability of
good quality schooling. However, the positive impact of higher mother’s time fades
away and we observe a drop in child ability of up to approximately 0.2% at age 8
as the child ability is not augmented due to private schooling. Therefore, children
graduate high school at age 18 with 0.1% lower child ability as measured by test
scores, on average, than in a scenario in which private schooling was available.
Wages and Selection: Figure A.8 (e) plots the difference in log hourly wages (con-
ditional on working) in the no private schooling scenario from the baseline scenario.
On average, the hourly wage in the no private schooling scenario are higher than
in the baseline scenario despite the overall decrease in work hours. This is because
differences in wages represent differences in not just hours worked and accumulated
experience, but also in the ability composition of women. Using the model, I can as-
sess the role of private schooling in shaping the ability composition of working women
over the life cycle. This adds to the literature on female labor supply that has evalu-
ated the selection of women into the labor market [58, 59, 60, 61, 15]. Figure A.8 (f)
plots the ratio of high ability (type 3) to low ability (type 1) women, conditional on
working, for the no private school and baseline scenarios. Under the baseline scenario,
at the time the child starts school, high ability women drop out of the labor force,
with the largest drop from periods 9 to 14 (when the child is between 2 and 8 years
of age). Shutting down the private schooling channel induces high ability women to
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rejoin the labor force during this time period, which shows that high ability women
select out of the labor force if they send their child to private schools.36 This selection
of high ability (and education) women into the labor force when the private schooling
channel is shut down also explains the overall increase in the average wage depicted
in Figure A.8 (e).
Heterogeneity across Education: To explore the heterogeneous effect of private
schooling on female’s time allocation and asset accumulation, I plot females’ life cycle
outcomes across different education groups in Figure A.9. Figure A.9 (a) shows how
asset accumulation differs between two scenarios across education groups. When
we shut down private schooling, less educated women have lower net assets, with
substantially larger effects for high school dropouts. On the other hand, women with
some college or above have higher net assets in phase 3. This suggests that less
educated mothers, particularly high school dropouts build up assets in response to
a precautionary saving motive for private schooling. When the precautionary saving
motive is shut down, they increase their consumption and accumulate less savings
over their life cycle. On the other hand, more educated mothers use contemporaneous
household income to pay for expensive private schooling. In the absence of private
schooling, they save the money they were using to fund private schooling for their
child.
The labor supply response by education groups is plotted in Figure A.9 (b). Figure
36Similar plot for college graduates versus high school dropouts is available upon request.
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A.9 (b) shows that high school dropouts experience the biggest drop in employment
rates starting at least two years before the child starts school when private schooling
is shut down. In particular, employment rate of high school dropouts drops by up
to 20% at the age the child starts school. On the other hand, there is an increase of
up to 5% in employment rates of women with some college or above when the child
starts school. These patterns suggest that the gap in labor supply observed before
childbirth in Figures A.3 to A.4 was due to selection. However, after the birth of
a child, and particularly when the child is above three years of age, women change
their labor supply due to the decision to send their child to private schooling in the
future. Consistent with Figure A.4 (a), the biggest drop in labor supply is observed
for less educated women, who earn lower wages and also have lower non-labor income
due to positive assortative mating on education. However, more educated mothers
select out of the labor force when the child starts private primary school, as they
are most productive with their time with the child, and also have higher non-labor
income and savings to be able to afford private schooling. Lastly, Figure A.9 (c)
shows how mothers belonging to different education groups change the amount of
time they spend with their child when private schooling is not available. Mothers
belonging to all education groups increase the amount of time they spend with their
child, particularly when the child reaches school-going age. High school dropouts
increase their time the most, which implies that they need to compensate the most
in terms of time investment for the lack of availability of good quality schooling.
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1.5.1 Causal Effect of a Change in p
I now calculate the causal effect of a change in private school tuition on private
school enrollment as well as female’s lifecycle choices and outcomes. Figure A.10 plots
the elasticity of private school enrollment over different values of tuition. In line with
estimates of private school elasticity in the literature, I estimate the private school
elasticity to be -0.25 [62, 63]. However, using the model, I can calculate elasticity
at different levels of private school fee. Results show that private school enrollment
is more elastic at lower levels of fee, with a 1% increase in school fee leading to up
to a 6% decrease in enrollment. At higher levels of fee, enrollment is less elastic.
This suggests that parents who are sending their children to high cost private schools
attach a higher valuation to private schooling (either due to higher returns or higher
preference for private schooling) and are therefore less responsive to price increases.
Next, I study the impact of private school price decrease on female’s and children’s
outcomes. Table A.6 shows that a 25% decrease in private school fee leads to a
7.7% increase in private school enrollment. The effect on other outcomes differs for
incumbents (mothers who were already sending their children to private school) and
new entrants (mothers who choose private schooling for the child after the price drop).
The price drop pulls in children from the lower end of the ability distribution, who see
large gains in ability once they move to good quality private schooling. New entrant
mothers increase their labor supply as they now have to pay private school tuition.
The increase in work hours translates to a 4% increase in terminal wages due to
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human capital accumulation over the life cycle. Terminal assets of these women also
increase by 83% due to higher wage income. On the other hand, incumbents decrease
their work hours by 1.4%, which leads to an average decrease of 0.1% in their terminal
wages. However, these mothers are able to spend more time with the child, which
leads to an overall increase in child ability of incumbent children. Moreover, due to
the drop in tuition, mothers are able to accumulate higher assets over the life cycle.
In panel (b) of Table A.6, I report changes to life cycle outcomes when price de-
creases by 75%. As a result of the fee decrease, private school enrollment increases by
88%. Child ability increases for both the new entrants and incumbent since children
are enrolled in good quality schools and mothers increase the time the spend with
their children. The generous subsidy results in a decrease in work hours for new en-
trants. However, for incumbent mothers, we observe a 50% drop in hours worked, as
they move from full-time work to part-time work. This leads to a substantial drop in
the wages these women earn, as wages for this group decrease by 2.1%. Interestingly,
terminal assets decrease for both groups of women. For new entrants, the anticipated
fee subsidy diminishes the precautionary saving motive and leads to a 5.2% drop in
accumulated assets. For incumbents, the drop in wage and the decrease in the pre-
cautionary saving motive due to lower school cost risk leads to a drop in terminal
assets of 1.6%.
54
CHAPTER 1. DYNAMIC FEMALE LABOR SUPPLY, INVESTMENT IN
CHILDREN AND PRIVATE SCHOOLING
1.6 Assessing the Impact of Private School
Subsidy
Private school vouchers have been one of the major education priorities of the
new administration. The literature in the economics of education has mixed results
on whether private school vouchers help improve academic achievement. While a
number of studies have found positive effects of vouchers on student achievement [64,
65, 66, 67], recent studies on the Louisiana Scholarship Program have found negative
effects [68, 69].37 However, the literature on private schools has ignored an important
spectrum of subsidizing child’s schooling working through parental labor supply and
asset accumulation. Moreover, policy initiatives such as providing subsidies for private
schooling can have lasting impact on female labor supply and career trajectories.
Insofar as private school subsidies in the form of vouchers will affect the incentive to
work and save for parents, which will in turn affect the resources that parents can
invest in their children, the link between vouchers and maternal labor supply and
savings is an important area of study.
I compare the choices of women facing the baseline private school fee structure in
the data with alternative hypothetical school fee structures that capture different sub-
sidy schemes that can be designed for private schooling. The counterfactual highlights
how changing the cost of private schooling affects not only private school enrollment
37A few papers have studied the political economy of private school vouchers [70, 71].
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and student achievement, but also impacts female labor supply, labor market returns
and asset accumulation. I analyze the effect of different subsidy schemes. First, I
study the effect of subsidy programs which require households to pass an income test
in order to qualify for the subsidy. Next, I analyze how life cycle outcomes are affected
if targeted private school subsidies are given based on mother’s education.
1.6.1 Subsidy with Asset Test
I conduct an experiment in which women get subsidies for private schooling for
their child depending on the level of assets. The asset test requires that assets be
less than 300% of the Federal Poverty Guideline. If households pass the asset test,
they are eligible for a private school voucher capped at $6, 100.38 Results, reported
in Table A.7 show that as a result of the subsidy, average private school enrollment
increased by 56%. Overall terminal child ability increased by 0.3%, with terminal log
ability of new entrants increasing by 1.03% while that of incumbents decreasing by
0.3%. The decrease in terminal log ability of incumbents can be explained by lower
goods investment in children as incumbent mothers decrease their work hours, which
decreases household income. The increase in child ability of new entrants is driven
by access to better quality private schooling, as well as an increase in mother’s active
time with the child. I also find that mothers of new entrants increase their work
hours, on average, by 24% in order to afford the additional cost of private schooling
38The cap is set at the average cost of private schools in the data.
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net of the subsidy, however, due to the lower fee, incumbent mothers eligible for the
subsidy are able to reduce their average annual hours by 21%. This results in terminal
wage gains for mothers of new entrants but terminal wage losses of 30% for incumbent
mothers.
Figure A.11 shows the distribution of assets at the time of child’s entry into private
schooling for the baseline and counterfactual with asset test. As a result of the asset
test, mothers have lower accumulated assets at the time their child enrolls in private
school.39 However, Table A.7 shows that terminal assets, both for mothers of new
entrants and incumbents, is higher than in the baseline. This implies that the subsidy
allows women with low assets to enroll their children in private schools, and due to
the subsidy, these women are able to accumulate more assets over the life cycle, and
hence have higher terminal assets.
1.6.2 Targeted Subsidies to Different Education Groups
Private school subsidies can have heterogenous effects on student achievement and
mothers’ career paths for women belonging to different education groups. To explore
these differences in responses and outcomes, I conduct an experiment in which I give
a 25% subsidy to (a) only high school dropouts, (b) only high school graduates and
(c) only to women with some college or higher. Table A.8 (a) shows that if women
who are high school dropouts are given a subsidy to send their children to private
39The average assets at time of entry for the baseline is $16,467 while the average assets at time
of entry under the counterfactual is $13,401.
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school, overall private school enrollment increases by 3%. Child ability as measured
by test scores goes up by 1.8% on average, and by 287% for new students who enter
private schooling as a result of the subsidy. To afford private schooling, new entrants
switch from unemployment or part-time work to full-time work, leading to an average
113% increase in hours worked. As a result of higher wage income over the life cycle,
these women are also able to accumulate higher assets, with terminal assets 116%
higher than in the baseline, and experience wage growth of 20%. On the other hand,
there is a very small decrease in work hours of incumbent mothers, with no gains in
child ability.
Next, in Table A.8 (b), I show that a 25% subsidy given to mothers with high
school degrees leads to a 5% increase in private school enrollment. Decomposition
analysis reveals that this leads to a 242% increase in child ability of new entrants,
with no gains for incumbent children. New entrant mothers switch from part-time
to full-time work to afford the cost of private school. This increase in work hours
has dynamic effects on wages through the human capital accumulation channel, with
terminal wages for this group of women 18% higher. Due to higher wage income,
these women also accumulate higher assets over the life cycle, with terminal assets
32% higher than in a scenario with no subsidy. In contrast, incumbents mothers
decrease labor supply by 0.4%, with no significant boost to child ability.
Lastly, in Table A.8 (c), I show the effects of a 25% subsidy to women belonging
to the highest education group. A subsidy for this group results in only a 1% increase
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in private school enrollment. Among new entrants, terminal child ability increases by
1.11%, while there is no effect on ability of incumbent children. Due to the subsidy,
new entrant mothers increase their work hours by 12.5%, suggesting that, on average,
these women were at the margin of choosing private schooling for the child and can
afford subsidized private schooling using their non-labor income and a very small
increase in their labor supply. As a result of the subsidy, these women are able to
accumulate higher assets, on average, with terminal assets 0.85% higher than in the
baseline.
In summary, these results suggest that targeted subsidies to different education
groups can substantially help women at the margin. The women who enroll their
children into private schooling after the subsidy had low assets – for example, high
school dropouts who were pulled into private schooling after the subsidy were up to
$10,000 in debt on average. Therefore, these women were not able to make substantial
goods investments in their children. Since the marginal productivity of their time with
their child is low, they switch to working full-time and sending their child to private
school once they are able to afford it after the subsidy. This increase in work hours
positively affects their careers as well, since human capital accumulation over the life
cycle leads to long term wage growth and higher asset accumulation. As expected,
the magnitude of these effects are largest for the lowest education group. On the
other hand, the subsidy acted as a windfall for incumbent mothers, with no returns
in terms of child ability or wage growth for the mothers.
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1.7 Summary and Conclusions
In this paper, I have focussed on the effect of the availability of private schooling
on the trade-off that women face between working more to finance monetary invest-
ments in their children that augment child ability, or spend more time in child care
activities at home. I developed a standard life cycle labor supply and savings model
that allows for investment in children to quantify the role of private schooling in ex-
plaining labor supply and saving patterns of women with children. The results of the
estimation showed that there is considerable observed and unobserved heterogeneity
in who selects private schooling for their child, and that these systematic differences
between individuals can also explain part of the differences in the observed labor
supply patterns and effects of private schooling on child outcomes. For example,
women without college degrees work more and accumulate savings to afford private
schooling, while college educated women decrease their labor supply and spend time
at home with the child if the child attends private school. Estimates of the child
ability function showed that attending private school increases terminal ability by
7.8%, and that mother’s time with the child and private schooling are complements.
I also found that the private school enrollment is more elastic to price changes at
lower levels of fee, and less elastic at higher levels of fee.
These complex interdependencies between female’s work and savings choices and
child’s schooling imply that policies aimed at subsidizing private schooling can have
effects beyond affecting student achievement. I illustrate that subsidizing private
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schooling for low income and low education women can result in large gains in chil-
dren’s outcomes for women at the margin. Moreover, private school subsidies can
increase labor supply of new entrants, leading to long term wage growth. However,
these subsidies act as windfalls for incumbent mothers, without any significant in-
crease in child ability. The analysis in this paper suggests that evaluating policies
only to the extent that they affect student achievement overlooks the impact of such
policies on the entire household. The different subsidy schemes evaluated in the paper
can be useful in designing subsidy programs that not only benefit children but also
have positive impacts on female’s career evolution and asset accumulation. Other
policy reforms that can be evaluated using the model include giving subsidies de-
clining in income. The model can also be used to evaluate which subsidy structure
would maximize gain in child outcomes, holding constant total (new) government
expenditures on subsidies.
This paper highlighted the connection between maternal labor supply and saving
decisions and investment in private schooling. However, due to data constraints, I
was not able to different types of private schools and the variation in their qual-
ity, that would affect not only child ability, but also mothers’ valuation of private
schools. Future research using detailed data that can distinguish between parochial
non-sectarian schools would be more informative about the returns to private school-
ing, and its effect on female labor supply and savings.
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Housing Demand and Private
Schooling
2.1 Introduction
What do we know about private schooling in the US? We know that its widely
used - roughly 11% of all students in the United States (or about 5.4 million children)
attend private school. Much research has examined its impacts, showing positive
returns for students along a number of dimensions [28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35].
However, private schooling is expensive, with costs ranging from $5000 to up to
I would like to acknowledge helpful comments from Robert Moffitt, Ammar Farooq, Manasi
Deshpande and Susan Dynarski. All errors are my own.
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$40,000 per annum. The high cost of private schooling implies that there must exist
a strong correlation between private education and household income. However, it is
difficult to establish a causal link between higher household wealth and investment
in private schooling for the child.
The main challenge faced by researchers in attempting to identify a causal re-
lationship between the two is the endogeneity of income. High-income households
are more likely to be more educated and have higher latent productivity, which may
be correlated with investments in children and preference for private schooling. To
identify a causal link between household wealth and private school enrollment, I ex-
ploit the variation in the magnitude of the housing demand shock across MSAs in
the US in the early 2000s. The identification strategy used in this paper is heavily
influenced by the literature investigating the effects of the housing market boom on
various aspects of the US economy.
Most of the research on this topic has focused on the effects of boom and the
subsequent bust on macroeconomic outcomes such as the marginal propensity to con-
sume and aggregate employment. The first evidence of the wealth effect of the house
price boom and home equity extraction comes from [72], who show that an average
homeowner borrows 25 to 30 cents for every dollar increase in home equity and that
this borrowing is spent on real outlays rather than paying down debt or purchasing
real estate. In a companion paper, [73] show that there is substantial geographical
heterogeneity in the marginal propensity to consume out of housing wealth which can
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explain the heterogeneity in consumption across the same geographical regions.1
A separate literature has investigated how the housing market boom impacted em-
ployment opportunities for the workers living in areas which experienced the housing
market boom. [78] and [79] exploit variation in local housing booms to show that it
increased the employment opportunities for younger men and women and the workers
impacted by the decline of manufacturing jobs. While laid-off manufacturing workers
were able to change their sectors and gain employment in the housing sector, the
boom also increased the opportunity cost of college for younger workers and college
attendance declined in these areas. These papers also introduce a new identification
strategy for analyzing the effects of the housing boom. Using models that identify
sharp structural breaks in local housing prices, they show that the areas that experi-
enced these sharp increases in housing prices had a plausibly exogenous variation in
housing demand driven by speculative activity rather than by changes in the funda-
mentals of the local economy.
In the current paper, I borrow the identification strategy of [79] and [78] and
apply it to the context of private school enrollment. In doing so, this paper also
contributes to the literature that has analyzed the relationship between house prices
and schooling. Typically this literature has focused on the effects of school perfor-
mance and school quality on neighborhood housing valuations [36]. The consensus in
this literature is that housing prices are significantly higher in places where measured
1Other papers in the literature using the geographical variation in the housing boom to analyze
the effects on macroeconomic outcomes include [74], [75], [76] and [77].
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school quality is higher (see [80] and [81] for a comprehensive review of the methods
and results in this literature). Recent papers such as [82] have looked at publicly
available data on value added generated by schools and have reached similar conclu-
sions. None of the papers in this literature have looked at how house price increases
can affect school choice and investment in human capital, which is the focus of the
current paper.
There are two main channels through which a local housing demand shock can
affect parents’ schooling choice for their children. First, an increase in house prices
should mechanically lead to higher property taxes, which are a source of revenue for
local public schools. If higher revenue leads to higher expenditure per pupil and also
translates to better public school quality, then private school enrollment may go down.
On the other hand, increases in house prices may also lead to an increase in private
school enrollment through two different channels. First, increases in house prices can
relax liquidity constraints faced by households by allowing borrowing against higher
home equity. This borrowing can be spent on children’s education. The increase in
household wealth can also lead to an increase in consumption in the absence of home
equity extraction if it changes the marginal propensity to consume [83]. Secondly, an
increase in house prices can stimulate the local economic activity in certain industries
expanding employment opportunities for parents which can lead to higher income
and spending on education including enrolling children in private schools. The net
effect of a housing demand shock on private schooling will, therefore, be theoretically
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ambiguous, and will depend on the magnitude of the wealth effect relative to the
effect of higher house prices on public school quality.
Using data from the Census, American Community Survey and Common Core
Data, I find that a local housing demand shock during the early 2000s led to an in-
crease in average total and current expenditure per pupil at public schools, however,
it did not significantly change any observable measures of public school quality. One
standard deviation larger housing demand shock in an MSA led to an 18% increase
in private school enrollment in the MSA during the housing boom. This is consistent
with results in the literature exploring the impact of housing wealth on college atten-
dance. In the context of the housing boom of the early 2000s, [84] has documented
that each $10,000 increase in housing wealth raised college enrollment by 0.7 percent.
In a follow-up paper, [85], show that variation in house price increases in the hous-
ing boom also impacted the quality of college attended by students. They find that
a $10,000 increase in housing wealth also increases the probability of enrolling in a
public flagship university and the effects are higher in magnitude for lower-income stu-
dents. These papers raised concerns that the subsequent housing bust and the decline
in housing wealth could impact the enrollment in college education and subsequently
the human capital of the next generation.
In my paper, I also explore how the housing bust in 2007 impacted private school
enrollment. The housing bust would impact parents’ schooling choice for their chil-
dren through the same channels as a housing price increase. I find that private school
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enrollment decreased in MSAs that experienced a larger negative housing demand
shock from 2006-2012. In terms of magnitude, a one standard deviation larger hous-
ing demand shock in an MSA led to a 17.4% decrease in private school enrollment
in the MSA during the housing bust. These MSAs were the same MSAs that had
experienced large house price gains over the period 2000-2006, a fact that has already
been established by the existing literature, suggesting that over the entire period of
2000-2012 there were no changes in private school enrollment in these MSAs. This
result is consistent with other research documenting symmetric effects of the hous-
ing boom and bust on different economic outcomes such as consumer spending [73],
employment [74], college choices [78] and labor market outcomes [79].
The results in the paper also highlight the importance of credit constraints in
investment in children. Existing literature has consistently found that credit con-
straints matter in human capital investment decisions [86]. [7] find that a $1,000
increase in income raises combined math and reading test scores by 6 percent of a
standard deviation in the short run. In my paper, I don’t focus on the impact of
household income on student achievement, but do find a significant impact on par-
ents’ school choice. The results in the paper show that increase in household wealth
and income affects parents’ choices regarding children’s schooling. These results show
that relaxing credit constraints can lead to higher private school enrollment, and can
be used to inform the debate on policies that aim to promote school choice.
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2.2 Background, Data, and Descriptive Ev-
idence
This section introduces the data set used in the analysis and presents descriptive
statistics. First, I document national averages in private school enrollment and costs
using data from the National Center for Education Statistics. Next, I present the
various data sources used for the analysis, and show the relationship between the
housing boom during the 2000s and private school enrollment in an MSA.
2.2.1 Private Schooling in the US
Data from the National Center for Education Statistics shows that private school
enrollment in prekindergarten (preK) through grade 12 increased from 5.9 million
students in 1995/96 to 6.3 million in 2001/02, and then declined to 5.4 million in
2013/14. Within grades, a higher percentage of students are enrolled in private schools
offering Pre-K through grade 8 (12.8%) than in schools offering grades 9 through 12
(8.0%). Private schools are also a more popular choice in the Northeast, where 14%
of all enrolled students went to private school, as compared to the West, where only
8.0% of all enrolled students went to private school in 2009.
Figure B.1 shows how the national average inflation-adjusted tuition has been
evolving over since 1999-2000 school year for different types of private schools. The
average tuition across all grades was $6,820 in the 1999-2000 school year and $10,940
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in the 2011-2012 school year, which is an increase of around 60% in a little more than
a decade. The bar chart also shows that the average tuition charged for all types
of school has been increasing over the years, with the steepest rise for non-sectarian
private schools. Schools associated with a religious congregation charge, on average,
less than non-sectarian private schools. In the 2011-2012 school year, the cost of
Catholic schooling was $7,020, as compared with $21,910 for non-sectarian private
schools. Thus, not only are private schools charging a non-trivial amount, these costs
have been rising at a higher rate than inflation in the past decade.
2.2.2 Data Sources
To investigate the impact of an increase in wealth on private school enrollment,
I use data from two main sources. First, demographic characteristics, labor market
variables and private school enrollment statistics at the MSA level are obtained from
the 2000 Census and data from the American Community Survey (ACS). Second,
MSA level information about public school supply and quality is constructed using
the Common Core Data.
I obtain private school enrollment statistics and MSA level information on the
share of females employed, the fraction of population that has a college degree, pro-
portion of African-Americans, proportion of people living below the poverty line, me-
dian household income and total population of school-going children from the Census
and multiple years of the ACS. The relevant years for the analysis are years 2000,
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2006 and 2012. The year 2000 marks the start of the housing boom in the US, the
year 2006 marks the end of the housing boom and start of the housing bust while
the year 2012 marks the end of the housing bust. The variable of interest is how
private school enrollment has changed during the boom period (i.e. between 2000
and 2006), and how it evolved over the housing bust (between 2006 and 2012). The
private school enrollment at the MSA is calculated as the proportion of school-going
children between the ages of 3 to 17 who were attending private school.23
MSA-level averages for all variables for the year 2000 are constructed using the
2000 Census. However, to compute averages for the years 2006 and 2012, I use
multiple years of the ACS to increase the sample size and precision of the estimates.
In particular, I pool ACS data from the year 2005 to 2007 to construct averages for
the 2006 period and pool ACS data from the year 2011 to 2013 to construct averages
for the 2012 period.4 The Census/ACS sample is restricted to include school-going
children, not living in group quarters, who are residing in an MSA in their state
of birth. Imposing the restriction of children residing in an MSA in their state of
birth partially alleviates concerns about the results being confounded by endogenous
migration across states by parents of these children in response to local labor demand
and school supply shocks.
2The denominator for this proportion excludes children who were home-schooled. Children be-
tween the ages of 3-5 were attending pre-school.
3I topcoded the private school enrollment variable at the 95th percentile to eliminate outliers.
4For all years except 2012 and 2013, I use the METAREA variable from IPUMS to identify MSAs.
For the years 2012 and 2013, I use the variable MET2013, which I match to METAREA by hand,
so that it is possible to pool the 2011-2013 datasets.
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A key component of this paper is to use the housing demand shock during the
2000s to isolate the effect of an increase in household wealth and income on private
school enrollment. I use the measure of local housing demand shocks created in [78],
in which the local housing demand shock is a function of the change in local housing
prices and change in the quantity of local housing available. Local housing prices are
obtained from the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) annual series on prices in
FHFA metro areas.5 Local housing supply is proxied by the number of new privately
owned housing units authorized via permits, data on which is obtained from the
Census Building Permits Survey.
Lastly, I construct measures of local public school supply and quality using Com-
mon Core Data. The Common Core Data (CCD) is the Department of Education’s
primary database on public elementary and secondary education in the US. It is
a comprehensive, annual, national database of all public elementary and secondary
schools and school districts. Among other things, it collects information about the
number of schools, by public school type, number of teachers, by grade, number of
students, by race, at the school and school district level. I use the CCD to construct
measures of total number of public schools, student-teacher ratio, current spending
per pupil, total spending per pupil and proportion of free lunch students at public
schools at the county level. I then use a county to MSA crosswalk to match CCD
5Data from FHFA is matched directly to Census/ACS data using MSA code as the unique
identifier. There were 15 MSAs within the Census data that did not map directly to any MSA
within the FHFA data. For these 15 MSAs, I use matched data from [78], who manually map these
15 Census MSAs to FHFA data.
71
CHAPTER 2. HOUSING DEMAND AND PRIVATE SCHOOLING
averages to the Census/ACS MSAs.
I also include a measure of the average private school tuition at the state level to
control for differences in price of private schooling. State level tuition data is obtained
from privateschoolreview.com, a website that lists private schools in each state,
gives information about the average tuition at the state and national level, as well
as information on average acceptance rates, student body demographics and teacher
student ratios. The website also hosts articles for parents on why they should send
their child to private schools, and if they choose to do so, how they can pay for it.
Data on tuition is available at the state level only for the school year 2014-2015. I
extrapolate data for my sample years and adjust the fee data by inflation.
2.2.3 Theoretical Discussion
Theoretically, if private schooling investment for the child is a normal good, both
changes in housing prices and changes in housing supply can affect private school
enrollment through their affect on household wealth and their impact on employment
opportunities for parents. The housing supply channel can increase the volume of
housing transactions which stimulates sectors associated with the selling and financing
of housing (e.g., mortgage brokers, real estate agents, etc.), which can possibly boost
parental employment working in these sectors and lead to an increase in private school
enrollment.
Increase in housing prices can stimulate investment in private schooling either
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through a housing wealth effect, or by relaxing liquidity constraints. In the after-
math of the housing boom and the subsequent bust, a growing literature has argued
that house price movements can have large effects on consumption. Most of the re-
search on this topic has focused on the effects of boom and the subsequent bust on
macroeconomic outcomes such as the marginal propensity to consume and aggregate
employment. The first evidence of the wealth effect of the house price boom and home
equity extraction comes from [72], who show that an average homeowner borrows 25
to 30 cents for every dollar increase in home equity and that this borrowing is spent on
real outlays rather than paying down debt or purchasing real estate. In a companion
paper, [73] show that there is substantial geographical heterogeneity in the marginal
propensity to consume out of housing wealth which can explain the heterogeneity in
consumption across the same geographical regions. They find that, the non-durable
consumption elasticity out of housing wealth is between 0.13 and 0.256 Other recent
papers such as [76] and [75] arrive at similar numbers using different data sources and
identification strategies. Relaxation of liquidity constraints and housing wealth effect
on consumer spending can also stimulate local labor market opportunities as shown
in [74], which can therefore increase private school enrollment as parents earn higher
wage income.
Such a large consumption effect out of housing wealth was thought to be at odds
with the theoretical models of housing consumption such as [87]. Such models would
6see the discussion in [83] on how this estimate was calculated.
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argue that increases in the value of an individual’s house are offset by increases in fu-
ture implicit rental costs, leaving the expected lifetime budget constraint unchanged.
Hence, if households make consumption decisions based the net present value of future
wealth, then the consumption effects out of housing wealth will be small. However,
recent papers in the macroeconomic literature such as [83] have shown that such large
effects can be rationalized in models with incomplete asset markets where agents are
facing liquidity constraints. Similar arguments would imply that housing wealth in-
creases can have impacts on educational spending and consequently private school
enrollment. There is also evidence that the Marginal Propensity to Consume out of
transitory income shocks changes over the business cycle [88] backed by theoretical
models of consumption [89], which could imply differential responses to private school
enrollment over the business cycle or the housing boom and bust.
Another important channel through which a local housing demand shock, in par-
ticular, an increase in house prices, will affect parents’ propensity to send their chil-
dren to private schooling is by affecting the quality of local public schools. An increase
in house prices will naturally lead to higher local property taxes, which are an im-
portant source of funding for local public schools. If higher revenue streams from
higher property taxes translate into better public school quality, parents should be
less likely to enroll their children into private school as the quality of public school has
improved. Therefore, the overall effect of a local housing demand shock on private
schooling is ambiguous, and depends on the magnitude of the income effect and the
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effect on public school quality.
2.2.4 Private School Enrollment and Local Hous-
ing Demand Shock
Table B.1 presents descriptive statistics for private school enrollment during the
period of analysis. In the year 2000 average private school enrollment in the US was
9.03%. It increased to 9.32% in 2006 and decreased to 8.90% in the year 2012. The
average change in private school enrollment between 2000-2006 was 0.26% and -0.46%
between 2006-2012. Figure B.3 plots the distribution of the change in private school
enrollment during these time periods. The histograms show that a greater density
of MSAs have a positive change in enrollment between 2000-2006, while a greater
density of MSAs have a negative change in enrollment between 2006-2012.
I use the measure of local housing demand shocks constructed in [78] to quantify
the relationship between wealth increases and private school enrollment. A local




k ∆Pk + ∆Qk (2.1)
where ∆Pk is the change in log local housing prices in MSA k, η
D
k is the price elasticity
of housing demand, and ∆Qk is the change in log local housing supply. Existing
literature estimates the price elasticity of housing demand to approximately equal 1
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[90, 91], therefore, the change in housing demand over any two periods, ∆̂HDk can be
proxied by the sum of a change in log housing prices and change in log of new housing
produced in the MSA over the two periods. Table B.1, panel (b) presents summary
statistics of the local housing demand measure. The average house price index grew
from 0.72 in 2000 to 1.07 in 2006. During the 2000-2006 period, house prices grew
by 33% on average, while housing supply grew by 21% on average. The average local
housing demand shock between 2000-2006 was 54%, which captures both a change in
local housing prices and change in local housing supply.
Table B.2 shows how the labor market performed during the sample years. Panel
a) shows the employment industrial mix across MSAs in the year 2000. Almost a
quarter of the US population was employed in manufacturing and construction sector
at the beginning of the decade. As documented by [79], the employment in the
Construction and FIRE sectors increased during the 2000-2006 housing boom period
which masked the decline in Manufacturing employment over the same time period.
The inflation-adjusted average hourly wage for males in an MSA in 2000 was $12.1
while that for females was $10.3.
Panel b) and Panel c) show the changes in the labor market outcomes of male and
female workers over the boom and bust period respectively. On average, male and
female annual real wage income declined in both the boom and the bust period with
the average decline being 4 times larger over the bust. The panels also show that
male labor force participation increased by 0.19% over the period 2000-2006 while it
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decreased by 0.68% over the 2006-2012 period. On the other hand female labor force
participation declined in both time periods, with the bigger decline being in the 2006-
2012 period. Employment rates declined for both groups over the 2000-2012 period,
although the decline was not as high as the decline in the labor force participation
rate.
To explore the relationship between the local housing demand shock and local
public school quality, I estimate first-difference regressions of the form:
∆Y pubkt = β0 + β1∆̂H
D
kt +Xktβ + εkt (2.2)
where ∆̂HDkt is the change in local housing demand, while ∆Y
pub
kt is the change in
public school quality measures in MSA k between time periods t and t+ s. The first
difference specification eliminates any latent MSA-specific factors that remain fixed
over time. I also include a vector of controls Xkt, which control for any dimensions
in which MSAs might systematically differ from each other and can also affect public
school quality. The vector includes controls for the share of college graduates in
the MSA, share of employed females, proportion of African-Americans, proportion of
people living below the poverty line, the median household income in the MSA and the
population of school-going children in the MSA in 2000. I also control for differences
in local labor markets across MSAs in 2000s by including controls for the percentage
of individuals in an MSA employed in construction, manufacturing, FIRE industries,
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wholesale trade, retail trade and transportation, as well as the average hourly wage
earned by men and women. These measures capture the idea that variation in the
industry mix in an area is correlated with demographics that affect schooling choice,
as well as the response to the housing demand shock. Standard errors in all regressions
are clustered by state and the regressions are weighted by the population of children
in the year 2000.
Table B.3 shows how the local housing demand shock between 2000-2006 affected
current expenditure per pupil, total expenditure per pupil, student-teacher ratios
and proportion of free lunch students in public schools in an MSA. A 100 log point
increase in the local housing demand shock between 2000-2006 raised current and
total expenditure per pupil by 4 percentage points. This is not surprising, since
the housing demand shock should increase public school revenue, which translates to
higher expenditure per pupil. Column (3) of Table B.3 shows that a 100 log point
larger housing demand shock between 2000-2006 predicts that average student-teacher
ratio in the MSA would go down by 1.05 unit, however, there is no significant effect
on the proportion of free lunch students in an MSA.
Results in Table B.3 suggest a correlation between the housing demand shock
between 2000-2006 and public school inputs. To explore how the local housing demand
shock relates to local private school enrollment I run first-difference regressions of the
form:
∆Pkt = α0 + α1∆̂HDkt +Xktα+ µkt (2.3)
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where ∆Pkt is the change in mean private school enrollment in MSA k between
time periods t and t + s. In addition to MSA level demographic and labor market
controls, I also control for the total number of public schools, student-teacher ratio,
log current expenditure per pupil and proportion of free lunch students at public
schools in the MSA in the year 2000 to account for differences across MSAs in public
school quality, which would directly affect parents’ decision to enroll their children
into private schooling. Table B.4 shows that the local housing demand shock does
not predict any increase private school enrollment during 2000-2006. However, one
reason why the OLS estimates are biased towards zero is measurement error in the
construction of the local housing demand shock. The data suffers from measurement
error in prices, permits and dating of the start and end of the boom period in an
MSA. There is randomness and measurement error in the housing demand variable
in each year, and I am not using all years from 2000-2006 to smooth out the trend.
2.3 Econometric Model
In order to identify a causal relationship between the housing demand shock and
private school enrollment, we need to isolate exogenous changes in housing demand. A
potential challenge to identifying the causal effect of changes in local housing demand
on any kind of local outcome is that these demand changes might be correlated with
latent MSA factors such as latent amenity shocks, labor demand shocks and labor
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supply shocks. Such factors and changes could affect the type of schooling chosen for
children either directly or indirectly through the change in demographics and income
of the local population. This would cause a bias in the OLS estimates.
I use the instrument created in [78] to isolate exogenous variation in local hous-
ing demand. The [78] strategy for isolating exogenous variation in housing demand
changes relies upon the emerging consensus in the literature that changes in housing
prices, production and transactions during the housing boom and bust in the U.S.
was caused primarily due to a speculative ‘bubble’ [78, 92, 93, 94], and not due to
changes in construction costs, latent productivity, incomes and population.
To create their instrument, [78] search for rapid changes in local housing prices
that occurred between 2000 and 2006. The identifying assumption behind using
rapid increases in housing prices is that underlying fundamentals at the MSA level
will not change abruptly and the changes will be smoothly incorporated in house
prices. However, sharp breaks from the trend in housing prices may arguably be a
result of speculative activity or other housing specific activity, rather than changes in
latent MSA specific factors - such as public school quality, among other things - that
will be correlated with private school enrollment and be a source of endogeneity in
our OLS estimates. Such variation in the timing of boom across US MSAs has also
been documented by [95].
In order to further explain the identifying variation coming from this instrument,
consider two hypothetical MSAs that have a similar increase in house prices over
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the period 2000-2006. However, one MSA experiences a ”smooth” increase in prices
over that time period indicating that there were latent changes in the MSA that
were gradually incorporated into increases in house prices over that time period.
In contrast, the other MSA has a sharp jump in house prices at a given point in
time between 2000-2006 rather than a ”smooth” evolution implying that the increase
was driven by ”speculative activity” rather than by changes in latent fundamentals
affecting house prices. In their paper, [79], provide examples of both types of MSAs.
MSAs that fit the ”smooth” price increase pattern and include Pittsburgh, Chicago
and New Haven whereas MSAs that fit the latter pattern include Portland, Tuscon
and Naples. We would expect the latter MSAs to have experienced changes in housing
demand that were orthogonal to local fundamentals and hence unrelated to local
economic activity.
2.3.1 Structural Break in Local Housing Prices
To create the instrument variable [78] use quarterly price series data from each
MSA in the sample between 2000Q1 and 2005Q4, and estimate MSA-specific OLS
regressions with a single structural break. Following the time series econometrics
literature for estimating structural breaks with unknown break dates [96, 97], they
search for the location of the break that maximizes the R2 of the following regression:
HPk(t) = ωk + τkt+ πk(t− t∗k)1{t > t∗k}+ ξk,t (2.4)
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where HPk(t) is the log local housing price in MSA k in year-quarter t, t
∗
k is the date
of the structural break in the MSA’s time series, restricted to be between 20001Q1
and 2005Q1, τk is an MSA-specific linear time trend before the structural break and
πk measures the extent to which the growth rate of MSA’s quarterly house price series
changed at the break. For MSAs that experienced no break from the linear trend in
house prices, the estimate of πk would be close to zero.
Figure B.2 maps the variation in the magnitude of the structural break in house
prices across MSAs in the US. This is the variation that will be exploited to identify a
causal effect of the housing demand shock on private school enrollment. As the map
shows, MSAs such as Yuma, Arizona and Naples, Florida experience a large change
in house prices during 2000-2005. On the other hand, MSAs such as Bloomington,
Indiana, and Eau Claire, Wisconsin experienced very small deviations from the linear
trend in house prices.
2.3.2 Instrument Relevance and Validity
Table B.5 shows the correlation between the magnitude of the structural break
in house prices between 2000-2006 and housing demand shocks during the boom and
bust. The housing demand shock during 2000-2006 has a strong positive correlation
of 0.70 with the structural break while the housing demand shock during 2006-2012
has a strong negative correlation of -0.6 with the structural break in house prices
between 2000-2006. The housing demand shock during the boom and bust are also
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negatively correlated, which is consistent with the idea that the MSAs that faced the
biggest increases in house prices during the boom also faced the biggest crash during
the housing bust. Figure B.4 (a) shows that the magnitude of the structural break
strongly predicts the local housing demand shock between 2000 and 2006 period, with
the instrument variable explaining 53% of the variation in the local housing demand
shock between 2000 and 2006. Figure B.4 (b) shows that the structural break in
house prices between 2000-2006 also strongly predict the negative housing demand
shock during 2006 and 2012, a fact I exploit to study the effect of the housing bust
on private school enrollment between 2006-2012.
Table B.6 shows the first stage relationship between the magnitude of the struc-
tural break in house prices and the 2000-2006 change in the local housing demand
measure, local housing prices and local supply of housing. In these first stage regres-
sions, I control for a host of MSA-level variables to account for underlying differences
across MSAs in the year 2000. For each of the regressions, even after including MSA-
specific controls, the structural break strongly predicts the local housing demand
shock and the increase in housing prices and housing supply. The F-statistic in all
three regressions is greater than 20, eliminating any concerns about the estimated
structural break being a weak instrument. To show that the estimated structural
break is a valid instrument, [78] present evidence that the structural breaks capture
exogenous speculative activity in the area. They show that the price/rent ratio in
an MSA is positively related to the magnitude of the structural break, which shows
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that the price of owning rose relative to the price paid by renters, suggesting that
the structural break is picking up investors’ positive judgement above the future de-
sirability of an MSA. [78] also use data on out-of-town buyers in an MSA to show
that there is a strong correlation between the structural break and the growth in the
share of speculative out-of-town buyers.
Figure B.5 explores whether the estimated structural breaks are reflecting vari-
ation in public school quality across MSAs, which would affect school choice. The
identifying assumption behind the instrument is that it should be orthogonal to any
factors that would drive educational choices for children. Figures B.5 (a) and (b)
show that total expenditure per pupil and total supply of public schools in an MSA
in the year 2000 are uncorrelated with the magnitude of the structural break.
In Figure B.6, I explore the relationship between the structural break and MSA-
level demographic controls that may also predict private school enrollment. These
controls include the proportion of African-Americans, share of college-educated indi-
viduals, proportion of people living below the poverty line and the share of working
women in an MSA in the baseline year 2000. Other than the proportion of African-
Americans in an MSA in 2000, which is negatively correlated with the magnitude
of the structural break, all other underlying MSA characteristics are uncorrelated
with the instrument variable. These figures lend support to the instrument validity
argument, allaying concerns that the structural break are just capturing observable
variation across MSAs that are correlated with children’s school choice.
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2.4 Results
Using the Census/ACS sample and the estimated structural breaks, I estimate
first-difference regressions specified in equations 2.2 and 2.3, instrumenting ∆̂HDkt
with the magnitude of the structural break in the MSA.
2.4.1 Housing Boom and Schooling Choices
I first investigate whether the exogenous increase in house prices led to a significant
increase in public school spending and observable measures of quality. The first two
columns of Table B.7 show that an exogenous increase in house prices leads to a
significant increase in the current and total expenditure per pupil in public schools.
This is not surprising, because even if house prices increase due to speculative activity,
public school revenue must increase, which translates to higher spending per pupil.
Columns (3) and (4) show that despite higher funding, the student/teacher ratios and
proportion of free lunch students in public schools did not change during the 2000-
2006 period7 This is consistent with existing literature in the economics of education
that shows that throwing money at schools does not improve student achievement
[98, 99, 100, 101].
These results show that the housing demand shock did not perceivably make pub-
lic schools more attractive to parents in the time period between 2000-2006, which
7Another tangible measure of public school quality is average school test scores. However, the
Common Core Data does not collect standardized test score data.
85
CHAPTER 2. HOUSING DEMAND AND PRIVATE SCHOOLING
could have potentially led to a drop in private school enrollment. The second channel
through which a local housing demand shock could affect parents’ schooling choices
for their children is by affecting their budget constraint, either through higher wage
income or by relaxing liquidity constraints. I control for MSA-specific demograph-
ics, local labor market variables, public school quality measures and an index for the
average private school tuition in the area. Table B.8 shows that in an MSA expe-
riencing a 100 log point larger increase in housing demand between 2000 and 2006,
average private school enrollment was 3 percentage points higher. The result is highly
statistically significant, even after adding all controls. The average private school en-
rollment in the year 2000 was 9.03%, which implies that a 100 log point larger increase
in housing demand in an MSA led to a 33% increase in private school enrollment, on
average. A one standard deviation change in the local housing demand shock during
the 2000-2006 period was 0.54, therefore, using the estimates we can conclude that a
one standard deviation change in the housing demand shock was associated with an
17.9% increase in private school enrollment in that MSA.
2.4.2 Housing Bust and Private School Enrollment
The substantial increase in private school enrollment during the housing boom
shows the importance of credit constraints affecting investment in children. This also
shows that parents consider private schooling to be a normal good, as its consumption
increases with an increase in income. In this section, I examine how private school
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enrollment changed during the housing bust during 2006 - 2012. The housing bust
resulted in people losing housing values as well as lower employment opportunities and
wage incomes. Therefore, it is possible that private school enrollment may decrease
as a result of the negative local housing demand shock. As previously shown, the
housing demand shock during 2000 - 2006 has a strong negative correlation with
the housing demand shock during the bust. Therefore, to identify a causal effect of
the negative local housing demand shock, I estimate first-difference models relating
private school enrollment during 2006-2012 to the 2000-2006 change in local housing
demand. The TSLS regressions are estimated using the magnitude of the structural
break in house prices during 2000-2006 as an instrument for the change in housing
demand. The regression also controls for MSA-specific demographics, public school
quality measures and local labor market controls for the year 2000.
Table B.9, column (1) shows that an MSA experiencing a 100 log point larger
increase in housing demand during 2000 - 2006 experienced a 3 percentage point
decrease in private school enrollment during the housing bust. The estimate suggests
that when credit constraints tighten, parents substitute at the margin of children’s
school choice, with private school enrollment decreasing by 32% between 2006 and
2012. The second column of Table B.9 shows how private school enrollment evolved
during the full cycle from 2000 - 2012. As expected, the overall change in private
school enrollment from 2000 - 2012 was zero, since the increase in enrollment during
the boom was exactly counteracted by the decrease in enrollment during the bust.
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2.4.3 Mechanisms
In Table B.10, I explore whether the effect of the local housing demand shock
was different across MSAs with different housing supply elasticities, which helps in
decomposing the effect of the housing demand shock into the effect coming from a
change in housing prices and changes in housing supply. If the effect of the local
housing demand shock on private school enrollment was primarily driven by increases
in employment opportunities of parents only in construction related occupations, we
would expect the effect of the housing demand shock to be positive and significant
in MSAs where housing supply was more elastic. I use housing supply elasticity
estimates from [102] and interact them with the local housing demand measure in
2000-2006 to test this hypothesis.8 Results show that the local housing demand shock
did not have differential effects on private school enrollment in MSAs where housing
was inelastically supplied relative to MSAs where housing was elastically supplied.
This suggests that the effect of the local housing demand shock on private school
enrollment was driven by house price increases, which relaxed liquidity constraints
for parents, as well as increased employment opportunities by fueling consumption.
To further understand how the housing boom of 2000-2006 affected employment
opportunities of parents of school-going children, I run first-difference regressions
relating fathers’ and mothers’ employment and wage income to the 2000-2006 local
housing demand shock. Table B.11 and B.12 show how the labor market outcomes for
8I lose observations on 24 MSAs when matching Saiz elasticity estimates with data from the
Census/ACS.
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mothers and fathers of children of school-going age responded to the housing boom.
A 100 log point larger increase in the local housing demand increases fathers’ labor
force participation by 5 percentage points and their annual wage income by 22%.
Table B.12 shows that the housing boom did not significantly affect mothers’ labor
force participation or wage income, however, it led to a 2 percentage point increase in
females’ employment rate. These results show that one of the channels through which
the housing boom increased private school enrollment was by increasing employment
opportunities for parents, that eventually led to higher labor income that could be
spent on private school tuition. I also see how non-labor income, defined as family
income minus any wage income earned by parents, was affected by the local housing
demand shock. I find that a 100 log point larger increase in the local housing demand
shock increased family’s non-labor income by 23%.
Similarly, Tables B.13 and B.14 show that a 100 log point larger increase in the
local housing demand shock during 2000-2006 led to a 7 percentage point decrease in
father’s labor force participation, 3 percentage point decrease in mothers’ labor force
participation, a 25% decrease in fathers’ annual wage income and a 12% decrease in
the annual wage income earned by mothers. This shows that MSAs that experienced
the largest housing boom during the early 2000s saw large declines in parents’ em-
ployment opportunities during the bust, which led to lower income that could be used
to pay for private school tuition.
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2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I assess the relationship between the housing demand shocks and
parents’ investment in private schooling for their children. I focus on the housing
boom of the 2000s and investigate the channels through which a positive local housing
demand shock can affect schooling choice. The measure of housing demand shock I use
in the paper is borrowed from [78], in which the local housing demand is a function of
an increase in both housing prices and housing supply. An increase in housing prices
will mechanically increase public school revenue generation through higher property
taxes, and can potentially make public schools a more attractive choice for parents
if higher expenditure also results in higher observable public school quality. On the
other hand, a positive housing demand shock also leads to a relaxation of liquidity
constraints and increases employment opportunities for parents, which can both lead
to higher income. If private schooling is a normal good, then due to a pure income
effect, we would expect to see an increase in private school enrollment.
To isolate the causal effect of the local housing demand shock on private school
enrollment, I exploit the exogenous variation in the growth in house prices across
MSAs during the 2000s which was orthogonal to the latent underlying characteristics
of an MSA [78]. I find that the local housing demand shock during the early 2000s
led to an increase in the total expenditure per pupil in public schools, however, it
did not result in significant changes in the average student/teacher ratios at public
schools, which suggests that perceived public school quality did not improve. Results
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for private schooling enrollment show that a one standard deviation larger increase
in the housing demand shock during the 2000-2006 period in an MSA led to a 18%
increase in average private school enrollment in that MSA. Similar analysis during the
housing bust period extending from 2007-2012 shows that the increase in enrollment
was completely counteracted by an equal decrease in private school enrollment during
the housing bust. Using data on parents’ labor market outcomes, I show that the
mechanism through which the housing demand shock affects private school enrollment
is by increasing parents’ employment opportunities and earned income.
These results underscore the importance of relaxing credit constraints to promote
quality investments in children. The estimates for private school enrollment during
the housing boom can be interpreted as the elasticity of private schooling with re-
spect to household wealth, specifically coming through the housing market. We learn
that private schooling is a normal good, with higher household income leading to
an increase in average private school enrollment, and a decrease in household wealth
leading to a decline in private school enrollment. These results imply that by relax-
ing credit constraints for private schooling, the housing boom of the 2000s could have
long-run impacts on the human capital of the children of the boom. Future work
should trace how academic achievement and long-run education and labor market
outcomes of these children were affected. Given that private school enrollment has
been shown to have positive effects on childrens’ achievement along a number of di-
mensions, another important question for further exploration is whether being born
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Expert Reviews and Demand for
Medical Treatment
This chapter is joint work with Nicholas W. Papageorge and Jorge Balat.
3.1 Introduction
Consumers facing uncertainty often turn to low-cost sources of information, such
as word-of-mouth, advertisements or product reviews generated by other consumers
We gratefully acknowledge helpful comments from Tat Chan, Andrew Ching, Michael Darden,
Gautam Gowrisankaran, Barton Hamilton, Ginger Jin, Stephanie Heger, Mitchell Hoffman, Jennifer
Kohn, Darius Lakdawalla, Michael Makowsky, Patrick McAlvanah, Yiyi Zhou and Kevin Thom along
with seminar participants at the FTC, the 2015 SEA meetings, the 2016 NASM of the Econometric
Society and the 2016 Yale SOM Marketing Science Conference at Olin Business School. The usual
caveats apply.
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or by experts. In the case of expert reviews, the idea is that individuals turn to a
trusted or authoritative information source to help them make decisions. Previous
research has demonstrated that expert reviews help drive demand for a number of
products, such as movies, wine and books. The impact of expert reviews also extends
to higher-stakes contexts, such as financial decisions [103, 104, 105, 106].1
Despite the importance of expert reviews in several economic contexts, little is
known about how consumer demand responds to conflicting expert reviews. Yet,
consumers often have access to multiple reviews from different experts who poten-
tially disagree. One possibility, which we explore in this paper, is that individu-
als facing conflicting reviews rely upon expertise from the source they view as best
aligned to their preferences. Seen this way, individuals facing uncertainty are not pas-
sive consumers of available information, but instead appear to actively choose which
information source to incorporate into their decisions.
In this paper, we study the impact of expert reviews on the demand for HIV drugs.2
In our setting, consumers face uncertainty about drug qualities, including treatment
efficacy and adverse treatment side effects. Their choices affect their health, well-being
and survival. At multiple points in its lifecycle, each HIV drug we study is reviewed
by both an HIV physician and an HIV activist, the latter often someone infected
with HIV. We demonstrate that favorable expert reviews increase demand for HIV
1[107] show evidence that social information affects decisions in high-stakes contexts, in their
case, career choices.
2HIV stands for Human Immunodeficiency Virus, which is a virus that attacks the immune
system.
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drugs. This finding provides evidence that the influence of expert reviews extends
to long-run health investments. Next, we examine patient responses to conflicting
reviews, i.e., when the doctor and activist disagree about a given drug. In such cases,
consumer responses vary by their current health, with sicker consumers choosing
treatments recommended by the doctor and healthier consumers following the activist.
To explain this pattern, we argue that consumer responses to expert reviews depend
on their incentives to use effective treatments despite adverse side effects — and that
these incentives shift with health status.
Examining consumer responses to conflicting reviews requires data that are often
lacking in studies linking expert reviews to demand. To study HIV drug reviews
and demand, we merge two unique data sets. The first is from a longitudinal study
of men infected with HIV (henceforth, HIV-positive or HIV+), which provides de-
tailed information on a variety of health measures and also records each individual’s
medical treatment consumption decisions. Using this data set, we can relate patient
health outcomes to the treatments they use, which allows us to construct two ob-
jective treatment characteristics: a measure of treatment effectiveness against HIV
and a measure of treatment side effects. We merge this information with a data set
consisting of manually-coded drug reviews. Doctor and activist reviews are dissemi-
nated in a comprehensive HIV drug guide published annually in a widely circulated
HIV lifestyle magazine called Positively Aware. As we explain in detail below, text
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reviews are scored as positive, negative or mixed.3 By combining these two data sets,
we are able to relate potentially conflicting activist and doctor reviews to drug de-
mand and health outcomes. Moreover, since we observe objective product qualities,
we not only control for them, but also relate them to reviews to better understand
how reviews are generated and, in particular, why doctors and activists sometimes
disagree about a given drug. Observed objective qualities are also integral to our
identification strategy in a way to be explained below.
We present two main sets of results. First, we estimate a discrete choice model
of demand for HIV drugs and provide arguably causal evidence that positive reviews
increase demand for HIV drugs. A positive correlation between positive reviews and
high demand could be driven by omitted third factors, such as unobserved drug
qualities, which affect both reviews and demand. We overcome potential endogeneity
problems by exploiting rich data on objective product qualities along with repeated
reviews of the same drug over time. Our identification strategy relies on the idea
that as new drugs emerge, reviews for existing drugs shift in response. Thus, we can
use the objective qualities of rival drugs on the market, which change over time as
the market evolves, to instrument for reviews. Our identification strategy follows the
spirit of [108] (henceforth, BLP), as we exploit characteristics of a shifting set of rival
products on the market to instrument for a drug’s review.4 Estimates indicate that
3Drug reviews from Positively Aware also contain information on a host of additional drug char-
acteristics, including known interactions, dosage and number of side effects discovered during clinical
trials, information which we also use in our empirical analysis.
4While we do not model the process by which reviews are generated, we maintain the identification
assumption that the entry of new drugs is orthogonal to the unobserved characteristics of existing
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reviews have a positive impact on demand. In particular, if reviews for a treatment
increase from neutral to positive, the average probability of taking it increases by
1.8%. To put this into context, an equivalent impact on demand would occur if drug
effectiveness (measured by the probability that patient CD4 count rises within six
months) improved by roughly 2%.
Our second set of results focuses on explaining consumer demand responses to
conflicting reviews.5 We find that, when the reviews of doctors and activists diverge,
relatively healthy patients follow the activist rather than the doctor. Our preferred
explanation is that this behavior is driven by patient distaste for drug side effects.
To support this view, we provide three pieces of empirical evidence. First, we show
that doctor and activist disagreements arise when a treatment is highly effective but
has severe side effects, in which case it is given a lower review by the activist, but
not by the doctor.6 If patients favor drugs with fewer side effects and face diverging
reviews, they might choose to follow the expert — in this case an HIV activist who
is also a fellow patient — who tends to downgrade drugs with harsher side effects.
Second, using rich data on individual health characteristics, we show that consumer
demand responses lead to declines in health along with reductions in side effects.
This would likewise be expected if consumers follow activist reviews in an effort to
drugs.
5As reviews are printed on the same page, one after the other, in the same magazine, the pre-
sumption is that individuals are exposed to both.
6This is in line with research demonstrating that doctors care less about side effects than patients
do. In a particularly striking contribution, [109] show that doctors, when they fall ill, avoid drugs
with side effects despite having recommended them to their patients.
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avoid effective drugs with harsh side effects. Third, we examine demand responses of
HIV+ men who are relatively sick (a condition known as AIDS).7 Previous research
has shown that patients who choose less effective treatments to avoid side effects are
more willing to choose effective treatments with adverse side effects when in poor
health since the payoff from doing so in terms of improved health is large [110]. This
suggests a way to test the validity of our preferred explanation. The reasoning is that
if healthier consumers follow the activist in an effort to avoid side effects, we would
expect sicker patients to respond more positively to the doctor, the expert who tends
to recommend highly effective treatments despite adverse side effects.8 Indeed, we find
that, in contrast to healthier patients, sicker HIV+ men respond positively to higher
doctor reviews. Together, these findings provide support for the idea that patients
choosing HIV treatments under uncertainty utilize information from the expert they
view as best aligned to their preferences, which can vary by health status.
This paper contributes to several strands of literature in economics. The first stud-
ies how individuals facing uncertainty rely on a variety of information sources, such
as direct-to-consumer advertising [111, 112] or social learning, which includes word-
of-mouth and peer effects [113, 114].9 More closely related to our study, a number of
papers show that “report cards” revealing information about product quality can af-
7AIDS stands for Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome.
8To fix ideas, Appendix C.1 presents a theoretical model that formalizes the logic behind our
interpretation of findings.
9The impact of social learning on demand has been shown in a variety of contexts, including the
adoption of new crops [115, 116, 117] and job uptake [107]. See [118] for a comprehensive review.
Other research has studied the effect of online reviews. [119] demonstrate how Yelp reviews affect
restaurant choices, and [120] show that eBay reputation affects purchasing decisions.
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fect choices when quality is uncertain.10 In our study, we incorporate consumer-level
data, which means we can study the impact of reviews not only on consumer choices,
but also on subsequent outcomes. In this sense, our study is related to [130], who
demonstrate that changes in restaurant choices in response to the posting of health
inspection grades lowered incidence of hospital admissions related to food poisoning.
Also related, [131] show that providing school test score information to lower-income
families affects school choice, which in turn increases students’ test scores. Similarly,
we show that expert reviews affect consumer demand for medical treatment, which
has subsequent impacts on their health outcomes.
An advantage of our study is that we incorporate information on objective product
qualities along with reviews from multiple, possibly conflicting experts. This allows us
to examine how reviews relate to objective product qualities along with heterogeneity
in consumer responses to disagreements. We can thus provide novel evidence that the
way in which experts weight product qualities in their reviews affects how consumers
incorporate these reviews into their decisions. This point relates our study to an
emerging literature on the demand for information. For example, [132] uses evidence
from field experiments to show that individuals demand information, though they
tend to underpay for it. [133] show that agent willingness-to-pay for information
rises when the rewards from information are higher and [134] show that when making
10Information in the form of audits or report cards affects election winners [121], stock-buying
[122], Medicare enrollment [123], health plan choice [124] and health care provider choice [125],
hospital patient volumes [126], and investments in the housing market [127] and education [128].
[129] show that agents are willing to pay for information about charity recipients when agents’
charitable giving is responsive to recipient type.
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risky decisions, agents pay for information based on the likelihood of information
being ex-post optimal. Relatedly, [135] show that when hospital report cards provide
information that differ from patients’ prior beliefs about hospital quality, patients
switch to higher-quality hospitals.
By focusing on disagreements among experts in high-stakes contexts, we also re-
late to a literature demonstrating that reliance on low-cost information sources, such
as expert reviews, can be problematic. For example, [136] show that information con-
tained in health care “report cards” decreased patient and social welfare by inducing
health care providers to decline treatment to sicker patients. [137] find that online
hotel reviews that affect demand are subject to manipulation. Relatedly, in a study
of expert judges of a musical competition, [138] show evidence that judges’ rankings
are often the result of random ordering of the performers and not the underlying
performance quality. Yet, judges’ rankings affect performers’ subsequent careers.11
The idea is that reviews, either from experts or other users, might not provide useful
or accurate information, but could still affect economic decisions and outcomes. The
disagreements between reviewers that we examine might suggest that at least one
expert is “wrong,” which could mean that reliance on reviews could harm patients.
Our findings suggest a different interpretation. We argue that disagreements reflect
that experts generate reviews that place different weights on multiple drug character-
istics. Consumers therefore respond differently to divergent reviews, which suggests
11Relatedly, [139] show that a picture of a smiling woman on a loan brochure affects demand for
the loan.
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that they demand different information depending on their current health status and
follow conflicting expert reviews accordingly.
Finally, we contribute to a literature examining health investments under uncer-
tainty. For example, [140] show the effects of uncertainty and learning in the demand
for anti-ulcer drugs.12 [142] model how doctors update their beliefs about drug qual-
ity relative to existing drugs after observing the new drug’s effects on their patients.
Further studies examine how direct-to-consumer advertising [143], spillover effects
from advertising of similar drugs [144], detailing [145, 146] and publicity [147] affect
demand for pharmaceuticals when drug quality is uncertain.13 There is also evidence
of peer effects in healthcare adoption ([149]; [150]; [151]).14 We show evidence of a
novel way that consumers making health investments mitigate uncertainty: by incor-
porating expertise from potentially conflicting sources in a way that depends on their
health objectives.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses our data
sources, sample construction and preliminary data analysis at the drug level. Section
3.3 constructs combination-level data (as HIV drugs are consumed in combination
with one another), and presents a preliminary analysis at the drug-combination level.
12Related to learning, [141] designs a framework to analyze how price and promotion influence
the learning process of the doctor and the patient and applies his model to depression care.
13Related, [148] study promotion spillovers in demand for HIV drugs.
14Theoretical work on social learning from peers can be traced back to [152] and [153], who show
that informational cascades can explain herd behavior and fads. [154] presents a theoretical model of
decision making with advice from outside sources (such as word-of-mouth advice and observational
learning). [155, 156] write a behavioral game-theoretic model to explain limited strategic thinking
at the movie box-office.
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Section 3.4 describes our econometric model. Section 3.5 presents main results. Sec-
tion 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Data: Drugs, Reviews and Demand
In this section, we introduce the data set used in our analysis. First, we introduce
our two data sources. The first is a large panel data set on HIV+ men’s treatment
choices and health outcomes. The second contains expert drug reviews written in
the magazine Positively Aware. Even though HIV drugs are consumed in bundles (an
issue we address in Section 3.3), we conduct our preliminary analysis at the drug level
to establish some basic patterns in the data. In particular, we look at how reviews
published in Positively Aware relate to objective drug quality measures (also obtained
from the magazine), the relationship between reviews and drug consumption, and how
reviews evolve over a drug’s lifecycle.
3.2.1 Data Sources
Data from the Multi-Center AIDS Cohort Study. We use the publicly available
dataset from the Multi-Center AIDS Cohort Study (henceforth, MACS), an ongoing
study of the natural and treated histories of HIV+ homosexual and bisexual men that
was started in 1983.15 The study is conducted in four cities: Baltimore, Chicago,
15The study also follows HIV-negative (henceforth, HIV−) men, but we exclude them from our
analysis since over our sample period it is exceedingly rare that uninfected men consume HIV drugs.
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Pittsburgh and Los Angeles.16 At each semi-annual visit (conducted in March and
September of each year), data are collected on medical treatment choices, health
status and a host of socio-demographic measures, including employment, income and
in education. The MACS data set consists of 6,843 individuals over 50 (semi-annual)
visits. We restrict our attention to HIV+ individuals for the time period from 1997
to 2008, which is when drug reviews from the Positively Aware Drug Guides —
our second data source — are available. Restricting our sample leaves us with an
unbalanced panel of 1,330 individuals consisting of 13,472 observations, where each
observation is an individual-visit dyad.
The MACS dataset not only provides us with individual-level drug choices but also
includes two measures of health status relevant to individuals with HIV. The first is
an objective measure of the individual’s immune system health. At each interview, a
blood test is conducted to measure the subject’s CD4 count, which is defined as the
number of white blood cells per mm3 of blood. Typical CD4 counts range between
500 and 1000 for uninfected (HIV−) individuals and lower counts indicate that the
immune system is compromised by HIV. Counts below 300 indicate the individual
suffers from AIDS, a condition where the immune system has been compromised to
16Data in this manuscript were collected by the Multi-Center AIDS Cohort Study (MACS) with
centers (Principal Investigators) at The Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health (Joseph
B. Margolick, Lisa P. Jacobson); Howard Brown Health Center, Feinberg School of Medicine, North-
western University; Cook County Bureau of Health Services (John P. Phair, Steven M. Wolinsky),
University of California, Los Angeles (Roger Detels); and University of Pittsburgh (Charles R. Ri-
naldo). The MACS is funded by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, with
additional supplemental funding from the National Cancer Institute. UO1-AI-35042, 5-MO1-RR-
00052 (GCRC), UO1-AI-35043, UO1-AI-35039, UO1-AI-35040, UO1-AI-35041. Website located at
http://www.statepi.jhsph.edu/macs/macs.html.
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such a degree that it loses functionality and cannot fight off common infections. The
second health measure consists of subjects’ own reports of their physical ailments,
including nausea, headache, fever, diarrhea and drenching sweats. These physical
ailments reflect side effects of medical treatments, but can also be symptoms of HIV
infection if CD4 counts are low.
Data from Positively Aware. The second data source we use is a drug guide pub-
lished annually since 1997 in an HIV lifestyle magazine known as Positively Aware,
which contains drug reviews for all FDA-approved drugs and drugs nearing approval.17
While the magazine is issued semi-monthly (six regular issues per year), the com-
prehensive drug guide is published annually joint with the January/February issue.
The magazine’s contributing writers and columnists are professionals in the field of
HIV/AIDS, including HIV specialist physicians from the US, people living with HIV
and advocates. The magazine is widely known in the HIV+ community and dis-
tributed for free. To get a sense of their outreach, in their media kit for 2010, the
magazine publisher guarantees a minimum circulation of 100,000 copies, with 75,000
copies distributed to more than 1,900 community-based organizations and 700 Wal-
greens pharmacies across the US, 7,000 copies distributed at more than 200 venues,
5,000 copies distributed at HIV/AIDS conferences and events, 10,000 copies sent to
individual subscribers, 1,500 copies to members of the American Academy of HIV
17Positively Aware is a not-for-profit HIV/AIDS treatment journal published by Test Positive
Aware Network (TPAN).TPAN is a 501c3, not-for-profit AIDS Service Organization (ASO) based
in Chicago, IL.
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Medicine, and 1,500 copies to media, HIV advocates and pharmaceutical representa-
tives.
The aim of the drug guides is to present information about HIV drugs in a form
that is easy to decipher and comparable across drugs. It is meant as a guide for
patients who are just starting therapy, as well as those who have been on treatment
for a long time, helping patients discuss their treatment options with their doctors
and decide whether or not an alternative treatment regimen might be more suitable.
From 1997 until 2007, the magazines and the annual drug guides were only available
in print. However, starting in 2007, the Drug Guides have also been available on the
magazine’s website, positivelyaware.com.
The drug guides offer rich information on HIV drug quality. Measures include the
number of side effects observed in clinical trials, type(s) of side effects, severity of side
effects, food restrictions for each drug, dosage frequency, drug interactions, and the
drug’s annual cost.18 Most importantly for this study, the drug guides include reviews
for each drug from both an HIV physician and a community activist (see Figure C.1
for a sample page from the 2008 drug guide for AZT). To our knowledge, Positively
Aware provides the only source of expert reviews for all HIV drugs available on the
market at a given point in time.19
18A list of all variables constructed using information from the magazines, along with their defi-
nitions, is presented in Appendix C.2.
19An online search of HIV drug guides returns a host of resources available for people who want
information on HIV drugs. However, none of them publishes expert reviews on all FDA-approved
HIV drugs on the market in our time period of analysis. The only source of user reviews for HIV
drugs are drugs.com but they are only available after our period of analysis.
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3.2.2 Coding Textual Expert Reviews
Typically, in the existing literature on the impact of expert or customer reviews on
product demand, the ‘expert’ review variable is binary (Good or Bad) or categorical
(for example, number of stars). As can be seen in Figure C.1, our expert reviews
are not numerical ratings, but written text. The analysis of text is problematic and
open to subjective interpretation. Thus, an important question for us is how to code
reviews for subsequent analysis. One of the ways some authors have gotten around
this problem is to use the length of the text as a proxy for whether the review is
positive or negative, with longer text signifying a “mixed” review [157]. However, the
reviews for most drugs in the Positively Aware drug guides are similar in length and
gauging the quality of a review from its length would produce a very noisy measure
of the doctors’ and activists’ valuation of the drug. For some drugs a negative review
by the activist is long, as he or she narrates a personal experience, or the experiences
of friends, while for other drugs a positive review by a doctor or activist may be
long, including for example descriptions of specific experiences when a particular
drug helped to save a patient’s life. Another option would be to use text analysis
software to automate the coding of the reviews. Unfortunately, text analysis software
is imperfect and cannot accurately capture the true flavor of the review, especially
when the text may be using euphemisms, analogies or subtle sarcasm to convey the
message.
To circumvent these problems, we assign a ranking to the reviews manually by
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developing a numerical scale and by reading each review and assigning a number
to it. We use an ordinal rating of 1, 2 or 3 to classify each drug. A rating of 1
signifies a negative review and a rating of 3 a positive review. A rating of 2 means
we cannot assign a 1 or a 3, which thus means that a review is mixed.20 In what
follows, when we mention the doctor’s or activist’s review, we in fact refer to our
numerical interpretation of them. We provide the details of the criteria we followed
to construct these numerical variables in Appendix C.2. In the following preliminary
analysis, we confirm that higher reviews tend to predict better objective qualities,
which is to be expected if higher reviews are informative of the underlying qualities
of the drugs. Recall that while expert reviews are at the drug level, HIV drugs are
often consumed in bundles. The method we use to aggregate our numerical measures
at the bundle-level is addressed in Section 3.3.
3.2.3 Summary Statistics at the Individual and Drug
Levels
We report summary statistics for the variables at the individual level in our sample
in Table C.1. The average age of individuals in the sample is 47, with 54% of the
sample composed of white individuals. Close to 20% of the individuals have only a
20To verify that our results are not being driven by the particular way in which the reviews were
coded, we also employed two undergraduate students at Johns Hopkins University to separately
recode the magazine reviews. Results of the paper are robust to differences in coding, and the
robustness checks are available upon request from the corresponding author.
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high school degree, while 50% of the sample has completed college education, and
54% of people work full time. The average CD4 count of individuals in our sample
is 536, with 54% of individuals reporting non-decreasing CD4 count from one visit to
the next and 63% of the patients reporting no ailments such as fatigue, sweats, and
headache. Relevant to our later analysis, 20% of patients have a CD4 count of less
than 300, which indicates that they are living with AIDS.
Table C.2 provides summary statistics for drug characteristics from Positively
Aware. In total, we have data on 27 different drugs produced by 9 unique manufac-
turing firms that were on the market at some point during the period between 1997
and 2008.21 In 1997, there were only 9 drugs to choose from, while in the last period
of analysis, patients could choose between 25 different drugs.22 On average, drugs
have 13 side effects reported in clinical trials and have molecular interactions with 14
other drugs. The average pill burden for a drug is roughly 2 tablets, taken twice a
day.23
Descriptive statistics also show that the average rating given by doctors is higher
than that given by activists (2.02 versus 1.89) and the difference is statistically sig-
nificant at the 10% level. This suggests that, on average, activists are more critical.
This result is reinforced when we compare the fraction of 1’s, 2’s and 3’s given by the
21A detailed description of all the drugs, with information on when each drug entered (and exited)
the market, is presented in Table C.16 of Appendix C.2.
22We have a total of 27 different drugs over the entire sample period because two drugs, Hivid
and Preveon, were discontinued before 2008.
23The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) maintains a list of drugs with ‘preferred
regimen’ status. On average, 7 out of the 27 drugs on the market were given the preferred status.
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two sets of experts, as shown in Figure C.2. While an activist gives the lowest rating
36% of the time, the doctor rates a drug 1 only 26.7% of the time. On the other
hand, a drug gets the highest rating by a doctor 27.2% of the time, while the activist
rates a drug positively 24.7% of the time. Differences in reviews provide preliminary
evidence that drug reviews could depend on differences in how experts weight differ-
ent drug characteristics when generating a review. The last row of Table C.2 shows
that the doctor and activist disagree (i.e., give a different rating for the same drug)
39% of the time.24
3.2.4 Drug Reviews, Drug Characteristics and Con-
sumption
Though our main analysis focuses on the impact of reviews on the consumption
of combinations of drugs, here we show key patterns emerging when we examine indi-
vidual drug reviews and consumption. First, we show that higher expert reviews are
associated with better objective drug qualities recorded in Positively Aware. Second,
we show that higher reviews predict higher drug consumption. Third, we examine
how reviews evolve over a drug’s lifecycle, showing that reviews seem to decline over
time and that the decline is partly explained by the introduction of new and bet-
ter drugs into the market. The latter point is important since it will serve as the
24Note that having two sources of reviews for each drug helps identify separate effects on demand
for reviews written by doctors and reviews written by activists.
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motivation for our IV strategy, which is described in Section 3.4.
Reviews and Drug Characteristics. We first investigate how objective drug qual-
ities as reported in the annual drug guide relate to expert reviews. Table C.3 presents
results for the relationship between doctor and activist ratings and objective qual-
ities in the magazine. As a first pass, in columns (1) and (2) we regress doctor’s
and activist’s reviews, respectively, on drug characteristics by OLS. We find that, on
average, better drugs receive better reviews, as expected. The higher the number of
reported side effects and number of drug interactions of a drug, the lower both ex-
perts’ ratings (though the effects are statistically insignificant). As dosage frequency
increases, indicating difficulty in following the drug regimen and increasing the chance
of missed doses, both expert ratings decrease. Given that reviews are categorical vari-
ables, in columns (3) and (4) we estimate the same relationships using an ordered
probit model. We obtain qualitatively similar results.
Reviews and Consumption. To relate reviews to consumption at the drug level,
we use individual-level data from MACS to construct drug-level pseudo market shares,
defined as the fraction of people taking a particular drug out of the total number of
HIV+ men in the sample.25 Table C.4 presents the results of the linear regression
of drug-level market shares on reviews. Columns (1) and (2) show that both the
doctor’s and activist’s reviews are positively correlated with demand. Column (3)
25Note that these are not market shares since patients often take more than one drug at the same
time. Hence, our pseudo market shares do not add to 1. These variables just measure the number of
people that take a given drug normalized by the total number of potential consumers at any given
point in time. We formally address consumption of bundles in Sections 3.3 and 3.4.
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shows that when we control for both ratings together along with drug characteristics,
both reviews still predict demand positively. Next, we show that average doctor
reviews of other drugs in a combo predict lower demand. In Column (4), we add the
average of reviews of all other drugs taken by the individual at the same time. While
we continue to find that higher reviews by the doctor and the activist predict higher
demand for the drug, higher doctor reviews for other drugs in the combination predict
lower demand. In other words, when consumers combine drugs, for some drugs in
their bundle, higher doctor reviews predict lower demand.26 This finding suggests
that, once we explicitly treat consumers as choosing bundles, we might expect a
negative relationship between doctors’ reviews and market shares, a point we revisit
in Section 3.5.1 when we conduct our combo-level analysis.
Reviews over Drug Lifecycle. In our data, drugs are reviewed every year by two
experts and reviews might differ not only across experts but also over time. Here,
we look at how reviews for the same drug vary over the lifecycle of the drug. In
general, there seems to be a downward trend in reviews from both experts over time,
as illustrated in Figure C.3, which plots average reviews by drug age.27 One possible
reason for this “deflation” could be that reviews are relative to other available drugs
in the market.28 If so, as technology improves, reviewers may lower their reviews for
26On the other hand, higher activist reviews for other drugs in the combination predict higher
demand for the drug.
27Age of the drug is measured as the number of years the drug has been on the market since
introduction i.e. drug age = current year - year of introduction.
28Another possibility, explored further in Section 3.3.2, is that objective drug qualities decrease
over time and reviews just reflect this decrease. When studying drugs at the combination level, we
show some evidence of declining effectiveness, but reduced side effects as drugs in each treatment age.
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older drugs. What once was regarded as a stellar drug may now be superseded by
a newer, better drug. If this is the case, we would expect variation in how much
reviews change for a given drug depending on the quality of rival drugs, conditional
on a drug’s own characteristics (which might also change over time). We test this
hypothesis in Section 3.3.2, and we find that higher rival drug qualities lead to lower
drug reviews. This finding motivates our identification strategy. The idea is to
instrument for reviews using the qualities of the set of rivals at any point in time,
where the set of rivals shifts over time due to the emergence of new drugs. A more
detailed discussion of our identification strategy is presented in Section 3.4.2.
3.3 Combination-Level Data: Preliminary
Analysis
Section 2 presented some basic patterns in the data linking individual drug reviews
to objective drug qualities and drug consumption patterns. However, HIV drugs
are rarely consumed individually and are instead consumed in bundles. Bundles of
HIV drugs are sometimes called cocktails, combination therapy, combos or simply
treatments. At a given point in time, a large majority of HIV patients combine two
drugs or more in order to build a regimen that is effective in fighting HIV. Figure C.4
These patterns are consistent with drugs losing effectiveness as the virus mutates and with patients
gaining tolerance to side effects as doctors and patients gain experience with it. In subsequent
analyses, we control for time-varying objective drug qualities to capture changes in quality over
time.
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shows the distribution of drugs in the combinations. Conditional on taking at least
one drug, around 35% of HIV+ individuals take 3 drugs at the same time, while 25%
are following monotherapy, i.e., only taking one drug at the time of a visit.
A challenge for our subsequent analysis is that each drug is reviewed individually.
In this section, we describe how we construct a data set for analysis of demand for
combinations, which requires that we aggregate expert reviews for individual drugs
into combination-level reviews. Then, we conduct a preliminary data analysis relating
expert reviews to the demand for HIV drug combinations. We end this section with
a brief discussion of alternative interpretations of the observed relationships between
drug reviews and drug demand.
3.3.1 Combination Data Variable Construction
For our combination-level analysis, we construct the choice set, reviews for combos,
combo-level objective qualities and combo-level market shares.
Constructing the Choice Set. To study bundling, we return to the individual-
level data from MACS and construct a dataset of combination choices. We restrict
our attention to individuals who are taking 5 or fewer drugs during one visit.29 This
leaves us with a total of 1,248 unique drug combinations. A large number of these
combinations, however, are taken by a small number of individuals and can be thought
29Patients who are taking more than 5 drugs simultaneously are also those who are extremely sick
and are probably taking multiple drugs to find one that can decrease their viral load. Since this is
not how patients, on average, make medication choices, we exclude these people from our sample.
By doing so, we lose less than 2% of observations.
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of as experimental combos. Therefore, in order to reduce the choice set so that it
is manageable from a computational perspective, as well as to be able to construct
objective quality measures for every combination in our choice set, we define a ‘fringe’
category, in which we bunch together all combinations that are taken by fewer than
25 people.30 That leaves us with 79 unique combinations in total across all years in
our sample plus the ‘fringe’ category and the outside option of taking no HIV drug.
Note, however, that the choice set is evolving over time. The number of combos
over time (excluding the outside option) is illustrated in Figure C.5.31 We see that
patients have a minimum of 21 drug combinations to choose from for the first year of
our sample (early 1997), and a maximum of 58 drug combinations in late 2004.
Constructing Reviews for Drug Combinations. The doctor and activist reviews
are only available for each drug, not all possible drug combinations. Therefore, in
order to construct expert reviews for different drug combinations, we average over the
reviews of each drug component of the combination.32 Table C.5 presents summary
statistics for the combo level variables. Panel (A) shows that the average doctor’s
rating for a combination is 2.18, while the average activist’s reviews is 2.07.33 Con-
sistent with our previous results, doctor’s reviews are significantly higher. Using the
30A combination can belong to the fringe category in some visits, but not others.
31Over the span of 10 years, different drug combinations fall in and out of favor, especially when
new drugs are introduced on the market. The total number of unique alternatives we observe is 81,
but not all of these alternatives are encountered in any given time period.
32For example, if AZT has a rating of 2 and 3TC has a rating of 1, then the combination AZT-3TC
will have a rating of 1.5
33In [148], who also study HIV drugs, promotions are studied at the individual drug level even
though drugs are prescribed in combinations with others.
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average of the individual drug reviews as our measure of combo-level reviews may
overlook factors that consumers consider, such the minimum or maximum review
or the variance. To explore these possibilities, after we present our main results,
we assess robustness to alternative ways of aggregating individual drug reviews for
combinations. Main findings are robust to these alternatives.
Objective Qualities: Effectiveness and Side Effects. A key advantage of the
MACS data set is that it allows us to construct objective drug combination quality
measures that are crucial for our demand estimation. In particular, we follow [110] and
construct two objective quality measures for each treatment at each point in time.34
The first measure aims to quantify treatment effectiveness at improving underlying
health (as measured by CD4 count levels). The second provides a measure of the
treatment side effects. We allow these measures to change each period over the
lifecycle of a treatment to capture possible differences over time in treatment quality
that arise, for example, if HIV mutates.35
The way we construct these objective quality measures for the different combina-
tions is as follows. For each combination c, we run a probit regression on demographic
characteristics to predict c’s probability of non-decreasing CD4 count and probabil-
34From now on we use the terms “treatment” and “combination” interchangeably even though
some consumers are observed taking a single drug.
35When we allow these quality measures to vary over time, we find that drug efficacy tends to
decline and drug side effects become less frequent. The latter may occur if individuals or doctors
get used to using or dosing medications over time. Alternative specifications we have tried include
pooling observations to generate a single measure over time for a drug and rolling averages, which
generate smoother changes over time. Our results are robust to the use of constant quality measures
over time or rolling averages and the results of this robustness check are available upon request from
the corresponding author.
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ity of no ailment on the sample of individuals taking c. To obtain treatment-level
objective quality measures, we average over all individuals taking c. We allow the
quality measures to be time-variant by letting the probit coefficients vary over time.
Formally, to construct combo c’s measure of effectiveness, we first fit a probit model
of the likelihood that a patient will experience an increase in his CD4 count in period
t+ 1 when taking combo c at time t, conditional on patient’s characteristics. Letting
CD4nt be individual n’s CD4 count at time t, we estimate the model







on the sample of individuals who take combo c at time t, where Xnt is a vector of
demographic controls including patient n’s age, race, education level and work status
as well as n’s CD4 count at t, and Φ(·) is the standard normal cdf. We fit the
probit for each combo separately (so that all coefficients can vary for each combo),
and obtain the predicted probability of non-decreasing CD4 count for each individual
in each visit. In order to get the combo-level predicted probabilities, we average
the predicted probabilities over all n that take combo c at time t. The aim with
this procedure is to compute an average treatment effect, which consumers use when
choosing a treatment.
Similarly, our measure of combo c’s side effects is calculated as the average like-
lihood that combo c produces no ailments.36 Let noailnt be a dummy variable that
36We define an individual as being free of ailments if he reports no nausea, headache, fever,
116
CHAPTER 3. POSITIVELY AWARE? CONFLICTING EXPERT REVIEWS
AND DEMAND FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT
takes the value 1 if patient n experiences no ailments at time t and 0 otherwise. We
fit the model
Prct(noailnt = 1|Xnt) = Φ(X ′ntβnoailct ), (3.2)
on the sample of individuals who take combo c at time t and where Xnt is the same
vector of covariates as above and Φ(·) is the standard normal cdf. As before, we fit a
probit model for each combo and obtain the predicted probability of no ailment for
each individual in each visit. In order to get the drug-level predicted probabilities,
we then average the predicted probabilities over all n that take combo c at time t.37
Table C.5, panel (B) presents the summary statistics for the constructed objective
quality measures. The probability of non-decreasing CD4 count for the average drug
combination is 55%, while the probability of no ailment in the period after taking the
combination is 60%.38
Constructing treatment quality measures using individual-level data stands in
contrast to other demand estimation contexts, where product characteristics (e.g.,
car size or horsepower) are directly observed in the data. Controlling for consumer-
level characteristics when constructing these measures helps to eliminate potential
diarrhea, or drenching sweats in a period.
37An alternative approach would use probit coefficients to predict treatment effects for each set
of consumer characteristics. We do not follow this approach since the aim is to capture that con-
sumers likely know how drugs work in general, but not necessarily how they work for each set of
characteristics, many of which are not observable. However, we note that reduced-form estimates
remain unchanged if we allow for consumer-specific treatment effects.
38Since the ‘fringe’ category is composed of different combinations within and across different
time periods, each of which have their own objective quality value, we average over different combos
within the same time period t to obtain one value per time period for the objective quality measures
for ‘fringe’.
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selection bias. Most importantly, we control for individual health, which could drive
treatment choices along with one-period-ahead health or side effects, and could thus
lead to bias in estimated coefficients if omitted.39 We return to the discussion of the
consequences of using constructed treatment characteristics in Section 3.4.2, when we
discuss our identification strategy
Combination Market Shares. As mentioned before, the data in the MACS dataset
are collected twice a year. Thus, we can construct market shares for two six-month
periods (one for April–September and the other for October–March) in each year. Let
Cnct be a dummy variable that takes value 1 if patient n responded as having taken
combination c at visit t and 0 otherwise. Then, the market share for combination c






where Nt is the total number of HIV+ individuals at visit t.
Table C.5, panel (C) provides some summary statistics of combo-level market
shares.The average market share of the outside option (taking no drug) is 19%, while
the market share of the ‘Fringe’ group is, on average, 32%. The average market
share for combos other than ‘fringe’ and the outside option is 1%, with a maximum
market share of 18%. Figure C.6 shows how the market share of the outside option
39In additional results, we also control for consumer-level fixed effects in constructing treatment
quality measures and find that main results do not change.
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evolves over the time frame of our analysis. The market share for the outside option
picks up in October 1999, reaching a peak in April 2003, going down for the next
few visits, and then finally reaching a maximum in October 2007. In April 2008, the
market share of the outside option fall drastically, from 27% to around 15%. This is
because in April 2008, the drug Atripla was introduced on the market, which had a
market share of 19% at the time of introduction, suggesting that a large proportion
of patients who were off drugs switched to Atripla after its introduction.40
3.3.2 Preliminary Combination-Level Analysis
Having constructed combo-level reviews, objective quality measures and market
shares, we now establish reduced-form results from our data. First, we study objective
qualities and demand to see if individuals prefer better quality drugs. Second, we
explore the relationship between combo-level reviews and objective qualities. Third,
we relate reviews and demand before and after we control for objective qualities to
see if reviews have predictive power even after we control for observable drug quality
levels.41
Table C.6 shows how objective qualities from the MACS dataset and from the
Positively Aware drug guide relate to combo demand.42 Columns (1) through (3)
40Other significant changes in the share of the outside option can also be linked to years when
new drugs were introduced on the market.
41We also construct objective qualities from MACS at the drug level and relate reviews and drug
consumption before and after controlling for these objective qualities, and find similar patterns.
However, since that is not how drugs are actually consumed, we do not report these results as part
of our reduced form analysis, though the results are available upon request from the authors.
42We construct combo-level qualities using the Positively Aware data by averaging across all drugs
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show that if the probability of no ailment of a combo increases (i.e., the side effects
from taking that combo go down), the demand for that combo increases. Similarly, if
the probability of non-decreasing CD4 count increases with use of a specific combo,
then its demand is also larger. In particular, a one unit increase in the probability
of no ailment increases demand by 2.1%, while a unit increase in the probability of
non-decreasing CD4 count increases demand by 1.7%.43 In columns (4) through (6)
we also control for the objective qualities included in the annual guides. As expected,
as the number of reported side effects for a combo increases, or if the pill burden
or number of food restrictions for a combo increases, the demand for that combo
goes down. Lastly, if dosage frequency for a combo increases (which increases the
likelihood of missed doses and not being able to follow the drug regimen strictly),
demand for that combo decreases. Therefore, all these results show that people, on
average, prefer better quality drugs.
In Table C.7, we show how objective qualities from MACS relate to expert reviews.
We find that both the doctor and the activist give a higher rating to combos that
have a high probability of no ailment and probability of non-decreasing CD4 count.
Therefore, consistent with drug-level results using objective qualities from Positively
Aware, we find that doctor and activist reviews are higher for combos that are more
effective and have lower side effects.
in a combo. To calculate the combo-level pill burden, however, we sum the total number of pills
taken for each drug in a combination.
43The average marginal effect is calculated by first calculating the marginal effect for each combo-
year dyad and then averaging across the entire sample.
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Moving on to how market shares are related to reviews and drug qualities, Ta-
ble C.8 presents results from regressions of market shares on reviews and objective
qualities at the combo level. In columns (1) and (2), we see that a doctor’s review
positively predicts combo demand, even when we control for objective quality mea-
sures. Columns (3) and (4) show that an activist’s review also positively predicts
combo demand, even after controlling for objective quality measures. However, in
columns (5) and (6), when we include both experts’ reviews together, we see a re-
versal of sign for the doctor: that is, the doctor’s review now negatively predicts
combo demand (though the coefficient is not significant when we control for MACS
objective qualities). On the other hand, a higher activist’s review positively predicts
combo-level market share, even after we control for the probability of no ailment and
probability of non-decreasing CD4 count.
Lastly, in Figure C.7, we plot the combo ratings and combo objective qualities
over combos’ lifecycle. Panel (a) shows how doctors’ and activists’ reviews evolve as
the combo ages. As in the previous reduced form analysis, we find that combo reviews
are decreasing as the drug combination ages. Panel (b) shows how the probability of
no ailment and probability of non-decreasing CD4 count of combos changes over the
combination lifecycle. As the drug ages, probability of no ailment increases, indicating
that side effects decrease as the combination becomes older, while the probability
of non-decreasing CD4 count decreases for older combinations, suggesting that old
combinations are not as effective as new ones. In panel (c), we plot residual ratings
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after controlling for objective quality measures of the combo, and find that even when
we control for the evolution of a combination’s quality, reviews are still decreasing
over time. We use this fact to motivate our identification strategy in Section 3.4.2.
3.3.3 Expert Reviews and Demand: Alternative
Explanations
The previous analysis provides preliminary evidence that expert reviews published
in Positively Aware predict market shares for HIV drugs. However, there are several
alternative explanations which would also explain the correlation between combo
reviews and combo demand that we find in the data. One possibility is that reviews
do not drive demand but simply reflect a drug’s observed qualities which in turn
is the demand driver. However, in the previous section, we showed that reviews
continue to predict market shares even after we control for objective quality measures.
Still, it is possible that reviews are not exogenous. One concern is simultaneity. It
may be the case the reviews simply reflect demand patterns. Another possibility is
unobserved drug heterogeneity. Magazine reviews may reflect drug qualities that are
not observable to the econometrician but are observable to patients and doctors who
make treatment decisions and therefore affect demand. We defer the formal treatment
of the endogeneity issue to Section 3.4.
A second possibility is that the impact of reviews on demand for HIV drugs
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is indeed causal, but that it is not due to patients reading Positively Aware. For
example, Positively Aware magazines are not the only source of information about
drugs available to patients. Other magazines could provide similar information and
affect demand. However, to our knowledge, Positively Aware drug guides are the only
source of information in which patients can read reviews about all FDA approved
drugs from a doctor and HIV activist in a systematic way.
The third potential story is related to the previous one. It could be that the true
demand driver is collective, evolving knowledge about drug quality and the reviews are
just reflecting it. We provide some suggestive evidence that this is not the case. We
do so by exploiting the timing of the reviews relative to when we observe drug choices.
In particular, given that the annual guide is published in January/February and data
on drug choices are collected both in April and October, we consider three distinct
market share windows for our analysis. Relative to reviews published in Jan/Feb of
year t, we can construct market shares realized before the magazine is published (i.e.,
market shares for the window April-September in period t − 1), market shares for
the window that overlaps with the period during which magazine is published (i.e.,
market shares for the window October-March in period t − 1), and market shares
realized after the magazine has been published (i.e., market share for the windows
April-September and October-March in period t). The timeline of events is illustrated
in Figure C.8.
If the reviews solely capture evolving social knowledge about drugs, by construc-
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tion they would only capture knowledge from the 12 months prior to publishing.
Thus, we could falsify the social knowledge hypothesis if reviews at period t have no
effect on market shares for the before and during windows at t− 1, after controlling
for reviews at t− 1. Running these two regressions we find that reviews at t have no
significant effect.44 Moreover, when we run the regressions of market shares for the
after window at t and t+ 1 we find that reviews published in period t do have a sig-
nificant effect. We interpret this as suggestive evidence that reviews from Positively
Aware (rather than evolving social knowledge) drive demand for HIV drugs.
3.4 Econometric Model and Identification
In this section, we specify an econometric model of demand for HIV combos. The
purpose is twofold. First, the estimates of the coefficients of the structural model will
allow us to obtain own- and cross-review elasticities. Estimates of these elasticities are
crucial to quantify the effect of reviews on health outcomes. Second, the model makes
explicit the identification issue we need to overcome and will help in understanding
the logic behind our identification argument.
44Results available upon request.
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3.4.1 Model Specification
We study combination choice using a discrete choice demand model at the combo
level. Let Jt denote the choice set at time period t. To explain choices, we allow
the utility of an individual i, i = 1, . . . , n, from consuming combination j ∈ Jt at
time t to depend on the drug characteristics — both observed and unobserved — as
well as his demographic characteristics, health status, and unobserved taste shocks.45
Let xjt be a K-dimensional vector of observed product characteristics — including
the doctor’s and activist’s reviews — at time t and let ξjt denote the unobserved
product characteristic.46 Also, let zit be an R-dimensional vector of individual i’s
characteristics at time t, including age, education (dummies for whether the individual
is a high school or college graduate), work status (dummy for full-time work), race
(dummy for black), AIDS status, and whether or not the individual was taking the
same combination in the last period. We can then write the utility i gets from




xjtkβ̃ik + ξjt + εijt, (3.4)
45The model we specify here is used to estimate the impact of reviews on demand. Following
literature on advertising, which uses a similar framework, our model treats reviews as an additional
product characteristic that drives demand by affecting the utility of a given product. Alternatively,
a fully specified structural demand model could treat individuals as not having preferences over
reviews, but as relying on reviews for additional information about drug characteristics over which
they do have preferences, but do not fully observe. If so, in our current setup, we are recovering a
reduced-form relationship between reviews and demand. This limits the types of counterfactuals we
can perform, a point we return to in Section 3.5.3.
46Note that we treat each combination j at time t as a separate product, so that AZT–3TC in
1997 is a different product that AZT–3TC in 1998.
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with




where β̃ik is individual i
′s taste for product characteristic k, which depends on his
observed individual-level characteristics zi, and εijt represents a shock to preferences





xjtkβ̄k + ξjt (3.6)
denote the mean utility level we can rewrite the utility as
uijt = δjt +
∑
k,r
xjtkzirβkr + εijt. (3.7)
Market-level aggregate consumer behavior is obtained by aggregating the choices
implied by the individual utility maximization over the population distribution of
individual characteristics. Let P(w) denote the distribution of w in the population,
where w = (z, ε) is the vector of observed and unobserved individual characteristics.
Then, conditional on product characteristics, the fraction of individuals who choose
combination j at time t is given by integrating over the set of individual characteristics
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where
Ajt(δ,β; x) = {w : maxp∈∅∪Jt [uipt(w; δ,β,x)] = uijt}. (3.9)
Details about the estimation of the demand model are presented in Appendix C.3.
3.4.2 Identification
We know from Section 3.3.2 that doctors’ and activists’ reviews reflect observed
combo characteristics. An endogeneity problem might arise if reviews also reflect
unobserved combo quality. This problem is analogous to the price endogeneity issue
that arises in traditional demand estimation (see, e.g., BLP). In order to establish a
causal relationship between reviews and market share, we leverage the idea that the
choice set is evolving over time, with new drugs entering the market every period.
If combo entry is exogenous and reviews are relative, then the entry of new combos
provides exogenous variation in reviews over the combo’s lifecycle. Specifically, we use
the average of (observable) qualities of rival combos on the market as an instrument for
reviews. The intuition is that the quality of rival drugs should change the reviewer’s
relative valuation of an incumbent drug’s quality, and will hence affect the review for
that drug. Table C.9 shows how the doctor’s and activist’s reviews of a combo relate
to the average quality of rival combos on the market. As expected, results show that
(i) an increase in the objective qualities of a combo is positively correlated with its
reviews; and, more importantly, (ii) an improvement in the average probability of no
127
CHAPTER 3. POSITIVELY AWARE? CONFLICTING EXPERT REVIEWS
AND DEMAND FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT
ailment or the average probability of non-decreasing CD4 count of rival combinations
leads to a decrease in the reviews for the combination. A joint test of the rivals’
objective quality measures show that both the average probability of non-decreasing
CD4 count of rival combinations and the average probability of no ailment of rival
combinations significantly affect doctors’ and activists’ ratings for a combination.
Our key identifying assumption is that rival treatments enter the market exoge-
nously (technically, that the observable characteristics are orthogonal to the unob-
served characteristics, X ⊥ ξ) and affect reviews by experts but are uncorrelated
with incumbent treatment unobserved characteristics.47 Note that the logic behind
our instruments is similar in spirit to the one in BLP. In BLP, prices are endogenous
and need to be instrumented. Prices are set in equilibrium by oligopolistic firms,
and therefore prices not only depend on a given product’s characteristics but also
on the characteristics of its rivals. Therefore, rivals’ characteristics are valid instru-
ments under the assumption that product characteristics — other than price — are
exogenous. In contrast to the instruments in BLP, we construct the treatment char-
acteristics, and hence the instruments, from our patient-level data as described in
Section 3.3.1. To the extent that there is selection into treatments based on patients’
characteristics, this could undermine the validity of our instruments. To mitigate the
effects of selection, we control for patient demographics and health in (3.1) and (3.2)
47It would be a threat to identification if the observed objective characteristics of rival treatments
were correlated with the experts’ reviews as well as with the unobserved characteristics of incumbent
combinations.
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and in our specification of the utility function.48
3.5 Findings
This section presents our main findings. We begin with estimates from our baseline
model. Results are qualitatively similar to the reduced-form estimates we obtained
previously. Higher activist reviews increase demand, whereas higher doctor reviews
lower demand, even after controlling for objective treatment characteristics. To in-
vestigate this point further, we distinguish between cases where doctors and activists
agree versus disagree. We show that higher reviews increase demand when doctors
and activists agree. However, when they disagree, healthier consumers tend to follow
the activist’s review, while less healthy patients follow the doctor. The remainder
of this section provides evidence that these patterns reflect how consumers trade off
their demand for long run health and their distaste for treatment side effects.
48To fix ideas, if a negative change in a given drug’s ξ induces patients to switch to other drugs
in a random way, this poses no problem to us. The problem arises when switchers are, for example,
systematically sicker. This could affect the drug characteristics we construct in a way that would
potentially render them (positively) correlated with ξ. Controlling for individual health helps to
mitigate this problem. It is worth noting that if sicker patients switch to other drugs, which lowers
the quality of other drugs we estimate, this would induce a positive correlation between instruments
and unobserved drug quality, which would bias estimates upward. As instruments negatively affect
demand (through a negative impact on reviews), upward bias means our estimates are biased towards
zero, suggesting that we estimate a lower bound on the true causal positive impact of reviews on
demand.
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3.5.1 Estimates of the Baseline Model and Ro-
bustness
We begin by estimating the parameters of the demand model given by equations
(3.4) and (3.5), treating reviews from both experts as additional treatment charac-
teristics, instrumenting for both using the average of the rivals’ objective qualities.
Table C.10 reports the logit coefficients. Column (1) shows that a higher doctor’s
review on its own raises demand. A one-unit increase in the doctor’s review increases
the likelihood the treatment is chosen by 1.5%.49 This result also holds when we
control for objective treatment qualities (see column (2)). Similarly, columns (3) and
(4) show that a higher activist’s review for a combination increases consumption. A
one-unit increase in the activist’s review for a combination increases demand by 2.2%.
When we include both reviews together, we find that a positive review from the
doctor lowers demand, while a positive review from an activist raises demand (see
columns (5) and (6)). This finding is in line with our previous reduced-form estimates.
Keeping objective qualities and the activist’s review fixed, an increase in the doctor’s
rating of one unit leads to a 2.9% decrease in demand, while an increase in activist’s
rating, keeping the doctor’s review fixed, raises demand by 4.3% .50
49The percentage change in the probability of choosing a combo alternative is calculated for each
combo-year dyad and then averaged across the entire sample.
50Note that in our IV logit specifications, once we control and instrument for activist’s reviews,
the coefficient on probability of non-decreasing CD4 count is negative. This negative coefficient
captures how patients with different attributes (for example, those who are working full-time) may
prefer combinations with fewer side effects but lower efficacy. In fact, in our demand model with
individual attributes, we show that once we explicitly account for differences in patients’ attributes
such as race, work status etc., both objective qualities affect utility positively.
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Next, we assess whether our results are robust to different ways of constructing
combo-level reviews. First, we generate reviews for combos by calculating the per-
centage of drugs that have a rating of 3 in the combination. This relaxes the implicit
cardinality assumption arising from our use of averages. Demand estimates using this
definition of reviews are given in panel (A) of Table C.11. Notice that results are simi-
lar to our original specification. As before, we find that doctor’s and activist’s reviews
positively predict demand when including them one at a time; however, when we con-
trol for both at the same time, we find that a higher doctor’s review lowers demand.
In panel (B) of Table C.11, we include a variable that controls for the percentage of
drugs in a combo that have a rating of 2. Results do not change appreciably, though
the negative effect of the doctor’s review becomes insignificant.
Our second alternative specification includes the average review across all drugs in
a combination as well as the standard deviation of reviews within each combination.
The aim is to capture how patients value both the mean and the variance of individual
product attributes (drug-level reviews) in the bundles they consume ([158], [159]).51
Results using this specification are shown in panel (C) of Table C.11. For the doctor’s
review, after controlling for the average review, an increase in the standard deviation is
negatively related to demand, though the relationship is not statistically significant.
For the activist’s review, the standard deviation of the reviews has a positive but
51[158] and [159] describe individual choices among an assortment of multi-attributed items in
which the assortment could be made from a subset of all items available to individuals. In their
mode, they allow a mean level of attribute for the assortment as well as the dispersion of attributes
to affect utility.
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insignificant relationship to demand once we control for objective qualities of the
combination. In columns (5) and (6), we again see the reversal in sign for the average
doctor’s review when we include both the activist and doctor’s review. Since we find
no evidence that the standard deviation of reviews affects demand significantly once
we control for the average reviews, we omit the standard deviations.52
3.5.2 Disagreements and Demand
At face value, it seems puzzling that demand responds negatively to higher doc-
tor’s reviews. To explore this result, we consider how consumers respond to reviews
when the doctor and activist agree versus when they disagree. In fact, disagreements
occur quite frequently: for roughly 60% of combination-time dyads.
To understand disagreements better, we first assess how they evolve over the age
of the combination. For this exercise, we define a dummy variable, which takes a
value of one if the activist’s review is not equal to the doctor’s review. Panel (a)
of Figure C.9 depicts disagreements over drug age. Not surprisingly, most of the
disagreements between the two experts occur when the combination is ‘new’, i.e., the
combination has only been on the market and consumed by patients for three years
or less. The experts disagree 75% of the time when the combination is new, but
over time, specifically, when the combination has been part of the choice set for more
than 6 years, the frequency of disagreements between the two experts declines.53 We
52Additional robustness checks are presented in Appendix C.4.
53An exception is a high proportion of disagreements occurring when combo age is 11. This is
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also consider the magnitude and direction of the disagreements. Panel (b) of Figure
C.9 shows the distribution of the difference between the activist and doctor’s review.
When the two experts disagree, we are more likely to see a higher average review for
the combination from the doctor than the activist.
Next, we explore the effect of disagreements on demand by interacting the doctor’s
and activist’s review with a dummy for disagreements, and interacting the doctor’s
review with a dummy for agreements.54 The coefficient on the interaction between
agreements and the doctor’s review captures the relationship between reviews and
demand when the experts agree, while the coefficients on the interactions between
disagreement and the two expert reviews capture which expert patients follow when
experts disagree. The estimates are shown in Table C.12 (for comparison, column (1)
reproduces the last column of Table C.10). In column (2), we see that, on average, if
both experts agree and the combination gets a higher review, then demand rises. This
finding means that patient demand rises when both the activist and the doctor ratings
for a treatment are high. On average, a one unit increase in experts’ rating when both
experts agree leads to an increase in the probability of taking a combination by 1.8%.
55 To put this in context, to achieve the same increase in demand, the probability
driven by a set of combinations of old drugs (d4T, 3TC and Nevirapine). Removing these combina-
tions does not affect our results.
54Note that when the experts agree, the activist’s and doctor’s reviews take the same value, so
interacting the dummy for agreement with the activist review is redundant.
55We calculate the average marginal effect by first calculating the marginal effect for each combo-
visit dyad, and then averaging across all combo-year dyads. Similarly, the percentage change in
the probability of choosing a combo alternative is calculated for each combo-year dyad and then
averaged across the entire sample.
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of non-decreasing CD4 count would have to increase by 1.06 percentage points and
the probability of not experiencing side effects when taking the treatment would have
to increase by 0.85 percentage points.56 According to Table C.5, on average across
treatments, these measures of quality are 55% and 60%, respectively. Thus, a rise in
reviews from neutral to positive has the same positive impact on demand as a 1.93%
increase in our measure of effectiveness or a 1.43% increase in the probability of not
causing ailments.57
When the experts disagree, however, a higher activist’s review for a combination
increases demand, while a higher doctor’s review lowers demand. This result suggests
that that the negative coefficient on the doctor’s review from our baseline model is
driven by cases when the doctor’s review is at odds with the activist’s. To explore
this point a bit further, we also assess potential asymmetries in how patients respond
to conflicting expert reviews. We calculate the difference between the activist’s and
doctor’s review for each drug, generate a dummy for whether this difference is positive
(the activist gives a higher review compared to the doctor) or negative (the activist’s
review is lower than the doctor’s) and interact these dummies with the two experts’
reviews. Results are shown in column (3) of Table C.12. Estimates show that when
reviewers disagree, there is a significant effect on demand when the activist’s review
is lower than the doctor’s. In particular, an increase in the doctor’s (activist’s) review
56These figures are calculated by using the marginal effects for the two objective qualities reported
in Section 3.3.2.
57This comparison is similar to one made in [139], who show how much non-standard content
(advertising) is worth versus standard determinants of demand — in their case, interest rates for
loans.
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has a negative (positive) effect on demand when the reviews differ and the activist’s
review is lower than the doctor’s review. When the activist’s review is higher that
the doctor’s, the effect of both reviews is not significant. This result provides further
nuance to baseline estimates. The negative reaction to the doctor’s review arises
when doctors and activists disagree and, moreover, when the activists downgrades a
drug that the doctor does not.
3.5.3 Conflicting Reviews, Side Effects and De-
mand for Expertise
Having established the importance of disagreements in explaining how patients
respond to expert reviews, we now turn to understanding patient responses. We
present three sets of empirical results, all of which rely on rich data on objective
treatment qualities and individual characteristics. First, disagreements arise when
treatments are effective, but have strong side effects, in which case they receive lower
reviews from the activist, but not from the doctor. Second, following the activist’s
review over the doctor’s leads to worse health, but reduced side effects. These results
suggest the possibility that patients follow the activist in an effort to avoid treatments
with harsh side effects. If so, we might expect sicker patients, who are willing to suffer
side effects if drugs are effective, to follow the doctor. Our third empirical finding is
to show that this is the case.
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3.5.3.1 Disagreements and Objective Qualities
We begin by exploring the relationship between experts’ ratings and objective
qualities of treatments (probability of no ailment and probability of non-decreasing
CD4 count) in the choice set to see if there are differences in how experts respond to
these qualities when they disagree. In Table C.13, we regress doctors’ and activists’
ratings on the objective qualities of own and rival combos for the sample of combos
for which the two experts disagree. We find that when the two experts disagree, the
doctor’s review increases if the probability of non-decreasing CD4 count of a combo
increases, while the probability of no ailment has a statistically insignificant effect on
doctor’s rating. On the other hand, the activist responds positively to both objective
quality measures.
We also consider the correlation between our two objective qualities grouped by
the age of the combination in Table C.14. When experts agree, on average, the
correlation between the two objective qualities is positive, implying that combos
are either good or bad in both dimensions when there is an agreement.58 On the
other hand, when there are disagreements between the two experts, the correlation
between objective qualities is negative. The last two columns of Table C.14 show that
when there is a positive difference in the reviews (the activist gives a higher review
than the doctor), on average, there is a strong negative correlation between the two
58For combination age between 4 and 7 years, the correlation between the objective qualities when
the experts agree is negative. However, we find that the negative correlation is driven by combos
containing two drugs: Zerit and Kaletra. Once we exclude those combos when calculating the
correlations, we get a positive, though insignificant correlation between the two objective qualities
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objective qualities, implying that for these combos, the trade-off between effectiveness
and side effects is important. For cases in which we observe negative differences (the
doctor gives a higher review than the activist), the correlation between the two quality
measures is negative but small, except for when combo age is between 4 and 7 years.59
3.5.3.2 Expert Reviews and Health Outcomes
Next, we examine how reviews affect individuals’ health outcomes (through their
effect on combo choices). The way we quantify these effects is the following. We simu-
late how drug choices would have changed in the absence of the reviews. We consider
three cases: (i) absence of activist reviews; (ii) absence of doctor reviews; and (iii)
absence of both types of reviews. We then construct measures of individual-level
health outcomes based on the counterfactual combo choices. We also simulate fac-
tual health outcomes including both reviews, and compare the counterfactual health
outcomes to the simulated factual ones.60 We focus on two key health outcomes: (i)
the probability of having AIDS in the next period and (ii) the probability of having
no ailment in the next period, both conditional on the individual’s current period
health status.
Our simulation results show that some people might get sicker by defying the
doctor. However, they suffer fewer side effects. Figure C.10 shows the percent change
59The positive correlation in the age bracket between 4 and 7 is again being driven by drugs Zerit
and Kaletra. When we exclude these two drugs from our analysis, we get a negative correlation
when there is a negative difference.
60The simulations are performed by taking a random sample of 10,000 patients with replacement
in each visit.
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in the probability of having AIDS and having no ailments over the entire period of
analysis compared to the baseline case in which the two reviews are present.61 The
dotted vertical lines on the figures indicate the introduction of at least two new drugs
in the months spanning that visit (see Appendix C.5 for details on how the state of
the market evolves over our analysis time period). Panel (a) shows the change in the
probability of AIDS over time for the full sample. When we shut down both reviews,
there is a modest decrease in the probability of AIDS. When we only allow activist
reviews and shut down doctor’s reviews, the probability of AIDS in all time periods
goes down. Under the counterfactual exercise in which we only allow for the doctors’
reviews, we find that the probability of AIDS increases, with a sharp increase between
October 2002 and April 2004, followed by a drop in October 2006. This suggests that
by opposing the doctor’s review (and after controlling for objective drug qualities),
patients are making choices that increase their probability of AIDS, especially so
when good quality drugs are introduced (the probability of AIDS is highest between
April 2002 and April 2004, when 3 new good quality drugs were introduced).62
At face value, the previous finding that patients are hurt when only doctors’
reviews are available seems counterintuitive: they could be better off just by ignoring
61Notice that we are not estimating dynamic effects, but one-period-ahead simulations at different
points in time. While estimating the dynamic effects is certainly of interest to us it is beyond the
scope of this paper.
62We present details on how the state of the market evolves over time in Appendix C.5. Table C.20
shows the date of entry for the new drugs and their initial market share, and Table C.21 provides
some summary statistics of the qualities and reviews for the new entrants at the time of entry and
the state of the market. We can see that entrants are more effective compared to the market average
(with the exception of the two early entrants), while some have fewer side effects but not all. Also
note that while the doctors’ reviews for the entrants are always higher (except for Atripla) than the
market average, activists’ reviews in some cases are lower.
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the doctors’ reviews instead of doing the opposite of what they say. Note, though, that
patients also care about the likelihood of experiencing side effects. To investigate the
effects on the latter, panel (b) of Figure C.10 shows that with only doctors’ reviews
available, the probability of no ailments goes up in all time periods. This shows that
by not following doctors’ reviews in informing treatment choice, patients are more
likely to have AIDS but less likely to have side effects. Therefore, it seems that
patients understand the basic trade off they face and have a greater preference for
drugs which have lower side effects but are less effective. Another interesting finding
is that with only activists’ reviews available, there is an increase in the probability of
no ailment, suggesting that activists’ reviews push patients towards treatment choices
that are more effective and do not cause severe side effects.63
3.5.3.3 Individual Characteristics and Demand for Expertise
Results until now suggest that patient responses to conflicting reviews could re-
flect their attempt to choose treatments with fewer side effects. Effective treatments
with side effects are downgraded by the activist, but not by the doctor. Consumers
with a distaste for side effects may understand this and utilize expertise accordingly.
63We also look at how the effects of reviews on health outcomes differ across individuals’ health
status. Our parameter estimates suggest that since individuals with AIDS follow the doctor’s advice,
and doctors are pushing drugs that are effective, we should expect to see a decrease in the probability
of AIDS for this group. Figure C.11 presents the results for the sample of individuals who have
AIDS in the current period. Figure C.11 (a) shows that when we only have doctor’s reviews, even
individuals with AIDS have a higher likelihood of suffering from AIDS in the next period. However,
we find that once we control for composition effects (people with AIDS may differ in a systematic
way in terms of their other sociodemographic characteristics), there is at least a 1.6% drop in the
probability of AIDS when we only have the doctor’s reviews, with a larger drop after April 2004,
when there is a structural change in the market and new and effective drugs are introduced.
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In particular, consumers may turn to the activist — a fellow patient whose review re-
sponds to side effects — when choosing treatments under uncertainty. A test for this
explanation would consider the behavior of patients who are not necessarily seeking
drugs with fewer side effects, but instead aim to use the most effective treatments
possible.64 Presumably, such patients would be more likely to follow the doctor’s
review. In fact, using the same data set, [110] shows that sicker patients are more
willing to suffer side effects. The reason is that they face stronger incentives to make
costly health investments and use treatments despite their drawbacks. If patient re-
sponses to reviews reflect a distaste for side effects, we might expect sicker patients
to respond more positively to doctors’ reviews in comparison to relatively healthy
patients.
To explore this possibility, we allow parameters on reviews to depend on patient
characteristics as formulated in equation (3.5). Results are presented in Table C.15.
Many results are similar to baseline estimates. On average, individuals prefer combi-
nations that have a higher probability of increasing CD4 count in the next period as
well as those that increase the probability of suffering no ailments. The parameters on
doctors’ and activists’ reviews are both statistically significant, showing that reviews
matter for treatment choice.65 As in the baseline model, a higher activist’s review
increases combo demand, while a higher doctor’s review reduces demand.66
64Appendix C.1 presents a very simple theoretical model that formalizes the logic behind this
falsification test.
65For the base case of a white individual with no AIDS, working part-time, less than college
education, and who is taking the combination for the first time.
66Note, though, that we are already controlling for combos’ objective characteristics. Therefore,
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Turning to individual characteristics, we find that different types of patients react
differently to reviews. The most striking finding is that sicker patients — defined
as those living with AIDS — respond positively to both the doctor’s and activist’s
reviews. In other words, for patients with AIDS, we find a reversal in sign in how
patients respond to the doctor’s review. While healthier patients respond positively
to the activist and negatively to the doctor, sicker patients respond positively to
both. This finding provides strong evidence of our preferred explanation of patient
responses to conflicting reviews. When doctors and activists agree, their reviews lead
to increases in demand for HIV treatments. When they disagree, healthier patients
use information from the reviewer who downgrades effective treatment with harsh side
effects. However, sicker patients who face strong incentives to invest in their health
despite harsh side effects do the opposite. They utilize expertise from the doctor, the
expert reviewer who recommends treatments based on their effectiveness and largely
ignores side effects.
Interacting demand responses to expertise with individual characteristics provides
several more nuanced lessons about how individuals incorporate possibly conflicting
expert reviews into their decisions. We show that the coefficient on full-time work
is negative and significant, meaning that full-time workers are more likely to avoid
medication altogether. This is consistent with the idea that individuals may choose
when we say that the patient’s preferences align with the activist’s or do not align with the doctor’s,
this statement is conditional on objective characteristics. In other words, patient’s preferences (do
not) align with the activist’s (doctor’s) above and beyond objective effectiveness and side effects
measures.
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not to take life-saving treatments if the side-effects interfere with daily functions.
Moreover, full-time work predicts a relatively large increase in demand due to a high
activist’s versus a high doctor’s review. This suggests that full-time workers are
somewhat more likely to use information from the activist, which makes sense if they
aim to use treatments with fewer side effects.67
We also find evidence of differences by race in how consumers respond to expert
reviews. In particular, our estimates suggest that black men are just as likely to follow
the activist’s review as are white men, but are less likely to follow the doctor. This
is consistent with distrust of the medical establishment among African Americans,
which has been documented in many studies [160]. A similar pattern emerges for
individuals without a college degree: they place more weight on the activist’s review.
In other words, apart from health differences in how individuals respond to different
sources of information, there may also be socioeconomic gradients. One concern with
the pattern we find is that it suggests that lower-educated and non-white individuals
may put their long-run health at more risk compared to white men with higher
educations. Patients may follow the activist’s review in an effort to use medical
treatments that make side effects less probable. However, when they become ill, they
67The estimated positive coefficient on the dummy variable ‘same combo last period - other’,
even though not significant, can be interpreted as capturing switching costs or, alternatively, as
learning-by-doing (i.e., experience). That is, if a patient was taking a combo (other than the fringe)
in the previous period, it is more likely that the patient will continue taking that same combo in
the current period. On the other hand, if the patient was taking a combo from the fringe class in
the previous period, it is more likely that the patient will switch out of the fringe in the current
period. This could be interpreted as a cost associated with continuing experimenting with a rarely
used treatment. The interactions also indicate that college-educated individuals respond positively
and significantly to doctors’ reviews, but not to activists’ reviews.
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turn to the doctor’s review in an effort to recover their health. Indeed, following the
activists review when in relatively good health makes most sense if patients switch
gears when in poor health. If less educated or non-white individuals are less likely
to switch to following the doctor’s review when in poor health, they may be less
likely to recover. If so, the expertise provided by the activist may be more harmful
to blacks as compared to whites. If so, patient advocates (in our case, encapsulated
in the activist’s review) may provide information that is more helpful to more highly
educated individuals at the expense of others. Future research could further explore
how various information sources affect demand and health outcomes for different
socioeconomic groups.
3.6 Conclusion
We have demonstrated that expert reviews affect demand in a high-stakes context:
the market for HIV treatments. Much research on low-cost information and decision-
making overlooks the idea that consumers often have access to multiple information
sources. Exploiting rich data that includes objective drug qualities, individual-level
health outcomes and multiple reviews, we show that consumer responses depend on
their health along with other observable factors. We argue that these responses pro-
vide evidence that consumers demand information that is aligned to their preferences
over health and side effects, which can vary depending on their current health state.
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According to our results, consumers are not passive consumers of low-cost informa-
tion sources, but actively incorporate information from different sources to make more
informed decisions.
Future work could also compare consumer responses to conflicting reviews when
reviews are side-by-side, as in our case, versus when they are not. For example, how
consumers incorporate information into their choices could be different if acquiring
additional information from a possibly conflicting source is costly. Moreover, future
research could further explore heterogeneity in how individuals respond to various in-
formation sources when making decisions under uncertainty. An experimental setting
could be used to vary not only the source of the information, but also its content.
Moreover, though we have emphasized health differences in responses to doctors’ ver-
sus activists’ reviews, future work could focus on socioeconomic differences in how
individuals respond to conflicting information sources. Such work could allow for an




Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Two Period Model
I develop a simple two period model to understand how an agent’s labor supply
decision responds to private school cost. I consider an economic environment which
begins with the birth of a child with initial ability k0. Period 1 child ability is a
function of k0 and mother’s time with the child, m1. In period 2, the mother chooses
between sending her child to a public or private school. I define a variable s which
is 1 if the child is sent to private school and 0 if the child goes to public school.
Sending the child to private school incurs a cost p, while public schools are free of
cost. Schooling is also added as an input to the second period child ability production
function, in addition to mother’s time with the child in period 2, m2, and last period’s
child ability k1. Let ht ∈ {0, 1} where ht = 1 if the female works full-time and spends
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no time with the child, and ht = 0 if the female does not work in period t. The
female’s maximization problem can then be written as:
V (c1, c2, k1, k2) = max
c1,c2,h1,h2,s
U(c1, k1) + βU(c2, k2)
s.t
c2 + sp = R(w1h1 +N − c1) + w2h2, (A.1)
k1 = g1(m1, k0), (A.2)
k2 = g2(s,m2, k1), (A.3)
1 = h1 +m1, (A.4)
1 = h2 +m2. (A.5)
where w1 and w2 is market wage in period 1 and 2, and N is non-labor income.
Equation (A.1) is the female’s inter-temporal budget constraint and equations (A.2)
and (A.3) define the child ability production function in periods 1 and 2. I assume
that utility is concave in all its arguments, and that
g1(1, k0) > g1(0, k0), (A.6)
g2(1, 1, g1(1, k0)) > g2(0, 1, g1(1, k0)) = g2(1, 0, g1(1, k0)) > g2(0, 0, g1(1, k0)), (A.7)
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g2(1, 1, g1(0, k0)) = g2(0, 1, g1(1, k0)), (A.8)
g2(1, 0, g1(1, k0)) > g2(0, 1, g1(0, k0)) > g2(0, 0, g1(0, k0)). (A.9)
We can analyze eight cases derived from the two period theoretical model:
Case 1: h1 = 1, h2 = 1, s = 1
V 1(c1, c2, k1, k2) = U(c
1∗
1 , g1(0, k0)) +βU(R(w1 +N − c1∗1 ) +w2− p, g2(1, 0, g1(0, k0))),
(A.10)
Case 2: h1 = 1, h2 = 0, s = 0
V 2(c1, c2, k1, k2) = U(c
2∗
1 , g1(0, k0)) + βU(R(w1 +N − c2∗1 ), g2(0, 1, g1(0, k0))), (A.11)
Case 3: h1 = 1, h2 = 0, s = 1
V 3(c1, c2, k1, k2) = U(c
3∗
1 , g1(0, k0)) + βU(R(w1 +N − c3∗1 )− p, g2(1, 1, g1(0, k0))),
(A.12)
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Case 4: h1 = 1, h2 = 1, s = 0
V 4(c1, c2, k1, k2) = U(c
4∗
1 , g1(0, k0)) + βU(R(w1 +N − c4∗1 ) + w2, g2(0, 0, g1(0, k0))),
(A.13)
Case 5: h1 = 0, h2 = 1, s = 1
V 5(c1, c2, k1, k2) = U(c
5∗
1 , g1(1, k0)) + βU(R(N − c5∗1 ) + w2 − p, g2(1, 0, g1(1, k0))),
(A.14)
Case 6: h1 = 0, h2 = 1, s = 0
V 6(c1, c2, k1, k2) = U(c
6∗
1 , g1(1, k0)) + βU(R(N − c6∗1 ) +w2, g2(0, 0, g1(1, k0))), (A.15)
Case 7: h1 = 0, h2 = 0, s = 1
V 7(c1, c2, k1, k2) = U(c
7∗
1 , g1(1, k0)) + βU(R(N − c7∗1 )− p, g2(1, 1, g1(1, k0))), (A.16)
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Case 8: h1 = 0, h2 = 0, s = 0
V 8(c1, c2, k1, k2) = U(c
8∗
1 , g1(1, k0)) + βU(R(N − c8∗1 ), g2(0, 1, g1(1, k0))), (A.17)
where cj∗1 is the solution to the first order condition with respect to c1 for case j.
Within this simple framework, a number of testable propositions emerge which
are consistent with the observed data patterns.
Proposition 1. The mother will choose to work full-time and send her child to private
school over not working and sending her child to public school if the marginal utility
from the difference in consumption – which includes monetary investments in the child
– is greater than the marginal utility from the difference in child cognition between
the two scenarios.
Proposition 2. A drop in p unambiguously increases the likelihood of choosing pri-
vate schooling for the child.
Proposition 3. An increase in p leads to an increase in end of period 1 savings.
Proposition 4. For women switching from public to private school (i.e. women at
the school choice margin), or for women who have chosen private schooling for their
child, an increase in p will increase female labor supply if the change in utility from
lower consumption is more than the change in utility from higher child ability.
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A.1.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1:
Proof. The proof can be generalized to any of the eight cases presented above. The
female opts for case i versus case j, j 6= i, if and only if
V i(c1, c2, k1, k2) − V j(c1, c2, k1, k2) > 0, (A.18)
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[g2(0, 1, g1(1, k0)) − g2(1, 0, g1(0, k0))]
(A.19)
Proof of Proposition 2:
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where case j is any case in which the child goes to public school and case i is any case










decrease in p will lead to an increase in period 2 consumption, so that the probability
of switching the child from public school to private school increases. In particular,
the probability of switching from any case in which the child is going to public school
(cases 2, 4 ,6 and 8), to any of the cases in which the child is going to private school
(cases 1, 3, 5 and 7) increases when p decreases.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Proof. The proof extends from equation (A.19). Specifically, when switching from
any case in which the mother chooses public schooling for her child (cases 2, 4, 6 and
8) to any case in which the child is sent to private school, the mother will choose case
1,3 or 5 over case 7 (not working in either period and sending her child to private
school) if and only if the marginal utility from the increase in child ability due to
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the mother spending time with the child in both periods is lower than the marginal
utility from higher consumption due to labor market earnings.
Proof of Proposition 4:
Proof. End of period 1 savings, ak∗1 = w1h
k∗








p decreases, we would expect period 1 consumption to change by a non-negative
number, which would lead to a decrease in savings
A.1.2 Comparative Statics with respect to w1, w2,
and N
Increase in w1 and w2































where case j is any case in which the female does not work in period 1 while case
i is any case in which h1 = 1. Under this scenario, an increase in w1 leads to an
unambiguous increase in the probability of switching to cases in which the mother









= 0 and an
increase in period 1 earnings will lead to an increase in consumption, which raises the
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probability that the change in utility from higher consumption will exceed the loss in
utility from lower child ability due to the mother spending less time with the child.
Conditional on working in the first period (cases 1-4), an increase in w1 will
increase period 1 and period 2 consumption, leading to an increase in the probability
that the mother switches her child from public school to private school (since the
extra earnings can be used for paying the higher school fee). Lastly, an increase in







































where case j is any case in which the female does not work in period 2 while case i
is any case in which h2 = 1. Under this scenario, an increase in w2 will lead to an
increase in the probability of switching to cases in which the mother is working in









= 0 and an increase in period 2
earnings will lead to an increase in consumption, which raises the probability that the
change in utility from higher consumption will exceed the loss in utility from lower
child ability due to the mother spending less time with the child in period 2.
Conditional on working in period 2, an increase in w2 will result in a non-negative
change in period 1 and period 2 consumption, leading to an increase in the probability
that the mother sends her child to a private school instead of a public school (since
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i.e. savings will decrease if period 1 consumption increases as a result
of w2 rising.
Increase in N
From the envelope theorem, an increase in N will increase the probability of
































As an example, consider the choice between case 7 and case 8. The labor supply
pattern of the mother is the same for both cases, and the only difference is the
choice of private school in case 7. When N increases, c7∗1 and c
7∗
2 increases, which
decreases the consumption gap between case 8 and 7, and increases the probability
that the additional utility from higher child ability will exceed the change in utility
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A.2 Data Appendix
I use data from two main sources: NLSY79 and NLSY79 Child and Young Adult,
and supplement it with time use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) and private school fee data from privateschoolreview.com. The NLSY79
Cohort is a longitudinal project that follows 12,686 American youth born between
1957-64, and were 14-22 year olds at the start of the survey. Around 52% of the
individuals surveyed are women, and the survey was conducted annually through
1994, after which the survey was conducted on a biennial basis. The sample consists
of a core random sample, and an oversample of blacks, Hispanics, poor whites and
the military. Data is collected on respondents’ schooling and employment, as well as
marriage and fertility decisions. I use demographic data on the women of NLSY79
and construct the following key variables:
Labor Supply: NLSY79 collects data on annual hours worked by the respondent in
the past calendar year. I use annual hours worked data to conduct analysis at the
intensive margin. I also construct annual employment rates for each respondent for
each year, where the respondent is counted as employed if she worked more than six
weeks in the past calendar year.
Income: The NLSY reports the wage income and net family income in the past
calendar year for each respondent. While total income from wages and salary in the
past calendar year is self-reported, the net family income is a created variable, which
is the sum of all sources of income for the family, including income from the spouse,
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farm income as well as welfare income.
Assets: NLSY started collecting data on savings and assets from 1985. The savings
variable is an indicator variable which is an answer to whether the respondent or
respondent’s spouse has any cash kept in a safe place at home, or money in a savings or
checking accounts, money market funds, credit unions, U.S. savings bonds, Individual
Retirement Accounts (IRA or Keogh), certificates of deposit, personal loans to others
or rights to an estate or an investment trust. In a follow-up question, respondents are
asked the total amount of money assets altogether in these instruments. NLSY also
contains a created variable on family net worth, that is available from 1985 onwards,
and is constructed by summing all asset values and subtracting all debts. Missing
assets and debt values are imputed.
Child’s Schooling and Test Scores: A separate survey of all children born to the
NLSY79 female respondents began in 1986, in which children were followed from the
time of their birth. In addition to all the mother’s information from NLSY79, the
child survey includes information about the child’s schooling, as well as demographic
and development information collected from the mother and the child. In particu-
lar, the NLSY79 Child and Young Adult (C-NLSY79) survey contains information
about the type of school the child studies in, which helps identify whether the child
is going to a public school or private school. Additionally, C-NLSY79 also reports
cognitive assessment scores for each child in the survey. I use the standardized scores
on the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT), Peabody Individual Achievement
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Test-Reading Recognition subtest (PIAT-R) and the Peabody Individual Achieve-
ment Test - Mathematics subtest (PIAT-M) as measures of child’s cognitive ability.
Standardized scores are an age-specific transformation of the raw scores. The PPVT
is a vocabulary test for standard American English and provides a quick estimate
of verbal ability and scholastic aptitude for children less than 5 years of age. The
PIAT-M measures attainment in mathematics. Finally the PIAT-R measures word
recognition and pronunciation ability.
Time Use Data: Though NLSY79 and C-NLSY79 are a rich source of data on labor
supply, wages and child development, it does not collect time use data for parents
and children. To supplement data from NLSY79, I use time diary data from the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) Child Development Supplements (CDS-
I and CDS-II). The PSID is a longitudinal dataset of a nationally representative
sample of about 5000 American families that was started in 1968. In 1997, the PSID
began collecting data for up to two children from a random sample of families that had
children under the age of 13 in the Child Development Supplement (CDS-I). A follow-
up survey was conducted in 2002-3 (CDS-II), when children were between 8-18 years
of age. The entire CDS sample consists of 3,500 children residing in 2,400 families.
The CDS collects extensive data on child development and time use. For two days per
week (one weekday and either Saturday or Sunday), children (young children were
aided by a primary care giver) filled out a detailed 24 hour time diary in which they
recorded all activities during the day and who else (if anyone) participated with the
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child in these activities. At any point in time, the children recorded the intensity of
participation for both parents. Parents could either be actively involved (active time
use), or just be around without being engaged in any activity with the child (passive
time use). I construct annual time use measures for the mother by summing both
active and passive time for a day, multiplying the daily hours by 5 for the weekday
and 2 for the weekend day to get a weekly measure (using a Saturday and Sunday
report adjustment) and then multiplying by 52 for the annual measure.
Private School Fee: State level tuition data is obtained from privateschoolreview.com,
a website that lists private schools in each state, gives information about the average
tuition at the state and national level, as well as information on average acceptance
rates, student body demographics and teacher student ratios. The website also hosts
articles for parents on why they should send their child to private schools, and if they
choose to do so, how they can pay for it. Data on tuition is available at the state
level only for the school year 2014-2015. I extrapolate data for my sample years, I
adjust the fee data by inflation.1
Construction of the Private School Variable
In order to construct the private school dummy, I use the question in which re-
spondents are asked of the type of school their child goes to. The respondents can
1Adjusting the 2014-2015 tuition data for inflation can be concerning since private school tuition
rose more than inflation in the 1990s and 2000s. While I use the inflation-adjusted tuition data
for the reduced-form analysis, I allow for measurement error in private school tuition data in the
structural model.
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choose between private school, public school, home schooling and no school. This
question was added to the NLSY79 after 1998, therefore, for some children, informa-
tion about school type is available when they are older than 4-6 years of age (when
children start primary school).
The private school variable is meant to capture the preference for better schooling
and additional cost associated with it. I let the private school dummy to be 1 if
the mother of the child has ever reported that her child goes to private school. This
means that mothers of children who ever went to a private school (even if they, at
some point, were going to a private school and switched to a private school, or vice
versa), are coded as “private school mothers”.
There are a total of 39 children who switch schools. Out of these 39 children, 9
switch from a private school at younger ages to public school when they are 12 or
older, while the remaining 30 children switch from a public school to a private school.
The ages of children for whom this question is answered for the first time range from
4 years of age till 14 years of age, so that the maximum extrapolation about child’s
school type is 8 years, which happens for 151 children (8.68% of individuals who
respond to this question)). 71% of the children for whom this information is available
for the first time are less than 12 years of age.
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Construction of the Aggregate Test Score
The PPVT is available for children who between four and five years of age, while
the PIAT-R and PIAT-M are available for children of age five and above. There are,
however, cases in which all three test scores are not available for the child. To avoid
losing any information due to missing values, I follow [24] and pool the three test
scores available by averaging across all three age-adjusted standardized test scores.
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A.3 Additional Results from Preliminary
Analysis
I report additional descriptive statistics and regression results of the impact of
private schooling decision on annual hours worked, probability of being employed
and the probability of having savings. For the labor market results, I report the
marginal effects of choosing private school for different sub-populations by stratifying
on education and non-labor income quantiles.
A.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table A.9 shows that among the more educated mothers, a higher proportion
send their child to private schools and that private school enrollment is higher among
households with higher family income.2 I also find the proportion of people who are
sending their children to a private school in each county. In my NLSY79 sample,
the counties with highest private school enrollment are Alexandria City, Virginia;
Baltimore, Maryland; Hamilton, Indiana; Hamilton, Ohio and St. Joseph, Indiana.3
2In the sample, non-labor income is distributed as follows: Quantile 1: ≤ $6,207, Quantile 2:
Between $6,208 and $21,384, Quantile 3: Between 21,385 and $36,731, and Quantile 4: Between
$36,732 and $1,167,736.
3Note that in order to calculate the proportion of children going to private school in each county,
I exclude counties where less than 50 people are residing in my sample. I am also aggregating
individuals over all years.
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A.3.2 Auxiliary Regressions
To capture the dynamics of maternal labor supply, I interact private school choice
with six different periods of the female’s life cycle: (1) 4-6 years before the child
is born, (2) 1-3 years before the child is born, (3) 0-2 years after childbirth, (4)
3-5 years after childbirth, (5) 6-8 years after childbirth, and (6) 9-11 years after
childbirth. Table A.10 presents the results of the average marginal effect of choosing
private schooling over different periods of the mother’s life cycle. The results mirror
the patterns observed in the graphical analysis. Even after controlling for mother’s
education, non-labor income, and state fixed effects, I find that private school mothers
are working significantly more before the child is born, and significantly less than
public school mothers after childbirth.
Table A.11 presents marginal effects of private schooling at the extensive margin.
On average, the probability of being employed 4-6 years before birth is 5% higher
for private school mothers, while after the child starts school, private school mothers
are 9.3% less likely to be working. In Table A.12 and Table A.13, I present results
for the marginal effect of choosing private schooling on the probability of having
savings and asset holdings of females. After controlling for demographic, education
and geographic controls that may affect the assets that households accumulate, I find
that the probability of having savings 4-6 years before child’s birth is 8.1% higher
for private school mothers, and is 3.8% higher just before the child is about to start
private schooling. I also find that asset holding of private school mothers is higher
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after the first two years of child’s birth.
Finally, in Table A.14, I show how the labor supply and savings response of
women belonging to different education and non-labor income sub-groups. The first
column shows that for all values of non-labor income, private school mothers with
lower education levels work more hours annually when the child is 3-8 years of age
and work less after the child is 3 years of age as their education level rises. This is
consistent with the graphical evidence presented earlier, which showed that private
school mothers with less than a high school degree were working more hours that
public school mothers, but more educated mothers were spending more time with
their children after 3 years of age. Columns 2 and 3 show that higher educated
private school mothers at all levels of non-labor income do hold more assets just
before the child is about to start school.
A.4 Additional Results for Structural Es-
timation
This section presents additional results from the structural estimation. Section C.3
presents the algorithm employed for the Bayesian estimation. Next, I show additional
results for goodness of fit.
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A.4.1 Solution Method for Structural Estimation
This section describes the [50] Bayesian estimation algorithm. The fundamental
idea behind the algorithm is to not only treat the parameters but also the value
functions and expected value functions as objects that have to be updated at each
Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) iteration. The algorithm consists of three steps:
1. The Parameter Updating Step (Metropolis-Hastings algorithm):
First, draw a candidate parameter vector from the proposal density Θ(s)∗ ∼
q(Θ(s)∗|Θ(s)), where Θ(s) is the parameter at the sth iteration, and q is assumed
to follow the Gaussian distribution centered at Θ(s). Then, evaluate the Method
of Simulated Moments objective function G(Θ) = (MN −MS(Θ))′WN(MN −
MS(Θ)) conditional on Ω









We then accept Θ(s)∗ with probability P , i.e.
Θ(s+1) =

Θ(s)∗ with probability P
Θ(s) with probability 1− P.
2. The Dynamic Programming (or Bellman equation iteration) Step:
The following Bellman equation step is nested within the parameter updating
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, k = 1, . . . , ns.
(A.27)
where D is the choice tuple at time t, k indexes the choice, and ns is the number
of choices in period t.
3. Expected Value Approximation Step:
The expected value function approximation is computed using information from
earlier iterations of the MCMC algorithm. The idea is to approximate the
expected value functions at Θ(s) by looking at value functions that were already
calculated on earlier iterations of the MCMC algorithm, emphasizing parameter


















where Θ(j) denotes a parameter value from an earlier iteration (j) of the MCMC
algorithm and V (j)(Ωt+1,Θ
(j)) is the value function at state point Ωt+1 that was
calculated on iteration (j).4 Finally, W (Ωt+1,Θ
(j)) is a weighting function that
4Note that in equation (A.28) I only have a single sum over iterations because in an abuse of
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formalizes the notion of closeness between Θ(s) and Θ(j). I follow [50] and define








where Kh is a kernel with bandwidth h = 0.02.
As the number of iterations grows large, the output of this algorithm generates con-
vergence to the posterior distribution of the parameter vector, as well as convergence
to the correct (state and parameter contingent) value functions. I initialize the algo-
rithm using an arbitrary vector of starting values. Therefore, the sum in eq (A.28)
needs to be taken on a moving window of more recent iterations. I solve the full model
(with value function iterations) for the first 2000 “burn-in” iterations, and then start
the expected value approximation. I use a moving window of the last 100 iterations
to calculate the sum in eq (A.28). I also solve the full model after every 100 iterations
to ensure the approximation is not far away from the true value function.
A.4.2 Results
Table A.15 (a) reports logit coefficients used to calculate the transition probability
for having a child in the next period. Estimates show that the probability of having a
notations, I am letting the expression inside the sum to represent the expected value function at
t + 1, where the expectation is taken over the stochastically evolving state space (in my model,
number of children, marital status and child ability in the next period evolve stochastically).
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child goes down as a woman’s age increases. However, compared with women who are
high school dropouts, women belonging to higher education groups are more likely to
have a child. Blacks and married women are also more likely to have child in the next
period. Table A.15 (b) reports the logit coefficients for calculating the probability of
entering into marriage conditional on being unmarried in the last period. Estimates
show that the probability of marriage increases with education, but goes down with
age and is also lower for blacks as compared to white and hispanic women. The
probability of being married is also lower for women who have a child greater than
six years of age. Finally, Table A.15 (c) shows that the probability of transitioning
out of marriage increases with age, is higher for blacks, and goes down as education
of the mother increases, and is higher if the woman has a child greater than six years
of age.
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A.5 Tables
Table A.1: Summary Statistics
Public Private
Mean S.d Min Max N Mean S.d Min Max N
Hispanic 0.07 0.26 0 1 59304 0.05 0.22 0 1 16839
Black 0.13 0.34 0 1 59304 0.06 0.23 0 1 16839
White 0.80 0.40 0 1 59304 0.89 0.31 0 1 16839
Urban 0.75 0.43 0 1 55447 0.84 0.37 0 1 15568
Protestant 0.05 0.21 0 1 59114 0.06 0.24 0 1 16795
Baptist 0.20 0.40 0 1 59114 0.12 0.32 0 1 16795
Episcopalian 0.02 0.12 0 1 59114 0.03 0.19 0 1 16795
Lutheran 0.07 0.25 0 1 59114 0.04 0.20 0 1 16795
Methodist 0.08 0.27 0 1 59114 0.05 0.23 0 1 16795
Presbyterian 0.03 0.17 0 1 59114 0.04 0.20 0 1 16795
Roman Catholic 0.31 0.46 0 1 59114 0.43 0.50 0 1 16795
Jewish 0.02 0.13 0 1 59114 0.03 0.17 0 1 16795
Other Religions 0.14 0.35 0 1 59114 0.14 0.34 0 1 16795
Less than High School 0.14 0.34 0 1 59304 0.02 0.14 0 1 16839
High School 0.41 0.49 0 1 59304 0.25 0.43 0 1 16839
College 0.26 0.44 0 1 59304 0.23 0.42 0 1 16839
More than College 0.19 0.39 0 1 59304 0.50 0.50 0 1 16839
Age 30.0 7.92 18 53 57532 30.6 8.42 18 53 16190
Age at First Marriage 23.4 4.34 18 50 58946 25.0 4.38 18 46 16778
Age at First Birth 22.9 4.06 13 40 43309 26.2 4.43 13 41 9655
No. of Children 2.82 1.19 1 10 59304 2.88 1.35 1 10 16839
Child Age 7.92 5.78 0 18 37512 7.77 5.55 0 18 8161
Child Care 1st year 0.48 0.50 0 1 56693 0.48 0.50 0 1 15652
Child Care 2nd year 0.52 0.50 0 1 55849 0.54 0.50 0 1 14956
Child Care 3rd year 0.54 0.49 0 1 55048 0.54 0.50 0 1 14873
Annual Wage Income 13.2 12.8 0 194.04 44011 17.6 20.2 0 194.04 13769
Annual Family Income 42.0 64.7 0 1168.3 48281 68.9 108.5 0 1168.3 13629
Annual Non-labor Income 29.6 56.7 -71.5 1167.8 38207 49.2 97.2 -71.9 1167.5 11871
Spouse’s Annual Earnings 32.3 26.5 0 219.78 29040 48.3 42.0 0 219.8 8989
Total Assets 28.6 146.2 0 5955.6 23506 58.6 221.3 0 4637.1 8394
Net Worth 75.8 190.4 -1015 2093.2 35259 148.5 283.2 -605.1 2093.3 9672
Annual Hours 1237.9 932.8 0 8736 56858 1287.1 928.1 0 7950 15985
Annual Employment Rate 0.78 0.41 0 1 56858 0.81 0.39 0 1 15985
Full-time Work 0.43 0.50 0 1 56858 0.45 0.50 0 1 15985
Part-time Work 0.35 0.48 0 1 56858 0.36 0.48 0 1 15985
No Work 0.22 0.41 0 1 56858 0.19 0.39 0 1 15985
Spouse’s Annual Hours 2198.2 677.5 0 8736 34409 2325.1 675.9 0 8736 10172
PIAT - Math 103.7 13.6 65 135 9,528 109.2 12.2 65 135 1,752
PIAT - Reading Recognition 106.6 14.4 65 135 9,481 112.0 12.1 65 135 1,749
PPVT 96.9 18.2 0 158 6,215 105.2 17.5 20 158 687
Test Score 219.7 81.0 0 424 11,748 261.9 59.1 95 428 1,756
Private School Fee 8.96 3.87 2.13 26.82 76143
Notes : Family Income, Wage Income, Non-labor Income, Spouses’ Annual Earnings, Total
Assets, Net Worth and Private School Fee are in constant 1990 dollars (using the Bureau of
Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index - All Urban Consumers (CPI-U)). The values have
also been divided by 1000. All summary statistics are weighted using the sampling weights
provided by NLSY79. Annual Employment Rate reports the average of a dummy which is 1
if the respondent has worked more than 6 weeks in the past calendar year. The respondent is
considered as having worked full-time if she worked more than 1600 hours in the past calendar
year, part-time if she worked less that 1600 hours but more than 6 weeks, and unemployed (no
work) if she worked less than or equal to 6 weeks in the past calendar year.
Test Score is a composite measure of test score for the children of NLSY79, which is created by
averaging over the standardized PIAT-Math, PIAT-Reading Recognition and PPVT scores.
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Table A.2: Descriptive Regressions
Private Annual Hours Employment Rate
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Private -13.7 -38.1∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗
(10.3) (10.8) (0.02) (0.03)
Age 0.14∗∗∗ 207.3∗∗∗ 208.3∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗
(0.00) (4.41) (4.42) (0.011) (0.011)
Age Square -2.76∗∗∗ -2.76∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00)
Married 0.01 -86.3∗∗∗ -86.2∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗
(0.02) (9.63) (9.64) (0.025) (0.03)
No. of Children 0.03∗∗∗ -190.2∗∗∗ -189.9∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗
(0.01) (4.81) (4.81) (0.010) (0.01)
Child Age -0.15∗∗∗ 5.46∗∗∗ 3.81∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.00
(0.00) (1.18) (1.26) (0.003) (0.00)
Hispanic 0.26∗∗∗ 39.3∗∗∗ 40.8∗∗∗ 0.05 0.05
(0.03) (14.8) (14.9) (0.035) (0.04)
White 0.39∗∗∗ -73.1∗∗∗ -70.2∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(0.02) (11.7) (11.7) (0.03) (0.03)
High School 0.62∗∗∗ 191.0∗∗∗ 195.0∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗
(0.03) (14.9) (15.0) (0.031) (0.031)
College 0.81∗∗∗ 140.2∗∗∗ 146.0∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗
(0.03) (15.5) (15.5) (0.03) (0.04)
More than College 1.05∗∗∗ 190.5∗∗∗ 199.6∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗
(0.04) (17.8) (18.0) (0.04) (0.04)
Non-Labor Income 0.01∗∗∗ -7.90∗∗∗ -7.77∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.95) (0.94) (0.001) (0.00)
Urban 0.18∗∗∗ -19.3∗ -17.7∗ -0.01 0.00
(0.02) (10.5) (10.5) (0.03) (0.03)
Protestant 0.12∗∗ -37.1 -35.9 -0.06 -0.05
(0.05) (25.1) (25.0) (0.06) (0.06)
Baptist 0.15∗∗∗ 157.4∗∗∗ 159.3∗∗∗ 0.07∗ 0.08∗
(0.04) (17.8) (17.8) (0.04) (0.04)
Episcopalian 0.28∗∗∗ 100.1∗∗∗ 103.2∗∗∗ -0.014 -0.00
(0.06) (37.4) (37.4) (0.09) (0.09)
Lutheran -0.11∗∗ 173.6∗∗∗ 172.7∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗
(0.05) (21.6) (21.6) (0.07) (0.07)
Methodist -0.05 83.9∗∗∗ 83.6∗∗∗ 0.08 0.08
(0.05) (20.9) (20.9) (0.05) (0.05)
Presbyterian 0.42∗∗∗ 76.6∗∗∗ 80.8∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.05) (26.1) (26.1) (0.08) (0.08)
Roman Catholic 0.42∗∗∗ 76.2∗∗∗ 80.3∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(0.04) (16.8) (16.8) (0.04) (0.04)
Jewish 0.08 -102.6∗∗ -101.9∗∗ -0.11 -0.10
(0.07) (42.4) (42.6) (0.10) (0.10)
Other religions 0.35∗∗∗ 64.2∗∗∗ 67.6∗∗∗ 0.01 0.02
(0.04) (19.1) (19.1) (0.05) (0.05)
N 47842 47842 47842 47842 47842 47842 47842
Notes: The dependent variables for each column, respectively, are: 1) An indicator variable for whether
the respondent sends her child to a private school, 2) Annual hours worked by the respondent, and 3) an
indicator variable for whether the respondent worked more than 6 weeks in the past calendar year. Total
Assets, Wage Income, Non-Labor Income and Family Income have been divided by 10,000 and have been
converted to constant 1990 dollars using BLS Consumer Price Index - Urban Workers (CPI-U). * p <
0.10,** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01; standard errors are given in parentheses.
169
APPENDIX A. APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 1
Table A.3: State Space
Variable Description Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
(a) Time-invariant
educi Female’s education level
racei Female’s race
µi Female’s unobserved type
(b) Time-varying
Ait Asset stock available at start of period t
Hit Stock of human capital at start of period t
kit Child’s cognitive ability in period t 7
mit Marital status
nkit No. of children
yit Husband’s income
akit Child’s age 7
pit Private school fee 7 7
Ψ Vector of iid shocks to preferences
ξit Idiosyncratic shock to female’s wage
ξfit Idiosyncratic shock to husband’s earnings process
ηit Idiosyncratic shock to child ability
Notes: The table lists all state space variables and their description. The checkmarks indicate
the phases in which the variable is part of the state space.
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Table A.4: Preference Parameters
Parameter Variable Estimate Std. Error Parameter Variable Estimate Std. Error
(a) Private School Preference Parameters (e) Initial Child Ability
γs0 Constant 0.265 0.018 γ
k0
0 Constant 1.493 0.935
γs12 High School 0.130 0.037 γ
k0
12 High School 0.648 0.144
γs13 Some College or Greater 0.474 0.087 γ
k0
13 Some College or More 0.611 0.201
γs2 No. of children 0.015 0.018 γ
k0
2 Black -0.063 0.093
γs31 Type 1 -0.764 0.448 γ
k0
31 Type 1 -0.090 0.201
γs32 Type 2 -0.246 0.313 γ
k0
32 Type 2 0.033 0.002
γs33 Type 3 0.114 0.056 γ
k0
33 Type 3 0.425 0.071
(b) Consumption Preference Parameters (f) Child Ability Production Function
α1 CRRA parameter 0.354 0.064 β0 Total Factor Productivity 0.781 0.514
γc0 Constant 0.585 0.076 β1 ln k 0.013 0.005
γc1 Child age < 6 -0.091 0.016 β3 lnG 0.990 0.085
γc2 Child age ≥ 6 0.089 0.010 β4 s 0.042 0.014
γc32 High School 0.404 0.115 β5 ln k × ln τ 0.010 0.033
γc33 Some College or More 0.602 0.045 β6 ln k × lnG -0.010 0.009
γc4 No. of children 0.307 0.202 β7 ln τ × lnG 0.069 0.029
γc51 Type 1 0.451 0.041 β8 ln k × s 0.002 0.006
γc52 Type 2 0.062 0.008 β9 ln τ × s 0.153 0.093
γc53 Type 3 0.141 0.023 β10 lnG× s 0.004 0.001
(c) Child Ability Preference Parameters (g) Productivity of Mother’s Time
λ CRRA parameter 0.489 0.116 πτ0 Constant 0.431 0.857
γk0 Constant -0.133 0.782 π
τ
1 Child age < 6 0.746 0.223
γk1 Child age < 6 2.902 1.451 π
τ
2 Child age ≥ 6 0.399 0.351
γk2 Child age ≥ 6 2.001 1.347 π
τ
32 High School 0.232 0.250
γk32 High School 1.014 0.418 π
τ
33 Some College or More 0.227 0.101
γk33 Some College or More 1.058 0.458 π
τ
4 Married 0.045 0.052
γk4 No. of children -0.015 0.161 π
τ
5 No. of Children 0.116 0.082
γk5 Married 0.889 0.305 π
τ
61 Type 1 -0.209 0.803
γk61 Type 1 0.321 0.554 π
τ
62 Type 2 -0.348 0.509
γk62 Type 2 0.347 0.819 π
τ
63 Type 3 0.536 0.081
γk63 Type 3 0.504 0.177 σ
2
η Variance of ability shock 0.805 0.336
(d) Leisure Preference Parameters (h) Type Parameters and Type Distribution
γh0 Constant 0.416 0.240 α
µ
02 Type 1 Constant 0.309 0.151
γh1 Child age < 6 -2.727 0.856 α
µ
112 Type 1 High School 0.426 0.308
γh2 Child age ≥ 6 3.729 1.704 α
µ
122 Type 1 Some College or More 0.195 0.024
γh32 High School 0.240 0.103 α
µ
03 Type 3 Constant -0.172 0.244
γh33 Some College or More 0.336 0.032 α
µ
113 Type 3 High School -0.006 0.004
γh4 No. of children 0.546 0.120 α
µ
123 Type 3 Some College or More 0.335 0.080
γh51 Type 1 0.064 0.018 πµ1 Proportion of Type 1 0.471
γh52 Type 2 0.186 0.564 πµ2 Proportion of Type 2 0.267
γh53 Type 3 0.044 0.034 πµ3 Proportion of Type 3 0.262
Notes: The table reports preference parameters for the method of moment estimation. Standard errors are calculated by
solving the model using the Monte Carlo Markov Chain method 50 times and using those 50 estimates to calculate the
variance of the parameters.
171
APPENDIX A. APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 1
Table A.5: Budget Constraint Parameters
Parameter Variable Estimate Std. Error
(a) Wage Parameters
γw0 Constant 0.992 0.108
γw11 High School 0.002 0.097
γw12 Some College or More 0.458 0.217
γw2 Black -0.114 0.034
γw3 Experience 0.102 0.013
γw4 Experience Squared -0.001 0.006
γw51 Type 1 0.022 0.053
γw52 Type 2 0.340 0.168
γw53 Type 3 0.825 0.086
σ2ξ Wage shock variance 0.170 0.020
(b) Husband’s Weekly Earnings Parameters
γy
h
0 Constant 336.6 50.15
γy
h
11 High School 684.4 230.8
γy
h
12 College and More 461.9 123.4
γy
h
2 Black -48.95 50.15
γy
h
3 t 393.1 162.5
γy
h
4 t squared -0.160 0.016
γy
h
51 Type 1 319.0 708.2
γy
h
52 Type 2 300.6 33.60
γy
h
53 Type 3 -104.4 15.11
σ2
ξh
Earnings shock variance 73.17 45.49
(c) Asset Evolution and Terminal Value Parameters
b Assets lower bound −$41, 520 51547
c Consumption lower bound $164 90.1
cost Cost of other kids 3, 903 1406
αG Proportion of family income 0.03 0.002
αp School fee intercept 3.245 2.713
βp School fee slope 0.822 0.259
σ2p School fee error variance 0.307 0.235
γT1 Value from assets in T 0.004 0.001
γT2 Value from k in T 1.726 0.606
Notes: The table reports female’s wage and husband’s weekly earnings
parameters, as well as the asset evolution equation parameters for the
Method of Moment estimation. Standard errors are calculated by solving
the model using the Monte Carlo Markov Chain method 50 times with
different starting values and using those 50 estimates to calculate the
variance of the parameters.
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Table A.6: Impact of Drop in Private School Fee
(a) 25% Decrease
Full Sample New Entrants Incumbents
Baseline Subsidy %∆ Baseline Subsidy %∆ Baseline Subsidy %∆
Private School 0.27 0.30 +11.1
Log Ability 7.27 7.65 +5.2 1.76 7.60 +332 9.21 9.21 0.00
Hours with Child 431.8 431.4 -0.01 591.1 566.0 -4.23 388.6 388.4 -0.04
Hours Worked 1319 1337 +1.4 1047 2064 +97.1 2064 2052 -0.58
(cond. on working)
Terminal Assets 81.7 84.2 +3.1 12.9 18.5 +43.4 45.8 46.3 +0.91
Mean Wages 12.7 12.3 -3.15 6.34 7.71 +21.6 7.08 7.07 -0.11
(b) 75% Decrease
Full Sample New Entrants Incumbents
Baseline Subsidy %∆ Baseline Subsidy %∆ Baseline Subsidy %∆
Private School 0.27 0.50 +85.2
Log Ability 7.27 7.67 +5.5 5.04 6.49 +28.7 9.21 9.20 -0.04
Hours with Child 431.8 441.5 +2.25 550.6 592.0 +7.52 388.7 390.7 +0.51
Hours Worked 1319 1293 -1.97 1168 1103 -5.57 2064 1106 -46.4
(cond. on working)
Terminal Assets 81.7 80.5 -0.01 84.8 80.6 -4.95 45.8 45.2 -1.45
Mean Wages 12.7 12.3 -3.15 13.0 12.1 -6.90 7.05 6.89 -2.27
Notes: The table reports changes in life cycle outcomes under counterfactual scenarios with universal subsidies. Panel (a)
reports results for the experiment in which everyone gets a 25% subsidy. Panel (b) reports results for the experiment in
which everyone gets a 75% subsidy. Baseline results are averages with estimated parameters and observed private school fee
in the data. Results for log ability, assets and mean wages are calculated for period 25 (terminal period). Results for private
schooling, hours with child and hours worked are calculated by averaging over all time periods.
Table A.7: Subsidy with Asset Test
Full Sample New Entrants Incumbents
Baseline Subsidy %∆ Baseline Subsidy %∆ Baseline Subsidy %∆
Private School 0.27 0.43 +56.2
Log Ability 7.27 7.29 +0.28 5.80 5.86 +1.03 9.21 9.18 -0.33
Hours with Child 431.8 429.1 -0.63 545.9 529.6 -6.69 388.5 388 +2.83
Hours Worked 1319 1362 +3.27 1175 1456 +23.9 2063 1633 -20.8
(cond. on working)
Terminal Assets 81.7 87.7 +7.34 60.3 87.9 +45.8 45.8 46.9 +2.36
Mean Wages 12.70 12.73 +0.24 12.0 12.2 +1.7 7.42 5.23 -29.5
Notes: The table reports changes in life cycle outcomes under the counterfactual experiment with subsidy with an asset test.
Women with assets less than 300% of the federal poverty guideline are given a subsidy capped at $6,100. Baseline results
are averages with estimated parameters and observed private school fee in the data. Results for log ability, assets and mean
wages are calculated for period 25 (terminal period). Results for private schooling, hours with child and hours worked are
calculated by averaging over all time periods.
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Table A.8: Subsidizing Different Education Groups
(a) 25% Subsidy to High School Dropouts
% Change
Full Sample New Entrants Incumbents
Private School Enrollment +2.70
Log Ability +1.78 +287 0.00
Hours Worked +0.54 +113 -0.20
(cond. on working)
Terminal Assets +3.87 +116 +0.33
Mean Wages -0.8 +19.6 -0.03
(b) 25% Subsidy to High School Graduates
% Change
Full Sample New Entrants Incumbents
Private School Enrollment +4.82
Log Ability +3.47 +242 0.00
Hours Worked +0.86 +97.1 -0.35
(cond. on working)
Terminal Assets +4.43 +32.2 +0.61
Mean Wages +2.36 +18.4 0.00
(c) 25% Subsidy to Women with Some College or More
% Change
Full Sample New Entrants Incumbents
Private School Enrollment +1.04
Log Ability +0.003 +1.11 0.00
Hours Worked -0.002 +12.5 0.00
(cond. on working)
Terminal Assets -0.01 +0.85 -0.02
Mean Wages 0.00 +0.01 0.00
Notes: The table reports changes in life cycle outcomes under the counterfac-
tual experiment with subsidy for different education groups. Panel (a) reports
results for the counterfactual in which a 25% subsidy is given to high school
dropouts. Panel (b) reports results for the counterfactual in which a 25%
subsidy is given to high school graduates. Finally, panel (c) reports results
for the counterfactual in which a 25% subsidy is given to women with some
college or more. Counterfactual results are compared to the baseline with
no subsidy. Results for log ability, assets and mean wages are calculated for
period 25 (terminal period). Results for private schooling, hours with child
and hours worked are calculated by averaging over all time periods.
Table A.9: School Enrollment by Education and Household Income
(a) Mother’s Education
HSD HS College > College
Public 94.3 85.3 77.5 54.9
Private 5.7 14.7 22.5 45.1
(b) Household Income
Quantile 1 Quantile 2 Quantile 3 Quantile 4
Public 88.9 82.9 77.4 62.6
Private 11.1 17.1 22.6 37.4
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Table A.10: Hours over the life cycle: Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
4-6 Years Before Birth × Private 286.7∗∗∗ 300.1∗∗∗ 201.9∗∗∗ 208.3∗∗∗
(23.98) (42.20) (47.44) (47.12)
1-3 Years Before Birth × Private 142.4∗∗∗ 126.5∗∗∗ 92.94∗∗∗ 86.19∗∗
(26.34) (32.33) (35.06) (34.62)
Child Age 0-2 × Private 53.52∗ 84.56∗∗∗ 41.52 45.02
(28.49) (27.42) (31.00) (30.46)
Child Age 3-5 × Private -112.3∗∗∗ -59.91∗∗ -91.12∗∗∗ -90.66∗∗∗
(31.66) (30.36) (35.13) (34.52)
Child Age 6-8 × Private -148.1∗∗∗ -94.57∗∗∗ -147.3∗∗∗ -153.4∗∗∗
(35.75) (34.24) (36.97) (36.60)
Child Age 9-11 × Private -208.7∗∗∗ -153.5∗∗∗ -178.0∗∗∗ -177.7∗∗∗
(39.37) (37.71) (40.70) (40.09)
Demographic Controls N Y Y Y
Education Controls N N Y Y
Non-labor Income Controls N N Y Y
State Fixed Effects N N N Y
Obs. 59712 50091 32610 32409
Notes: *, **, *** denote p-value < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. Standard errors
are given in parentheses. The table reports the average effect of choosing private school
on mother’s annual hours over different periods of the mother’s life cycle. Demographic
controls include dummies for respondent’s age at first birth, race and marital status,
and controls for respondent’s religion and number of children.
Table A.11: Employment over the life cycle: Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
4-6 Years Before Birth × Private 0.08∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
1-3 Years Before Birth × Private 0.04∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Child Age 0-2 × Private 0.03∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Child Age 3-5 × Private -0.04∗∗ -0.03∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Child Age 6-8 × Private -0.08∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Child Age 9-11 × Private -0.07∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Demographic Controls N Y Y Y
Education Controls N N Y Y
Non-labor Income Controls N N Y Y
State Fixed Effects N N N Y
Obs. 59712 50091 32610 32394
Notes: *, **, *** denote p-value < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. Standard
errors are given in parentheses. The table reports the average effect of choosing
private school on employment decision over different periods of the mother’s life
cycle. The dependent variable is a dummy for whether the female was employed
during the last year. If the female reports working for 6 weeks or less in the past
calendar year, I code her as being unemployed. Demographic controls include
dummies for respondent’s age at first birth, race and marital status, and controls
for respondent’s religion and number of children.
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Table A.12: Probability of Having Savings over the life cycle:
Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
4-6 Years Before Birth × Private 0.16∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
1-3 Years Before Birth × Private 0.18∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.04∗ 0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Child Age 0-2 × Private 0.19∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Child Age 3-5 × Private 0.18∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.04∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Child Age 6-8 × Private 0.15∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Child Age 9-11 × Private 0.15∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Demographic Controls N Y Y Y
Education Controls N N Y Y
Non-labor Income Controls N N Y Y
State Fixed Effects N N N Y
Obs. 46169 39002 24437 24210
Notes: *, **, *** denote p-value < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. Standard
errors are given in parentheses. The table reports the average effect of choosing
private school on the probability of having savings over different periods of the
mother’s life cycle. Demographic controls include dummies for respondent’s
age at first birth, race and marital status, and controls for respondent’s religion
and number of children.
Table A.13: Real Assets over the life cycle: Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
4-6 Years Before Birth × Private 2.20∗∗∗ 0.24 -0.52 -0.78
(0.42) (0.88) (0.89) (0.90)
1-3 Years Before Birth × Private 2.89∗∗∗ 0.78 0.15 -0.15
(0.70) (0.96) (0.97) (0.97)
Child Age 0-2 × Private 3.32∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 0.74 0.45
(0.47) (0.50) (0.50) (0.48)
Child Age 3-5 × Private 6.65∗∗∗ 4.74∗∗∗ 4.14∗∗∗ 3.98∗∗∗
(1.36) (1.33) (1.34) (1.32)
Child Age 6-8 × Private 5.32∗∗∗ 3.36∗∗∗ 2.78∗∗ 2.66∗∗
(1.10) (1.11) (1.11) (1.07)
Child Age 9-11 × Private 7.75∗∗∗ 5.55∗∗∗ 4.86∗∗∗ 4.63∗∗∗
(1.73) (1.73) (1.71) (1.69)
Demographic Controls N Y Y Y
Education Controls N N Y Y
State Fixed Effects N N N Y
Obs. 29423 25609 25609 25351
Notes: *, **, *** denote p-value < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. Standard
errors are given in parentheses. The table reports the average effect of choosing
private school on real assets held by the household over different periods of the
mother’s life cycle. Demographic controls include dummies for respondent’s
age at first birth, race and marital status, and controls for respondent’s religion
and number of children. The dependent variable has been divided by 10,000.
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Table A.14: Labor Supply and Savings Response over Child’s Life Cycle
Annual Hours Real Assets Have Savings Employed
4-6 Years Before Birth × Private × Educ × Non-Labor Inc -0.254 -0.011∗ 0.004 0.004
(0.415) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
1-3 Years Before Birth × Private × Educ × Non-Labor Inc -0.0348 0.015 0.002 0.002∗
(0.204) (0.009) (0.002) (0.001)
Child Age 0-2 Years × Private × Educ × Non-Labor Inc -0.226 0.019∗ 0.002 0.001∗
(0.171) (0.010) (0.002) (0.000)
Child Age 3-5 Years × Private × Educ × Non-Labor Inc -0.755∗∗∗ 0.052∗ -0.001 -0.001
(0.247) (0.027) (0.001) (0.001)
Child Age 6-8 Years × Private × Educ × Non-Labor Inc -0.782∗∗ -0.040 0.002 -0.003∗∗∗
(0.363) (0.039) (0.002) (0.001)
Child Age 9-11 Years × Private × Educ × Non-Labor Inc -0.052 -0.007 -0.001 -0.000
(0.744) (0.026) (0.002) (0.001)
4-6 Years Before Birth -565.2∗∗∗ 0.775 -0.310∗∗∗ -0.070
(27.68) (0.915) (0.076) (0.072)
1-3 Years Before Birth -408.0∗∗∗ 1.047 -0.353∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗∗
(21.46) (0.849) (0.076) (0.058)
Child Age 0-2 Years -414.3∗∗∗ 0.973 -0.372∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗
(19.31) (0.875) (0.085) (0.046)
Child Age 3-5 Years -280.9∗∗∗ 1.804∗ -0.125∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗
(19.90) (0.990) (0.063) (0.048)
Child Age 6-8 Years -190.6∗∗∗ 0.192 -0.106∗ 0.324∗∗∗
(21.04) (1.502) (0.063) (0.053)
Child Age 9-11 Years -95.32∗∗∗ 1.099 -0.114 0.234∗∗∗
(31.15) (1.157) (0.070) (0.055)
Years of Schooling 43.32∗∗∗ -0.157 0.131∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗
(3.110) (0.125) (0.010) (0.008)
Non-labor Income -7.994 -0.528 0.084∗ -0.006
(5.003) (0.349) (0.049) (0.010)
Years of Schooling × Non-Labor Inc -2.642∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.004∗∗∗
(0.355) (0.033) (0.004) (0.001)
Educ × Non-Labor Inc × 4-6 Years Before Birth 3.371∗∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗ -0.001 0.004∗∗∗
(0.270) (0.020) (0.002) (0.001)
Educ × Non-Labor Inc × 1-3 Years Before Birth 3.155∗∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗ 0.001 0.004∗∗∗
(0.216) (0.021) (0.002) (0.000)
Educ × Non-Labor Inc × Child Age 0-2 Years 3.088∗∗∗ -0.094∗∗∗ 0.003 0.004∗∗∗
(0.193) (0.021) (0.003) (0.000)
Educ × Non-Labor Inc × Child Age 3-5 Years 3.003∗∗∗ -0.091∗∗∗ -0.001 0.004∗∗∗
(0.220) (0.020) (0.002) (0.001)
Educ × Non-Labor Inc × Child Age 6-8 Years 2.789∗∗∗ -0.018 -0.001 0.005∗∗∗
(0.256) (0.044) (0.002) (0.001)
Educ × Non-Labor Inc × Child Age 9-11 Years 1.040 -0.035 0.000 0.001
(0.660) (0.032) (0.002) (0.001)
Private School -42.30∗∗∗ 0.706 0.129∗∗∗ -0.194∗∗∗
(16.37) (0.594) (0.048) (0.036)
Demographic Controls Y Y Y Y
State Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Obs. 32334 18165 24158 32319
Notes: *, **, *** denote p-value < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. Standard errors are given in parentheses. The table
reports the average effect of choosing private school over different periods of the mother’s life cycle for different education
and non-labor income groups. Education is measured in years of schooling and non-labor income has been divided by 1000.
The dependent variables are annual hours worked, real assets, a dummy for whether the household has savings in a checking,
savings or money market account, and a dummy for whether the respondent is employed. Demographic controls include
dummies for respondent’s age at first birth, race and marital status, and controls for respondent’s religion and number of
children.
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Table A.15: First Step Estimates
Parameter Variable Estimate Std. Error




















δm2 Black -0.01 0.04




δm34 More than College 0.04 0.05













δd34 More than College -1.06
∗∗∗ 0.08
δd4 Child > 6 1.12
∗ 0.07
Notes: The table reports the logit estimates from the first
step of the estimation, in which the exogenous transition prob-
abilities of marriage, divorce and number of children is calcu-
lated using data from NLSY79.
* p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard Errors in
parentheses.
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Table A.16: Model Fit
Child Age Pvt School Pvt/Pub ln k Exper Avg Exper Pub Exper Pvt
Data
-6 8.392 8.197 8.934
-5 8.634 8.469 9.119
-4 8.840 8.700 9.266
-3 9.008 8.883 9.397
-2 9.134 9.038 9.467
-1 9.265 9.176 9.579
0 9.358 9.292 9.623
1 9.428 9.364 9.686
2 9.472 9.418 9.717
3 1.085 9.537 9.484 9.759
4 1.099 9.576 9.522 9.812
5 0.165 1.125 9.642 9.589 9.850
6 0.184 1.120 9.687 9.637 9.904
7 0.173 1.007 9.759 9.712 9.939
8 0.202 0.981 9.786 9.739 9.984
9 0.188 1.010 9.851 9.807 10.01
10 0.220 1.027 9.878 9.833 10.05
11 0.204 1.078 9.917 9.877 10.06
12 0.229 1.098 9.946 9.905 10.12
13 0.213 1.063 9.981 9.946 10.11
14 0.234 1.075 10.02 9.982 10.17
15 0.214 10.03 10.01 10.13
16 0.211 10.06 10.03 10.19
17 0.191 10.08 10.07 10.16
18 0.179 10.10 10.08 10.17
Model Simulation
-6 6.384 8.338 8.372
-5 6.384 8.338 8.372
-4 7.509 8.590 8.520
-3 7.707 8.788 8.637
-2 7.841 8.950 8.732
-1 7.942 9.087 8.809
0 8.028 9.206 8.873
1 8.545 9.305 9.009
2 8.760 9.380 9.104
3 0.947 8.893 9.444 9.181
4 0.962 9.010 9.502 9.256
5 0.174 0.976 9.101 9.554 9.324
6 0.302 0.989 9.300 9.645 9.435
7 0.286 1.000 9.349 9.719 9.455
8 0.281 1.007 9.388 9.789 9.473
9 0.284 1.009 9.422 9.852 9.490
10 0.273 1.010 9.452 9.909 9.506
11 0.270 1.016 9.481 9.960 9.522
12 0.259 1.016 9.508 10.01 9.539
13 0.254 1.018 9.534 10.05 9.557
14 0.250 1.298 9.561 10.09 9.575
15 0.245 9.587 10.13 9.593
16 0.240 9.612 10.17 9.612
17 0.238 9.638 10.21 9.632
18 0.228 9.688 10.28 9.675
Notes: The table reports goodness of fit for the method of moment estimation.
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Source: US Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS)
The Figure plots average tuition costs for different types of private schools for four different time
periods.
Figure A.1: Average Tuition Costs over Time
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The Figure plots average real net worth for private and public school mothers. The x-axis is child’s
age, with negative ages denoting years before childbirth.
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(b) Average Annual Hours
Figure A.3 (a) plots the annual employment rate for private and public school mothers over the
child’s life cycle, while Figure A.3 (b) plots the average annual hours worked by the two groups of
women. The x-axis is child’s age, with negative ages denoting years before childbirth.
Figure A.3: Labor Supply over the life cycle
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(d) College and More
The Figure plots average annual hours worked by private and public school mothers for four educa-
tion groups: (1) High school dropouts, (2) high school graduates, (3) some college and (4) college
post-graduate degree holders. The x-axis is child’s age, with negative ages denoting years before
childbirth.
Figure A.4: Annual Hours Worked - Education Groups
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kernel = epanechnikov, degree = 0, bandwidth = 1.25
(d) Quantile 4
The Figure plots average annual hours worked by private and public school mothers for non-labor
income groups, where non-labor income is defined as family income minus the woman’s wage income.
The x-axis is child’s age, with negative ages denoting years before childbirth.
Figure A.5: Annual Hours Worked - Income Quantiles
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(b) Private School Enrollment and Private School Fee
Figure A.6(a) plots the distribution of state-level private school tuition averages in the sample.
Figure A.6 (b) plots the relationship between the probability of sending child to private school fee
and private school tuition.
Figure A.6: Distribution Plots
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Figure A.7 (a) shows the model simulation and data hourly wage over the 25 time periods, while
Figure A.7 (b) shows the average simulated and data assets over the life cycle.
Figure A.7: Goodness of Fit
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(b) Mother’s Time with Child






























































































(f) Ratio of High Ability to Low Ability
The different panels display differences in outcomes between a baseline scenario and one where
woman don’t have the private school option for their child. Figure A.8 (a) shows the percent change
in employment rate from baseline, Figure A.8 (b) shows the change in mother’s time with the child
from baseline, Figure A.8 (c) plots the difference in assets over the life cycle, Figure A.8 (d) plots
the difference from baseline in log ability over the life cycle, Figure A.8 (e) plots hourly log wage
difference and Figure A.8 (f) plots the ratio of low to high ability women conditional on working for
the baseline and counterfactual scenario.
Figure A.8: Shutting Down the Private Schooling Channel
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(a) Assets by Education



























(b) Employment Rate by Education




























(c) Mother’s Time with Child by Educa-
tion
Figure A.9 (a) show the change in assets by education, Figure A.9 (b) show the change in hours
worked by education, and Figure A.9 (c) plot the change in mother’s time with the child from
baseline by education.
Figure A.9: Shutting Down the Private Schooling Channel
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Figure A.10 plots the elasticity of private school enrollment for different levels of fee. The x-axis
markers represent the percentage of observed fee at which the elasticity has been calculated.
Figure A.10: Price Elasticity of Private School Enrollment
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Figure A.11 plots the baseline and counterfactual asset distribution of mothers at the time of child’s
entry into private schooling.
Figure A.11: Asset Distribution at Time of Entry
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(a) Assets by Type






























(b) Hours Worked by Type






























(c) Mother’s Time with Child by Type
Figure A.12 (a) show the change in assets by type, Figure A.12 (b) show the change in hours worked
by type, and Figure A.12 (c) plot the change in mother’s time with the child from baseline by type.
Figure A.12: Shutting Down the Private Schooling Channel
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Table B.1: Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Private School Enrollment %
Year 2000 9.03 4.95 0 26
Year 2006 9.32 5.62 0 29
Year 2012 8.90 6.38 0 39
∆ Private School Enrollment %
2000-2006 0.26 6.18 -22.7 27.2
2006-2012 -0.46 7.52 -27.3 38.9
Local Housing Demand Measures
Log House Price Index (2000) 0.72 0.07 0.50 1.10
Log House Price Index (2006) 1.07 0.45 0.65 2.80
House Price Growth 2000-2006 0.33 0.34 -0.06 1.25
Housing Supply Growth 2000-2006 0.21 0.36 -0.55 1.99
Housing Demand Shock 2000-2006 0.54 0.57 -0.61 3.08
Magnitude of Structural Break 0.05 0.07 -0.10 0.27
Demographic Controls for Year 2000
Share of College Graduates 0.58 0.08 0.33 0.76
Share of Females Employed 0.72 0.06 0.33 0.76
Proportion of African Americans 0.23 0.22 0 0.83
Proportion below Poverty Line 0.20 0.09 0 0.75
Number of Children 5718 15917 0 148344
Number of School-going Children 5161 14353 0 137760
Median Household Income 41.0 7.10 24.9 74.3
School Controls for Year 2000
Number of Public Schools 208 288 27 2184
Student Teacher Ratio in Public Schools 11.4 1.63 7.37 18.3
Current Expenditure Per Pupil in Public Schools 6921 1314 4501 13611
Total Expenditure Per Pupil in Public Schools 8365 1707 5318 17095
Proportion of Free Lunch Students in Public Schools 0.38 0.17 0 0.78
Stat-level Private School Tuition 6114 1947 1834 15879
No. of Obs. 259
Notes: The table reports summary statistics for percentage of students enrolled in private school
in years 2000, 2006 and 2012, and MSA-level averages of demographics and public school quality
measures for the year 2000. Private school enrollment in 2012 is top-coded at the 99% value.
Median Household Income has been divided by 1000. Housing price growth is the difference in
log of HPI in 2006 and log of HPI in 2000. Housing supply growth is the difference in log of
new privately owned housing units in 2006 and log of new privately owned housing units in 2000.
Housing demand shock is the sum of house price growth and housing supply growth during 2000-
2006.
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Table B.2: Summary Statistics: Local Labor Market
Mean Std. Dev Min Max
a) Local Labor Market Controls for Year 2000
% Employed in Construction 7.33 1.54 3.9 13.3
% Employed in Manufacturing 14.9 7.23 2.00 42.6
% Employed in FIRE 5.89 1.94 2.73 20.7
% Employed in Transportation 4.98 1.39 1.55 13.9
% Employed in Retail Trade 12.3 1.36 8.00 17.9
% Employed in Wholesale Trade 3.45 0.84 1.30 7.60
Inflation-Adjusted Hourly Wage - Males 12.1 3.18 4.55 24.3
Inflation-Adjusted Hourly Wage - Females 10.3 1.96 6.56 20.8
b) 2000-2006 ∆ in %
Male Annual Wage Income -0.06 0.45 -1.17 1.98
Female Annual Wage Income -0.05 0.34 -0.66 1.65
Male Labor Force Participation Rate 0.19 17.8 -83.3 58.0
Female Labor Force Participation Rate -0.15 13.2 -43.3 53.3
Male Employment Rate -0.01 0.16 -0.65 0.58
Female Employment Rate -0.04 0.12 -0.44 0.40
Non-Labor Income -0.03 0.31 -1.41 0.82
c) 2000-2006 ∆ in %
Male Annual Wage Income -0.21 0.61 -3.57 0.77
Female Annual Wage Income -0.21 0.50 -3.41 0.62
Male Labor Force Participation Rate -0.68 18.8 -57.1 80.0
Female Labor Force Participation Rate -1.30 15.0 -50.0 53.6
Male Employment Rate -0.06 0.21 -0.80 0.56
Female Employment Rate -0.05 0.18 -0.94 0.42
Non-Labor Income 0.01 0.42 -2.65 1.84
No. of Obs. 259
Notes : The table reports summary statistics for measures of local labor market
performance. All wages are in 2000 constant dollars. The values for males and
females is an average of all males and females respectively who have a child of
school going age. ∆ wage income and ∆ non-labor income are the difference in log
values for each year. Non-labor income is defined as total family income minus any
wage income from parents of the child. Change in labor force participation has been
multiplied by 100.
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Table B.3: Relationship between Public School Quality and Housing
Demand Shock













Housing Demand Shock 2000-2006 0.04∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗ -1.05∗∗ -0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.50) (0.03)
College Share 0.08 -0.16 9.87∗∗∗ 0.51∗
(0.27) (0.28) (3.66) (0.28)
Share of Females Employed -0.01 0.20 -17.70∗ -0.30
(0.38) (0.37) (9.25) (0.35)
Proportion of African-American 0.06 0.14 -2.69∗ 0.00
(0.08) (0.09) (1.37) (0.08)
Proportion below Poverty Line 0.19 -0.02 3.59 0.34∗∗
(0.25) (0.31) (4.43) (0.17)
Log School-Going Children -0.01 -0.00 0.28 -0.02∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.20) (0.01)
Female Hourly Wage -0.00 -0.01 -0.37 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.26) (0.01)
Male Hourly Wage -0.00 -0.00 0.06 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.13) (0.01)
Median Household Income 0.00∗ 0.00 0.08 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00)
Industry Controls N N N Y
No. of Obs. 264 264 218 264
Notes : The table reports OLS estimates of the effect of the housing demand shock between
2000-2006 in an MSA, measured by the change in house prices and change in supply of
housing, affects current expenditure per pupil, total expenditure per pupil, student-teacher
ratio and proportion of free lunch students in public schools in the MSA. Industry controls
include the percentage of individuals employed in construction, manufacturing, retail trade,
wholesale trade, transportation and FIRE industries in an MSA in 2000.
* p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard Errors in parentheses.
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Table B.4: Private Schooling and Housing Demand Shock
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Housing Demand Shock 2000-2006 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
College Share -0.14∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Share of Females Employed 0.04 0.02 0.11
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
Proportion of African-American 0.03 0.03 0.03∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Proportion below Poverty Line 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Log Median Household Income 0.02 0.02 0.05∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Log Private School Fee -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Log School-going Children -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Female Log Hourly Wage -0.01
(0.03)




Total Public Schools -0.00∗∗
(0.00)
Log Current Expenditure Per Pupil 0.01
(0.02)
Prop. of Free Lunch Students 0.02
(0.02)
Industry Controls N N N Y
No. of Obs. 259 259 259 259
Notes : The table reports OLS estimates of the effect of the hous-
ing demand shock between 2000-2006 in an MSA, measured by the
change in house prices and change in supply of housing, on private
school enrollment in the MSA. Industry controls include the percent-
age of individuals employed in construction, manufacturing, retail
trade, wholesale trade, transportation and FIRE industries in an MSA
in 2000.
* p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard Errors in parentheses.












Structural Break 2000-2006 1.00
Housing Demand Shock 2000-2006 0.70 1.00
Housing Demand Shock 2006-2012 -0.60 -0.65 1.00
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Table B.6: First Stage for Housing Demand Change







Magnitude of Structural Break in House Prices 5.08∗∗∗ 3.87∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗
(0.76) (0.53) (0.44)
F-statistic 68.83 71.85 19.92
MSA-level Controls Y Y Y
No. of Obs. 259 259 259
Notes : The table reports results for the first stage for housing demand
change. Columns (1), (2) and (3) show how the magnitude of structural
break in house prices affects change in housing demand, house prices and no.
of housing permits granted between 2000-2006. MSA-level controls include
the share of college educated individuals, shares of females employed, propor-
tion of African-Americans, proportion of individuals living below the poverty
line and log of the population of school-going children in the MSA in 2000.
* p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard Errors in parentheses.
Table B.7: Public School Quality and Structural Break in House
Prices













Structural Break in House Prices 0.10∗∗ 0.10∗∗ -0.09 0.04
(0.04) (0.05) (0.69) (0.06)
College Share 0.14 -0.11 10.57∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗
(0.28) (0.30) (3.62) (0.26)
Share of Females Employed 0.25 0.45 -13.45 -0.08
(0.35) (0.35) (9.76) (0.35)
Proportion of African-American 0.12 0.18 -1.85 0.05
(0.10) (0.11) (1.50) (0.06)
Proportion below Poverty Line 0.25 0.04 4.50 0.39∗∗
(0.26) (0.32) (4.33) (0.17)
Log School-Going Children -0.02 -0.02 0.08 -0.04∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.23) (0.02)
Female Hourly Wage -0.01 -0.01∗ -0.42 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.26) (0.01)
Male Hourly Wage -0.01 -0.00 0.02 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.13) (0.01)
Median Household Income 0.01∗∗ 0.00 0.09 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00)
Industry Controls N N N Y
No. of Obs. 266 266 220 266
Notes : The table reports IV estimates of the effect of the housing demand shock between
2000-2006 in an MSA between 2000 and 2006, instrumented by the magnitude of the struc-
tural break in house prices in an MSA, affects current expenditure per pupil, total expendi-
ture per pupil, student-teacher ratio and proportion of free lunch students in public schools
in the MSA. Industry controls include the percentage of individuals employed in construc-
tion, manufacturing, retail trade, wholesale trade, transportation and FIRE industries in
an MSA in 2000.
* p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard Errors in parentheses.
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Table B.8: Private Schooling and Structural Break in House Prices
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Structural Break in House Prices 2000-2006 0.01 0.03∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.03∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
College Share -0.14∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.07
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Share of Females Employed 0.19∗ 0.12 0.20∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Proportion of African-American 0.05∗ 0.05∗ 0.05∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Proportion below Poverty Line 0.05 0.04 0.03
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Log Private School Fee -0.02 -0.02 -0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Log Median Household Income 0.02 0.03 0.06∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Log School-going Children -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Female Log Hourly Wage -0.03
(0.03)




Total Public Schools -0.00∗∗
(0.00)
Log Current Expenditure Per Pupil 0.01
(0.02)
Prop. of Free Lunch Students 0.01
(0.02)
Industry Controls N N N Y
No. of Obs. 259 259 259 259
Notes : The table reports IV estimates of the effect of the housing demand
shock between 2000-2006 in an MSA, instrumented by the magnitude of the
structural break in house prices in an MSA, on private school enrollment in
the MSA. Industry controls include the percentage of individuals employed
in construction, manufacturing, retail trade, wholesale trade, transportation
and FIRE industries in an MSA in 2000.
* p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard Errors in parentheses.
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Table B.9: Private School Enrollment during the Bust and Full Cycle
Dependent Var. is ∆ in
Private School Enrollment during 2000-2006 2000-2012
Structural Break in House Prices 2000-2006 -0.03∗∗ 0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
College Share 0.17∗∗∗ 0.10∗
(0.06) (0.06)
Share of Females Employed -0.20∗∗ -0.01
(0.08) (0.07)
Proportion of African-American -0.01 0.04∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.01)
Proportion below Poverty Line -0.08∗ -0.05
(0.05) (0.06)
Log Private School Fee 0.04∗∗∗ 0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Log Median Household Income -0.07∗∗∗ -0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
Industry Controls Y Y
Local Labor Market Controls Y Y
No. of Obs. 259 259
Notes : The table reports results for the effect of the housing de-
mand shock during the 2000-2006, instrumented by the magnitude
of structural break in house prices in 2000-2006, on private school
enrollment during the bust period 2006-2012. Column (1) regres-
sion is weighted by the population of children of school-going age
in an MSA in 2006 while column (2) regression is weighted by
the population of children of school-going age in an MSA in 2000.
MSA-level controls include the share of college educated individu-
als, shares of females employed, proportion of African-Americans,
proportion of individuals living below the poverty line, log of me-
dian household income and log of the population of school-going
children in the MSA in 2000. Public school controls include the
student-teacher ratio, proportion of free lunch students and log
of current expenditure per student in public schools in the MSA
in 2000. Industry controls include the percentage of individuals
employed in construction, manufacturing, retail trade, wholesale
trade, transportation and FIRE industries in an MSA in 2000
and local labor market controls include average log hourly wage
for males and females.
* p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard Errors in paren-
theses.
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Table B.10: Decomposing the Effect of Housing Demand Shock
2000-2006 ∆ in
Private School Enrollment (1) (2) (3)
Housing Demand Shock 2000-2006 0.01 0.03∗ 0.03∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Housing Demand × Elasticity 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Elasticity 0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Demographic Controls N Y Y
Public School Controls N N Y
Local Labor Market Controls N N Y
No. of Obs. 226 226 226
Notes : The table reports IV estimates decomposing the
housing demand shock into changes in housing prices
and changes in housing supply. The variable elastic-
ity is the housing supply elasticity estimates from Saiz
(2010). The interaction term between housing demand
shock and elasticity captures whether the local housing
demand had differential effects across MSAs with differ-
ent housing supply elasticities. Demographic controls
include the share of college educated individuals, shares
of females employed, proportion of African-Americans,
proportion of individuals living below the poverty line,
median household income and log of the population of
school-going children in the MSA in 2000, while public
school controls include the student-teacher ratio, pro-
portion of free lunch students and log of current expen-
diture per student in public schools in the MSA in 2000.
Industry controls include the percentage of individuals
employed in construction, manufacturing, retail trade,
wholesale trade, transportation and FIRE industries in
an MSA in 2000, and local labor market controls include
average hourly wage for males and females.
* p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard Errors
in parentheses.
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Table B.11: Labor Market Effects for Fathers During Boom








Structural Break in House Prices 2000-2006 0.05∗∗ 0.02 0.22∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.10) (0.04)
College Share -0.12 0.15∗ 0.13 0.04
(0.13) (0.08) (0.40) (0.29)
Share of Females Employed -0.15 0.25 0.36 1.12∗∗
(0.20) (0.23) (0.61) (0.48)
Proportion of African-American 0.06∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ 0.02 0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.10) (0.08)
Proportion below Poverty Line 0.27∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 1.34∗∗∗ 1.23∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.10) (0.42) (0.26)
Log Median Household Income 0.14∗∗ 0.02 0.36∗ 0.30∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.04) (0.20) (0.10)
Industry Controls Y Y Y Y
Public School Controls Y Y Y Y
No. of Obs. 256 256 255 259
Notes : The table reports results for the effect of the housing demand shock during
the 2000-2006, instrumented by the magnitude of structural break in house prices
in 2000-2006, on labor market outcomes of fathers of children of school-going age
during 2000-2006. Industry controls include the percentage of individuals employed in
construction, manufacturing, retail trade, wholesale trade, transportation and FIRE
industries in an MSA in 2000. Public school controls include the student-teacher ratio,
proportion of free lunch students and log of current expenditure per student in public
schools in the MSA in 2000. Non-labor income is defined as family income minus wage
income earned by any parent.
* p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard Errors in parentheses.
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Table B.12: Labor Market Effects for Mothers during Boom






Structural Break in House Prices 2000-2006 0.01 0.02∗ 0.03
(0.02) (0.01) (0.04)
College Share 0.07 -0.18∗∗ -0.44∗
(0.10) (0.09) (0.25)
Share of Females Employed -0.23 0.08 -0.25
(0.18) (0.18) (0.54)
Proportion of African-American 0.02 -0.03 -0.09∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05)
Proportion below Poverty Line -0.04 0.06 0.22
(0.11) (0.08) (0.26)
Log Median Household Income 0.04 0.03 0.22∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.12)
Industry Controls Y Y Y
Public School Controls Y Y Y
No. of Obs. 259 259 259
Notes : The table reports results for the effect of the housing demand
shock during the 2000-2006, instrumented by the magnitude of structural
break in house prices in 2000-2006, on labor market outcomes of moth-
ers of children of school-going age during 2000-2006. Industry controls
include the percentage of individuals employed in construction, manufac-
turing, retail trade, wholesale trade, transportation and FIRE industries
in an MSA in 2000. Public school controls include the student-teacher
ratio, proportion of free lunch students and log of current expenditure per
student in public schools in the MSA in 2000.
* p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard Errors in parentheses.
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Table B.13: Labor Market Effects for Fathers During Bust








Structural Break in House Prices 2000-2006 -0.07∗∗∗ -0.01 -0.25∗∗∗ -0.20∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.08) (0.06)
College Share 0.02 0.24 0.06 0.17
(0.20) (0.16) (0.58) (0.38)
Share of Females Employed -0.11 -0.09 0.04 -0.00
(0.27) (0.34) (0.96) (0.40)
Proportion of African-American -0.08∗ 0.05 -0.13 0.07
(0.05) (0.07) (0.18) (0.08)
Proportion below Poverty Line 0.09 0.38 0.82 -0.38
(0.15) (0.24) (0.59) (0.27)
Log Median Household Income 0.02 -0.06 0.39∗ -0.35∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.07) (0.21) (0.12)
Industry Controls Y Y Y Y
Public School Controls Y Y Y Y
No. of Obs. 256 256 255 259
Notes : The table reports results for the effect of the housing demand shock during
the 2000-2006, instrumented by the magnitude of structural break in house prices in
2000-2006, on labor market outcomes of fathers of children of school-going age during
2000-2006. All regressions are weighted by the population of children of school-going age
in an MSA in 2006. Industry controls include the percentage of individuals employed
in construction, manufacturing, retail trade, wholesale trade, transportation and FIRE
industries in an MSA in 2000. Public school controls include the student-teacher ratio,
proportion of free lunch students and log of current expenditure per student in public
schools in the MSA in 2000. Non-labor income is defined as family income minus wage
income earned by any parent.
* p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard Errors in parentheses.
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Table B.14: Labor Market Effects for Mothers during Bust






Structural Break in House Prices 2000-2006 -0.03∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.05)
College Share -0.05 0.23∗ 0.65
(0.08) (0.12) (0.41)
Share of Females Employed -0.27∗ 0.04 -0.23
(0.16) (0.23) (0.64)
Proportion of African-American -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.03) (0.08)
Proportion below Poverty Line 0.00 0.02 0.63
(0.12) (0.13) (0.49)
Log Median Household Income 0.01 -0.02 -0.15
(0.03) (0.04) (0.16)
Industry Controls Y Y Y
Public School Controls Y Y Y
No. of Obs. 259 259 259
Notes : The table reports results for the effect of the housing demand shock
during the 2000-2006, instrumented by the magnitude of structural break in
house prices in 2000-2006, on labor market outcomes of mothers of children
of school-going age during 2000-2006. All regressions are weighted by the
population of school-going children in an MSA in 2006. Industry controls
include the percentage of individuals employed in construction, manufac-
turing, retail trade, wholesale trade, transportation and FIRE industries in
an MSA in 2000. Public school controls include the student-teacher ratio,
proportion of free lunch students and log of current expenditure per student
in public schools in the MSA in 2000.
* p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard Errors in parentheses.
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Source: US Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS)
The Figure plots average tuition costs for different types of private schools for four different time
periods.
Figure B.1: Average Tuition Costs over Time
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The Figure maps the magnitude of structural break in house prices across metro areas in the US.
Red areas experienced the highest change in house prices while lighter shades experienced smaller
deviations from a linear trend in house prices.
Figure B.2: Magnitude of Structural Break across MSAs
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The red histogram shows the distribution of the change in private school enrollment between 2000-
2006, while the blue histogram shows the distribution of the change in private school enrollment
between 2006-2012.
Figure B.3: Change in Private School Enrollment Distribution
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(b) Local Housing Demand Shock between 2006-2012
The Figure plots the relationship between the local housing demand shock between 2000-2006 and
2006-2012, and the magnitude of the estimated structural breaks.
Figure B.4: Relationship between Housing Demand Shock and Magni-
tude of Structural Break
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(b) Total Number of Public Schools
The Figure plots the relationship between the instrument variable - magnitude of structural break
in housing prices - and public school supply in the baseline year 2000.
Figure B.5: Relationship between Public School Quality in 2000 and
Structural Break
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(d) Share of Employed Females
The Figure plots the relationship between the instrument variable - magnitude of structural break
in housing prices - and MSA-level demographics in the baseline year 2000.




Appendix for Chapter 3
C.1 Theoretical Model
Let drug d′s unobserved quality θ ∈ IR2 have two dimensions: drug effectiveness
h ∈ IR and how well it represses side effects s ∈ IR. The utility an individual gets
from consuming drug d, conditional on all observed objective qualities X is given
by:12
ud(h, s|X) = αh+ βs+ γ(AIDS · h), (C.1)
1We write our theoretical model after conditioning on all observed characteristics of the drug to
understand how drug demand relates to unobserved qualities of the drug and expert comments. We
categorize the drug’s unobserved qualities into two dimensions, effectiveness and side effects, which
may be correlated with observed measures of drug effectiveness (probability of non-decreasing CD4
count) and side effects (probability of no ailment).
2We have suppressed the individual subscript i to simplify notation.
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where AIDS is a dummy for whether the individual is suffering from AIDS and α >
0, β > 0, γ > 0.3 We assume that the individual does not observe θ, and uses reviews
from doctors and activists as signals of the true unobserved quality. Let us assume
that h and s can take one of two values, h ∈ {hH , hL} and s ∈ {sH , sL}, where H
denotes high quality and L denotes low quality, and doctor and activist comments can
either be high or low, i.e., D,A ∈ {0, 1} where 0 denotes low comment and 1 denotes
high comment. Then, we can define probabilities for observing quality t ∈ {H,L},
conditional on doctor and activist comments as:
Pd(h = h
H |R = r) = prR, (C.2)
Pd(s = s
H |R = r) = qrR, (C.3)
R ∈ {D,A}, r ∈ {0, 1}. Moreover, we assume that conditional on both observed
and unobserved drug characteristics doctor’s and activist’s comment are indepen-
dent. Given this setup, we can now derive theoretical predictions that can be tested
empirically.
Proposition 5. When the doctor and activist agree, individuals choose the drug that
gets a high comment, provided that comments are informative.
Proof. Individuals will choose the drug that gives them the highest expected utility.
3This restriction on preference parameters assumes that individuals prefer drugs that are more
effective and have less side effects, and that these are state-dependent preferences for effectiveness,
in that individuals with AIDS prefer more effective drugs more [110].
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Suppose drug k gets high comments from both experts, while drug j gets low com-
ments from both experts. An individual, regardless of his AIDS status, will choose
drug k over j when
E[uk(h, s|X, D,A)] > E[uj(h, s|X, D,A)] (C.4)
⇔ (α + γAIDS)hH(p1D − p0D + p1A − p0A) + βsH(q1D − q0D + q1A − q0A) > (C.5)
(α + γAIDS)hL(p1D − p0D + p1A − p0A) + βsL(q1D − q0D + q1A − q0A).















words, both experts are more likely to give a higher rating to drugs that are better
on both dimensions.
Proposition 6. When the doctor and activist disagree, we will observe differences in
responses to conflicts depending on health status if and only if
1. individuals without AIDS value low side effects more than high effectiveness
(β > α),
2. individuals with AIDS value high effectiveness more than low side effects (β <
(α + γ)),
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4. the relative probability that the activist gives a high rating to a drug that has high
h is lower than the relative probability of the doctor doing the same ((p1A−p0A) <
(p1D − p0D)).
Proof. Suppose the doctor gives a low comment to drug k and a high comment to
drug j, while the activist gives a high comment to drug k and a low comment to drug
j. Then, an individual without AIDS will choose drug k when
=⇒ αhH(p0D − p1D + p1A − p0A) + βsH(q0D − q1D + q1A − q0A) > (C.6)
αhL(p0D − p1D + p1A − p0A) + βsL(q0D − q1D + q1A − q0A)
Given that hH > hL and sH > sL, under these assumptions, equation (15) will be
satisfied if (p1A − p0A) > (p1D − p0D). If (p1A − p0A) < (p1D − p0D), then for equation (15)
to be satisfied, β > α, so that the expected marginal utility from higher s is greater
than the expected marginal utility from higher h.
An individual with AIDS = 1 will choose drug j over drug k if
(α + γ)hH(p0D − p1D + p1A − p0A) + βsH(q0D − q1D + q1A − q0A) < (C.7)
(α + γ)hL(p0D − p1D + p1A − p0A) + βsL(q0D − q1D + q1A − q0A)
It is easy to see that equation (16) will be satisfied when (p1A − p0A) < (p1D − p0D),
α, β, γ > 0, and β < (α + γ), so that the expected marginal utility from higher s is
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lower than the expected marginal utility from higher h.
Now lets suppose (p1A − p0A) < (p1D − p0D), q0D > q1D, q1A > q0A and that for people
without AIDS β > α while for people with AIDS β < (α + γ).
An individual without AIDS will choose drug k (for which the activist’s comment
is higher than the doctor’s) when equation (15) is satisfied. Given our assumption
that hH > hL and sH > sL and the above conditions, we can see that since β > α, the
LHS of the equation (15) is greater than the RHS. Individuals with AIDS, however,
will choose drug j (for which the doctor’s comment is higher than the activist’s) when
equation (16) is satisfied. Given that we assume that α, β, γ > 0, and following the
above conditions, we can see that equation (16) is satisfied.
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C.2 Data Collection
C.2.1 Positively Aware Data Dictionary
In this section, we present a data dictionary for the constructed dataset from the
Positively Aware magazines. Below is a list of variables that we derived from the
magazines, along with a description of what that variable measures.
↪→ Common Name - This codes the generic name of the drug.
↪→ Brand Name - This variable codes the brand name under which the drug is sold.
↪→ Class - Class of drugs that the drug belongs to.
↪→ Manufacturer - Name of the manufacturer.
↪→ Public - A binary variable, indicating whether the drug company is publicly
traded.
↪→ Year - Year the magazine was published.
↪→ No. of Side Effects - Number of side effects for the drug listed in the drug guide.
↪→ No. of Drug Interactions - Number of drug interactions with other drugs listed
in the drug guide.
↪→ Pill Burden - Number of tablets that need to be taken together.
↪→ Dosage Frequency - Number of times a day the drug dose needs to be taken.
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↪→ Food Restrictions - A binary variable indicating whether drug intake has any
food restrictions.
↪→ Annual Cost - Average Wholesale Price of drugs, as specified by the manufac-
turer
↪→ DHHS Preferred - A binary variable, indicating whether the drug has been
approved as first-line therapy by the Department of Health and Human Services.
↪→ Doctor’s Rating - A categorical variable that encapsulates a doctor’s rating of
the drug on a scale of 1 to 3.
1. Doctor mainly uses negative words or phrases to describe the drug.
2. Doctor says positive things, with some qualifications.
3. Doctor says mostly positive things.
↪→ Activist’s Rating - A categorical variable that encapsulates the activist’s rating
of the drug on a scale of 1 to 3.
1. Activist mainly uses negative words or phrases to describe the drug.
2. Activist says positive things, with some qualifications.
3. Activist says mostly positive things.
↪→ Doctor - The variable codes the name of the doctor who has reviewed for the
current issue of the drug guide.
216
APPENDIX C. APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3
↪→ Activist - The variable codes the name of the activist who has reviewed for the
current issue of the drug guide.
Table C.16 presents a summary of all the drugs in the dataset, along with their
manufacturer details and year of entry and exit.
Doctor and Activist Reviews
In order to create a ranking system for the reviews, we use the following set of
criteria:
↪→ Assign a rating of 1 if mostly negative words or phrases have been used to
describe the drug. For example, comments such as “There is not much to say
about ddC anymore.” . . . “hard to get excited about it, and these days it’s
often not prescribed.” . . . “The role for delavirdine remains unclear.”, or an
activist’s comments such as “ddC has never lived up to its initial promise”
. . . “overall, not a very useful drug” . . . “Invirase was extraordinarily
weak . . . not much reason to take it. ” would be assigned a rank of 1.
↪→ Assign a rating of 2 if the doctor or advocate points out the positive as well as
the negative aspects of the drug, but does not give an absolute recommendation
of whether the drug is good or bad. For example, comments of the form “The
new soft-gel formulation achieves much better drug levels . . . but if you are
going to use Fortovase as a sole PI, you will have to take a lot of pills.”,
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and “It may not be the best bet to include in first-line treatment . . . but it
remains a solid antiviral.”
↪→ Assign a rank of 3 to drugs with reviews that mostly use positive words to
describe the drug. For example, “3TC is a potent, convenient and well-
tolerated drug” or, “3TC, with its minimal side effects, easy dosing
schedule and high potency, may be the most useful of the nucleosides
” would receive a rank of 3.
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C.3 Demand Estimation
We estimate the demand model by GMM, matching the moments predicted by
the model to the sample moments. We match two sets of moments to their sample
analogue: (1) the market shares for all combinations, and (2) the covariance of the
observed product characteristics, x, with the observed individual-level characteristics,
z.
For computational ease, we assume that the εijt’s have an independently and
identically distributed extreme value distribution, which leads to the familiar closed-
form for the model’s choice probabilities conditional on z:










In order to compute our moments, we first find the value of δ that makes the
market shares from the data, sNjt , equal to the market shares predicted by the model,
4
sjt(δ, β; .), for each guess at (β). We then substitute that δ(β, sjt; .) for δ into the
model’s prediction for the micro moments, making them a function of (β, δ(β, sjt; , )).
Lastly, we search over (β) to minimize the distance between model’s predictions for
the micro moments and the data.
Recall that we also need to address the endogeneity problem of the reviews, since
we expect reviews and ξjt to be correlated. The instruments we use are the average
4For the logit specification, that is simply equal to the log market share of combo c minus the
log of the share of the outside option (taking no drugs).
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combo characteristics of rival drugs on the market. Let Z = [Z1, Z2] be the set of
instruments, where Z1 is the average probability of no ailments for the rival drugs on
the market, and Z2 is the average probability of non-decreasing CD4 count for the
rival drugs on the market.
We now describe our estimation algorithm in detail:
1. Let zd, for d = 1, . . . , ns, be the individual-level characteristics for the ns in-
dividuals in visit t from the individual level data from MACS. We then define
δns,n(β) as the value of δ for a given value of β that sets







Prt (y = j|x, zd,β, δns,n(β)) (C.9)
equal to 0.
2. Calculate the model’s prediction for the covariances between the characteristics
of the chosen combination and individual-level attributes. In particular, to form
the sample moment, we interact the average attributes of the individuals that
chose combination j at time t with the characteristics of the combination at
time t, and then average over all available combinations in that time period.
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where
E[z|y = j,β, δns,n(β)] = (ns)
−1∑
d zdPrt(y = j|x, zd,vd,β, δns,n(β))
snjt
, (C.11)
nj is the number of individuals taking combination j, n =
∑
j nj and
Prt(y = j|x, zd,vd,β, δns,N(β)) is given by equation (C.8).
3. Calculate β̄k using the IV GMM formula, and then, using δ
ns,n(β) from step 1,






to calculate the third moment, which is given by:
g3 = E[Zω(θ)] = 0 (C.13)
4. Find the generalized method of moments estimator of (θGMM) = (βGMM , β̄GMM )
from stacking g2 and g3 into a single vector f . In particular, we use a two-step
estimation procedure with

















where W = E[f(θ)f(θ)′]. With the optimal weight matrix, the variance-
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covariance of the parameters θGMM is given by:
V̂ (θGMM ) = (Ĝ
T Ŵ Ĝ)−1 (C.15)
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C.4 Additional Robustness Checks
For additional robustness checks, we begin by pooling the doctor and activist
reviews. Table C.17 presents the results of the logit with instruments for two ways
of pooling the reviews: adding the two reviews for each combination, and taking the
maximum of the two reviews for each drug. For both measures, we find that even
after controlling for objective qualities, an increase in reviews leads to an increase in
the likelihood of choosing the drug combination.
In Table C.18, we report results for the specification in which we control for
individual and time fixed effects when predicting the probabilities of non-decreasing
CD4 count and no ailment for each individual. As before, doctors’ and activists’
reviews positively predict demand independently; however, in the specification in
which we control for both the activists’ and doctors’ reviews together and control for
the combination’s objective qualities, we find that a higher review from the doctor
decreases the probability of choosing that combination while a higher review by the
activist for a combination leads to an increase in the probability of that combination
being demanded. The disagreement results are the same, yet in this specification the
interaction between the doctors’ review and disagreement is not significant.
Lastly, we also check if our mechanism for explaining the negative coefficient
on doctor’s review is robust to how we define the reviews. Therefore, we use the
definition for reviews in which we calculate the percentage of drugs in a combination
that have a rating of 3 as our measure of combo-level reviews and run the specification
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with agreements and disagreements between the two experts. Table C.19, column
(1) replicates the results for this definition of reviews with which we find that after
we control for the activist’s review and the objective qualities, the doctor’s review
negatively affects demand. In column (2), we find that if the experts agree about a
combination, then a higher review increases the likelihood of taking that combination.
However, in the case of a disagreement, a higher activist’s review leads to an increase
in the likelihood of taking the combination while a higher doctor’s review decreases the
likelihood of taking that combination (though the effect is not significant). In column
(3), we explore the non-linearities in disagreements and find that if the activist gives a
lower review to the combination than the doctor (i.e. a smaller percentage of drugs in
the combo receive a rating of 3 from the activist), and the activist’s review increases,
then the probability of consuming that combination increases.
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C.5 State of the Market
The tables in this section show summary statistics and tabulations for the state
of the market over time.
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C.6 Tables
Table C.1: Summary Statistics: MACS Dataset (Individual Level Vari-
ables)
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
CD4 Count 536.4 283.9 5 3819
Non-decreasing CD4 0.54 0.50 0 1
No Ailment 0.63 0.48 0 1
AIDS 0.20 0.40 0 1
Age 47.15 8.21 19.5 80
Work Full-time 0.54 0.50 0 1
White 0.54 0.50 0 1
High School 0.19 0.39 0 1
College 0.50 0.50 0 1
Obs 13,472
Notes : Summary statistics for the Multi-center
AIDS Cohort Study (MACS) variables, which con-
sists of 13,472 patient-visit observations. We restrict
our sample to the years 1997-2008.
Table C.2: Summary Statistics: Positively Aware Drug Guides Data
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Annual Cost 6690 4180 875 28007
No. of Side Effects 13.16 6.10 1 33
No. of Drug Interactions 14.26 10.34 0 43
Food Restrictions 0.34 0.48 0 1
Pill Burden (per take) 2.15 1.86 1 8
Dosage Frequency (per day) 1.94 0.65 1 3
DHHS Preferred 0.27 0.25 0 1
Publicly Traded Manuf. 0.90 0.28 0 1
Doctor’s Rating 2.02 0.74 1 3
Activist’s Rating 1.89 0.77 1 3
Disagreement 0.39 0.49 0 1
Obs 197
Notes : Summary statistics for drug-level variables con-
structed using the Positively Aware annual drug guide,
which consists of 197 drug-year observations. We restrict
our sample to the years 1997-2008, and to drugs that have
been FDA approved and can be matched to treatments ob-
served in the MACS dataset. Doctor and activists’ rating
can take values 1, 2 or 3.
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Table C.3: Relating Reviews with PA Characteristics
OLS Ordered Probit
Doctor Activist Doctor Activist
No. of Side Effects -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
No. of Drug Interactions -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Food Restrictions -0.01 0.17 -0.00 0.09
(0.12) (0.13) (0.01) (0.06)
Pill Burden 0.10∗∗∗ -0.00 0.05∗∗∗ -0.00
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
Dosage Frequency -0.33∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗
(0.08) (0.09) (0.05) (0.04)
Publicly Traded 0.01 -0.24 -0.00 -0.12
(0.18) (0.18) (0.10) (0.10)
Nobs. 197 197 197 197
Notes : *, **, *** denote p-value < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respec-
tively. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Drug-visit dyad
is the unit of analysis. The left-hand-side variable is either Doc-
tor’s or Activist’s review (taking values 1, 2, or 3). Columns (3)
and (4) report marginal effects for the ordered probit.
Table C.4: Relationship between Reviews and Demand - Drug Level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Doctor’s Review 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Activist’s Review 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Average Doctor Reviews of Other Drugs in Combo -0.01∗∗∗
(0.00)
Average Activist Reviews of Other Drugs in Combo 0.01∗∗∗
(0.00)
PA Characteristics Y Y Y Y
Nobs. 33,608 33,608 33,608 33,608
Notes : *, **, *** denote p-value < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. Standard errors are given in
parentheses. Individual-drug-visit is the unit of analysis. The left-hand-side variable is drug-level market
shares, defined as the fraction of people taking a particular drug out of the total number of HIV+ men
in the sample.
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Table C.5: Summary Statistics: Combo Level
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
(a) Reviews
Doctor Average 2.18 0.57 0 3
Activist Average 2.07 0.56 0 3
Doctor Std. Dev. 0.51 0.38 0 1.41
Activist Std. Dev. 0.60 0.36 0 1.41
% of 3’s - Doctor 0.37 0.34 0 1
% of 3’s - Activist 0.32 0.30 0 1
% of 2’s - Doctor 0.47 0.34 0 1
% of 2’s - Activist 0.45 0.31 0 1
% of 1’s - Doctor 0.14 0.23 0 1
% of 1’s - Activist 0.21 0.26 0 1
Disagreement 0.62 0.49 0 1
(b) Objective Qualities
Probability of Non-decreasing CD4 0.55 0.15 0 1
Probability of No Ailment 0.60 0.19 0 1
(c) Market Shares
Combos 0.01 0.02 0 0.18
Fringe 0.32 0.05 0.23 0.42
Outside Option (No Drug) 0.19 0.04 0.12 0.27
Obs 1086
Notes : Panel (a) reports summary statistics for combo-level
variables constructed using the Positively Aware annual drug
guide. Panels (b) and (c) report combo-level variables con-
structed using the MACS dataset. The probability of non-
decreasing CD4 count and probability of no ailment are con-
structed by averaging data across all individuals for each combo
in every visit. Combos in the ‘Fringe’ category at a particular
visit are taken by fewer than 25 individuals in that visit.
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Table C.6: Qualities and Combo Demand
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Prob of No Ailment 1.02∗∗∗ 1.05∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19)
Prob of Non-decreasing CD4 0.80∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.26) (0.25) (0.25)
No. of Side Effects -0.09∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
No. of Drug Interactions 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Pill Burden -0.02 -0.03∗∗ -0.03∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Food Restrictions -0.41∗∗ -0.49∗∗∗ -0.41∗∗
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Dosage -0.21∗∗∗ -0.25∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Combo-visit dyads 1086 1086 1086 1086 1086 1086
Notes : *, **, *** denote p-value < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. Standard errors are given
in parentheses. Combo-visit dyad is the unit of analysis. The left-hand-side variable is combo-
level market shares. Probability of no ailment and probability of non-decreasing CD4 count are
combo characteristics constructed using the MACS dataset, while all other combo-characteristics
are constructed using the Positively Aware annual drug guide by averaging across all drugs in a
combo.
Table C.7: Qualities and Reviews
Doctor Activist
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Prob of No Ailment 0.48∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
Prob of Non-decreasing CD4 1.22∗∗∗ 1.15∗∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
Combo-visit dyads 1086 1086 1086 1086 1086 1086
Notes : *, **, *** denote p-value < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. Standard
errors are given in parentheses. Combo-visit dyad is the unit of analysis. The left-
hand-side variable is either Doctor’s or Activist’s review (taking values between 0
and 3, where expert review = 0 for the outside option).
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Table C.8: Reviews and Combo Demand with PA Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Doctor’s Review 0.16∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ -0.16∗ -0.11
(0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09)
Activist’s Review 0.36∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10)
Prob of No Ailment 1.01∗∗∗ 0.99∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.18) (0.19)
Prob of Non-decreasing CD4 0.59∗∗ 0.40 0.40
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25)
No. of Side Effects -0.09∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
No. of Drug Interactions 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Pill Burden -0.03∗∗ -0.03∗∗ -0.02∗ -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Food Restrictions -0.49∗∗∗ -0.40∗∗ -0.59∗∗∗ -0.51∗∗∗ -0.63∗∗∗ -0.54∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Dosage -0.28∗∗∗ -0.25∗∗∗ -0.43∗∗∗ -0.39∗∗∗ -0.45∗∗∗ -0.41∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Nobs. 1086 1086 1086 1086 1086 1086
Notes : *, **, *** denote p-value < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. Standard errors
are given in parentheses. Combo-visit dyad is the unit of analysis. The left-hand-
side variable is combo-level market shares. Both experts’ reviews are constructed by
averaging over drug reviews in each combo.
Table C.9: Reviews and Own and Rival Objective Qualities
Doctor Activist
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Prob of No Ailment 0.48∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Prob of Non-decreasing CD4 1.22∗∗∗ 1.15∗∗∗ 1.18∗∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗ 1.26∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Avg Rivals’ Prob of No Ailment -3.90∗∗∗ -4.51∗∗∗
(0.45) (0.43)
Avg Rivals’ Prob of Non-dec CD4 -2.20∗∗∗ 0.04
(0.48) (0.46)
Nobs. 1086 1086 1086 1086 1086 1086 1086 1086
Notes : *, **, *** denote p-value < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. Standard errors are given in paren-
theses. Combo-visit dyad is the unit of analysis. The left-hand-side variable is either Doctor’s or Activist’s
review for a combo.
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Table C.10: IV Logit Estimates - Baseline Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Doctor’s Review 1.38∗∗∗ 1.23∗∗∗ -2.67∗∗∗ -2.97∗∗∗
(0.34) (0.33) (0.87) (0.90)
Activist’s Review 2.12∗∗∗ 2.12∗∗∗ 4.08∗∗∗ 4.41∗∗∗
(0.33) (0.34) (0.75) (0.81)
Prob of No Ailment 1.44∗∗∗ 1.40∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗
(0.25) (0.27) (0.37)
Prob of Non-decreasing CD4 0.14 -0.93∗∗ -1.11∗∗
(0.36) (0.45) (0.56)
No. of Individuals 13,472 13,472 13,472 13,472 13,472 13,472
Combo-time dyads 1086 1086 1086 1086 1086 1086
Notes : *, **, *** denote p-value < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. Standard
errors are given in parentheses. The table reports the logit coefficients. The left-
hand-side variable is combo-level market shares. Doctor’s and Activist’s reviews
have been instrumented using the average probability of no ailment and average
probability of non-decreasing CD4 count of rival combos. Combo-visit dyad is
the unit of analysis. The total number of combo-visit observations used for the
estimation is 1,086, which are constructed using data on 13,472 individuals.
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Table C.11: Baseline Estimates - Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(a) Percentage of High Reviews
% of 3’s - Doctor 2.14∗∗∗ 2.16∗∗∗ -2.39∗∗∗ -2.43∗∗∗
(0.53) (0.52) (0.89) (0.90)
% of 3’s - Activist 3.21∗∗∗ 3.30∗∗∗ 4.48∗∗∗ 4.64∗∗∗
(0.39) (0.40) (0.65) (0.67)
Prob of No Ailment 1.27∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗ 1.15∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.22) (0.26)
Prob of Non-decreasing CD4 0.64∗∗ -0.06 -0.18
(0.29) (0.31) (0.36)
(b) Percentage of High and Medium Reviews
% of 3’s - Doctor 3.62∗∗∗ 2.91∗∗∗ -1.43 -1.44
(0.77) (0.72) (1.22) (1.19)
% of 2’s - Doctor 2.88∗∗∗ 2.02∗∗∗ -0.67 -0.75
(0.81) (0.76) (1.31) (1.30)
% of 3’s - Activist 2.78∗∗∗ 2.83∗∗∗ 3.15∗∗∗ 3.36∗∗∗
(0.56) (0.56) (0.98) (0.96)
% of 2’s - Activist -0.57 -0.73 -1.05 -0.91
(0.71) (0.68) (1.17) (1.13)
Prob of No Ailment 1.46∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗ 1.15∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.22) (0.28)
Prob of Non-decreasing CD4 0.05 0.19 0.41
(0.39) (0.39) (0.42)
(c) Review Average and Standard Deviation
Doctor’s Review 2.23∗∗∗ 1.80∗∗∗ -2.00∗ -4.26
(0.64) (0.62) (1.12) (3.24)
Doctor’s Review SD -0.27 -2.23 0.34 -7.63
(1.41) (1.47) (1.46) (5.30)
Activist’s Review 2.56∗∗∗ 2.56∗∗∗ 4.30∗∗∗ 4.11∗∗
(0.22) (0.23) (0.73) (1.83)
Activist’s Review SD 1.39∗ 0.58 2.45∗∗ -2.82
(0.79) (0.92) (1.06) (3.75)
Prob of No Ailment 1.48∗∗∗ 1.05∗∗∗ 1.65∗
(0.26) (0.22) (0.85)
Prob of Non-decreasing CD4 0.28 -0.04 -1.84
(0.36) (0.36) (1.67)
No. of Individuals 13,472 13,472 13,472 13,472 13,472 13,472
Combo-time dyads 1086 1086 1086 1086 1086 1086
Notes : *, **, *** denote p-value < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. Standard
errors are given in parentheses. The table reports the logit coefficients. The left-
hand-side variable is combo-level market shares. In panel (a), we use the percentage
of drugs that receive a rating of 3 in a combo as a measure of ‘high’ reviews. In
panel (b), we add the percentage of drugs that receive a rating of 2 in a combo as
a measure of ‘medium’ reviews. In panel (c), our measure of reviews for the two
experts includes the average across all drugs in a combo, as well as the standard
deviation of reviews across drugs in a combo. In all cases, we use the average
objective qualities (probability of no ailment and probability of non-decreasing CD4
count) of rival combos as instruments for reviews. Combo-visit dyad is the unit of
analysis. The total number of combo-visit observations used for the estimation is
1,086, which are constructed using data on 13,472 individuals.
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Agree × Review 1.68∗∗∗ 1.62∗∗∗
(0.49) (0.59)
Disagree × Activist’s Review 2.92∗∗∗
(0.54)




Positive Difference × Doctor -3.59
(15.42)
Negative Difference × Doctor -5.32∗
(3.00)
Positive Difference × Activist 6.14
(11.74)
Negative Difference × Activist 10.83∗∗∗
(3.53)
Prob of No Ailment 0.85∗∗ 1.15∗∗∗ 0.71
(0.37) (0.31) (0.61)
Prob of Non-decreasing CD4 -1.11∗∗ -0.83∗ -1.95∗
(0.56) (0.48) (1.01)
No. of Individuals 13,472 13,472 13,472
Combo-time dyads 1086 1086 1086
Notes : *, **, *** denote p-value < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01,
respectively. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
The table reports the logit coefficients. The left-hand-
side variable is combo-level market shares. Doctor’s and
Activist’s review have been instrumented using the av-
erage probability of no ailment and average probability
of non-decreasing CD4 count of rival combos. The vari-
able ‘Agree’ is a dummy which is 1 if both experts give
the same rating to a combo. The variable ‘Disagree’ is a
dummy which is 1 if each expert gives a different rating
to a combo. Finally, the variable ‘Positive Difference’ is a
dummy which is 1 if the doctor’s review is lower than the
activist’s review, while the variable ‘Negative Difference’
is a dummy which is 1 if the doctor’s review is higher than
the doctor’s review. Combo-visit dyad is the unit of anal-
ysis. The total number of combo-visit observations used
for the estimation is 1,086, which are constructed using
data on 13,472 individuals.
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Table C.13: Reviews and Objective Qualities when Experts Disagree
Doctor Activist
Prob of No Ailment -0.04 0.18∗∗
(0.09) (0.08)
Prob of Non-decreasing CD4 0.19∗ 0.50∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11)
Avg Rivals’ Prob of No Ailment -1.89∗∗∗ -3.79∗∗∗
(0.54) (0.52)
Avg Rivals’ Prob of Non-dec CD4 -1.56∗∗∗ 1.28∗∗∗
(0.50) (0.48)
Nobs. 671 671
Notes : *, **, *** denote p-value < 0.10, 0.05,
and 0.01, respectively. Standard errors are given in
parentheses. Combo-visit dyad is the unit of anal-
ysis. The sample is restricted to cases in which the
two experts’ ratings are different from each other.
The left-hand-side variable is either Doctor or Ac-
tivist’s review.
Table C.14: Correlation between Objective Qualities
Difference
Combo Age Full Sample Agree Disagree Positive Negative
0–3 Years -0.09∗ 0.07 -0.13∗ -0.25∗ -0.07
4–7 Years -0.05 0.08 0.07 -0.23∗ 0.21∗
8–11 Years 0.18 0.27∗ -0.14 -0.40 -0.06
Notes : The table reports correlations between probability of no
ailment and probability of non-decreasing CD4 count for differ-
ent brackets of combo age. Column (1) reports the correlations
for the full sample, column (2) reports correlations for the sam-
ple in which both experts’ rating is the same, and column (3)
reports the correlations for the sample in which both experts’
rating for a combo is different. Finally, column (4) reports the
correlations for cases in which the activist’s review is higher
than doctor’s review, and column (5) reports the correlations
for cases in which the activist’s review is lower than the doc-
tor’s review. *, **, *** denote p-value < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01,
respectively.
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Table C.15: Demand Model with Individual Attributes
Demand Side Parameters Variable Estimates Std. Errors
Means (β) Doctor’s Review -5.86 0.00
Activist’s Review 3.15 0.04
Constant 5.94 0.13
Prob of No Ailment 0.70 0.00
Prob of Non-decreasing CD4 0.40 0.01
Individual Attributes AIDS 0.06 0.05
Age 0.20 0.13
Full-time work -1.59 0.67
Black -0.17 0.18
College 0.50 0.03
Same Combo Last Period - Fringe -0.32 0.19
Same Combo Last Period - Other 2.00 1.90
Interactions with Individual Attributes Doctor’s Review × AIDS 9.50 2.38
Doctor’s Review × Age 0.26 0.01
Doctor’s Review × Full-time work -1.32 0.99
Doctor’s Review × Black -2.05 2.02
Doctor’s Review × College 3.41 1.25
Doctor’s Review × SC - Fringe -3.72 0.49
Doctor’s Review × SC - Other 3.32 1.43
Activist’s Review × AIDS 1.48 1.25
Activist’s Review × Age 0.38 0.31
Activist’s Review × Full-time work 0.55 0.22
Activist’s Review × Black -0.06 0.05
Activist’s Review × College -0.30 0.28
Activist’s Review × SC - Fringe -5.47 0.84
Activist’s Review × SC - Other 4.33 1.76
Notes : The table reports coefficients for the IV-logit demand model with individual charac-
teristics. Combo-visit dyad is the unit of analysis. The left-hand-side variable is combo-level
market shares. Doctor’s review, activist’s review, probability of no ailment and probability of
non-decreasing CD4 count vary only over combo and visit. The variable ‘Same Combo Last
Period - Fringe’ is a dummy for whether the individual taking a fringe combo was also taking
a combo from the fringe group (combinations taken by less than 25 individuals in a visit) in
the last visit, and ‘Same Combo Last Period - Other’ is a dummy which is 1 if the individual
was taking the same combo (including the outside option) last visit that he is taking in the
current period. The model is estimated using Generalized Method of Moments (GMM).
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Table C.16: Drug Information
Manufacturer Year of Introduction Year of Discontinuation
(a) NRTI
Retrovir GlaxoSmithKline 1987 -
Videx Bristol-Myers Squibb 1997 -
Hivid Hoffman-LaRoche 1997 2006
Zerit Bristol-Myers Squibb 1997 -
Epivir GlaxoSmithKline 1997 -
Combivir GlaxoSmithKline 1998 -
Ziagen GlaxoSmithKline 1999 -
Viread Gilead Sciences 2000 -
Trizivir GlaxoSmithKline 2001 -
Emtriva Gilead Sciences 2004 -
Epzicom GlaxoSmithKline 2004 -
Truvada Gilead Sciences 2004 -
(b) NNRTI
Viramune Boehringer Ingelheim 1997 -
Rescriptor Agouron Pharmaceuticals 1997 -
Sustiva Bristol-Myers Squibb 1998
(c) PI
Norvir Abbott Laboratories 1997 -
Crixivan Merck & Company 1997 -
Viracept Agouron Pharmaceuticals 1997 -
Saquinavir Hoffman-LaRoche 1997 -
Agenerase GlaxoSmithKline 1999 -
Kaletra Abbott Laboratories 2000 -
Aptivus Boehringer Ingelheim 2001 -
Reyataz Bristol-Myers Squibb 2002 -
Lexiva GlaxoSmithKline 2004 -
Prezista Tibotec Therapeutics 2004 -
Notes : The table lists details about all drugs in the sample, grouped by drug
type. HIV drugs belong to three drug types: Nucleoside Reverse Transcriptase
Inhibitor (NRTI), Non-nucleoside Reverse Transcriptase Inhibitor (NNRTI) and
Protease Inhibitor (PI). During our period of analysis, only one drug was dis-
continued.
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Table C.17: IV Logit Estimates - Pooling Reviews





Objective Qualities N Y N Y
No. of Individuals 13,472 13,472 13,472 13,472
Combo-time dyads 1,086 1,086 1,086 1,086
Notes : *, **, *** denote p-value < 0.10, 0.05, and
0.01, respectively. Standard errors are given in paren-
theses. The left-hand-side variable is combo-level mar-
ket shares. Doctor’s review and Activist’s review have
been pooled together and instrumented using the aver-
age probability of no ailment and average probability of
non-decreasing CD4 count of rival combos. Columns (1)
and (2) show results for the specification in which the
two experts’ reviews have been pooled by adding up the
reviews, while columns (3) and (4) show results for the
specification in which the maximum of the two experts’
reviews is used as the measure of combo review. The
total number of observations used for the estimation is
1,086, which are constructed using data on 13,472 indi-
viduals. Objective qualities include the probability of
no ailment and probability of non-decreasing CD4 count
of the combo.
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Table C.18: Objective Qualities with Individual and Time Fixed Ef-
fects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Doctor’s Review 1.64∗∗∗ 1.49∗∗∗ -0.79 -2.60∗∗∗
(0.38) (0.34) (0.77) (1.00)
Activist’s Review 2.01∗∗∗ 1.08∗∗∗ 2.63∗∗∗ 4.26∗∗∗
(0.36) (0.21) (0.71) (0.93)
Agree × Review 1.60∗∗∗
(0.46)
Disagree × Activist’s Review 3.00∗∗∗
(0.56)




Objective Qualities N Y N Y N Y Y
N 1086 1086 1086 1086 1086 1086 1086
Notes : *, **, *** denote p-value < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. Standard errors are
given in parentheses. The left-hand-side variable is combo-level market shares. Objective
qualities include the probability of no ailment and the probability of non-decreasing CD4
count of the combo, which are constructed by controlling for individual and time fixed
effects when predicting the probabilities using individual-level data from MACS. Doctor’s
and Activist’s review have been instrumented using the average probability of no ailment
and average probability of non-decreasing CD4 count of rival combos. The variable ‘Agree’
is a dummy which is 1 if both experts give the same rating to a combo. The variable
‘Disagree’ is a dummy which is 1 if each expert gives a different rating to a combo.
238







Agree × Review 3.07∗∗∗ 3.09∗∗∗
(0.57) (0.65)
Disagree × Activist’s Review 2.59∗∗∗
(0.57)
Disagree × Doctor’s Review -1.71
(1.70)
Agree (% High) -0.90 -1.06
(0.89) (0.85)
Positive Difference × Doctor 7.86∗∗
(3.61)
Negative Difference × Doctor -3.40
(2.09)
Positive Difference × Activist -1.42
(2.05)
Negative Difference × Activist 9.96∗∗∗
(3.06)
Objective Qualities Y Y Y
No. of Individuals 13,472 13,472 13,472
Combo-time dyads 1086 1086 1086
Notes : *, **, *** denote p-value < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01,
respectively. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
The left-hand-side variable is combo-level market shares.
Doctor’s and Activist’s review have been instrumented
using the average probability of no ailment and average
probability of non-decreasing CD4 count of rival combos.
The total number of observations used for the estimation
is 1,086, which are constructed using data on 13,472 in-
dividuals. The variable ‘Agree’ is a dummy which is 1
if both experts give the same rating to a combo. The
variable ‘Disagree’ is a dummy which is 1 if each expert
gives a different rating to a combo. Finally, the variable
‘Positive Difference’ is a dummy which is 1 if the doctor’s
review is lower than the activist’s review, while the vari-
able ‘Negative Difference’ is a dummy which is 1 if the
doctor’s review is higher than the doctor’s review. Ob-
jective qualities include the probability of no ailment and
probability of non-decreasing CD4 count of the combo.
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Table C.20: New Drugs
Market Share
Date of Entry Name at time of entry
April, 1997 Videx 4.40%
April, 1999 Efavirenz 5.84%
April, 1999 Ziagen 0.76%
October, 2000 Kaletra 0.28%
October, 2001 Viread 0.62%
April, 2002 Trizivir 1.67%
October, 2003 Reyataz 0.71%
October, 2003 Emtriva 0.71%
April, 2005 Lexiva 0.56%
April, 2005 Truvada 6.60%
April, 2005 Epzicom 1.88%
October, 2006 Prezista 0.37%
April, 2008 Atripla 19.0%
Notes : The table lists all new drugs that
enter the HIV drug market during our pe-
riod of analysis (1997-2008), along with
the market share of those drugs at the
time of entry. Market share is calculated
at the combo level; i.e. for each of the
drugs listed, the market share for drug i
is the combined market share of all com-
binations that include drug i.
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Table C.21: Objective Qualities and Reviews of New Entrants and
Rivals at Time of Entry
Reviews
Doctor Activist
Own Rival Own Rival
Videx 2.42 2.37 2.50 2.42
Efavirenz 2.78 2.28 2.16 2.15
Ziagen 2.92 2.32 2.00 2.16
Kaletra 2.33 1.97 2.67 2.41
Viread 2.83 2.52 2.33 2.38
Trizivir 3.00 2.26 2.17 2.09
Reyataz 2.20 2.36 2.00 2.11
Emtriva 2.17 2.36 2.17 2.11
Lexiva 2.33 2.20 2.33 1.91
Truvada 2.70 2.16 2.63 1.85
Epzicom 2.71 2.17 2.12 1.90
Prezista 2.33 1.91 2.33 1.80
Atripla 2.00 2.04 3.00 2.07
Objective Qualities
Non-Dec. CD4 No Ailment
Own Rival Own Rival
Videx 0.54 0.57 0.56 0.63
Efavirenz 0.55 0.56 0.65 0.55
Ziagen 0.61 0.56 0.61 0.56
Kaletra 0.55 0.49 0.73 0.55
Viread 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.59
Trizivir 0.54 0.53 0.56 0.61
Reyataz 0.69 0.55 0.71 0.61
Emtriva 0.52 0.56 0.86 0.60
Lexiva 0.76 0.55 0.74 0.63
Truvada 0.62 0.55 0.70 0.62
Epzicom 0.64 0.55 0.61 0.63
Prezista 0.93 0.56 0.90 0.63
Atripla 0.61 0.60 0.81 0.60
Notes : The table reports the average re-
views for each expert and objective qual-
ities (probability of non-decreasing CD4
count and probability of no ailment) for the
new entrants and their rivals at the time
of entry. For any new entrant drug i, the
columns labeled ’Own’ report the average
reviews (or objective quality measure) for
all combinations that contain drug i. The
columns labeled ’Rival’ report the average
review (or objective quality measure) for all
combos other than the combos that contain
drug i.
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C L A S S :  n u cl e osi d e a n al o g ( als o c all e d n u cl e osi d e r e v ers e 
t r a ns cri pt as e i n hi bit or, N R TI or n u k e)
S T A N D A R D  D O S E :  O n e 3 0 0 m g t a bl et t wi c e- a- d a y ( 1 2 h o u rs 
a p a rt); t w o 1 0 0 m g c a ps ul es t h r e e ti m es a d a y als o a v ail a bl e, 
n o f o o d r est ri cti o ns ( m a y b e t a k e n wit h or wit h o ut f o o d). 
Cl e a r, st r a w b er r y- fl a v or e d li q ui d a v ail a bl e f or p e di at ri c us e. 
Ta k e miss e d d os e as s o o n as p ossi bl e, b ut d o n ot d o u bl e u p o n 
y o u r n e xt d os e. G e n eri c R et r o vi r (zi d o v u di n e) is a v ail a bl e.
A W P :   $ 4 3 2. 8 8 ( g e n eri c $ 3 1 5) / m o nt h
M A N U F A C T U R E R  C O N  T A C T : Gl a x o S mit h Kli n e,  
w w w.t r e at hi v. c o m, 1 ( 8 8 8) 8 2 5± 5 2 4 9
A I D SI N  F O : 
1 ( 8 0 0) HI V± 0 4 4 0 ( 4 4 8± 0 4 4 0), w w w. ai dsi nf o. ni h. g o v
P O T E N TI A L  SI D E  E F F E C T S  A N D  T O X I CI T Y :  M ost c o m m o n si d e 
e ff e cts  i n cl u d e  h e a d a c h es,  f e v er,  c hills,  m us cl e  s or e n ess,  f a-
ti g u e, n a us e a, a n d fi n g er n ail dis cl or ati o n. Zi d o v u di n e ( A Z T) 
h as b e e n ass o ci at e d wit h alt er ati o n of v a ri o us c ells i n t h e bl o o d 
t h r o u g h b o n e m a r r o w s u p pr essi o n r es ulti n g i n a n e mi a (l o w 
r e d bl o o d c ells) a n d/ or n e ut r o p e ni a (l o w w hit e bl o o d c o u nts), 
p a rti c ul a rl y i n p e o pl e wit h a d v a n c e d HI V d u ri n g t h e fi  rst t h r e e 
m o nt hs. P ot e nti al f or s e v er e a n e mi a r e q ui ri n g bl o o d t r a nsf u-
si o n, er yt h r o p oi eti n i nj e cti o ns, or h os pit ali z ati o n w h e n us e d 
o n its o w n or i n c o m bi n ati o n wit h h y d r o x y u r e a. Pr ol o n g e d us e 
of hi g h d os es of zi d o v u di n e h as b e e n ass o ci at e d wit h s y m p-
t o m ati c m y o p at h y ( m us cl e d a m a g e). R a r e b ut p ot e nti all y f at al 
t o xi cit y wit h all N R TIs is p a n cr e atitis (i nfl a m m ati o n of t h e 
p a n cr e as),  h e p at o m e g al y  (e nl a r g e d  li v er)  wit h  st e at osis  (f at)  
a n d l a cti c a ci d osis ( a c c u m ul ati o n of l a ct at e i n t h e bl o o d a n d 
a b n or m al a ci d- b as e b al a n c e). L a cti c a ci d osis h as b e e n s e e n i n 
p ati e nts t a ki n g N R TIs b ut is m or e c o m m o n a n d m or e s e v er e i n 
w o m e n, p e o pl e w h o a r e o b es e, a n d p e o pl e w h o h a v e b e e n t a k-
i n g n u k es f or a l o n g ti m e; a n d m or e c o m m o n i n p e o pl e wit h 
li v er dis e as e, b ut c a n o c c u r i n p e o pl e wit h o ut a hist or y of li v er 
d a m a g e. P e o pl e wit h l a cti c a ci d osis m a y e x p eri e n c e p ersist e nt 
f ati g u e, a b d o mi n al p ai n or dist e nsi o n, n a us e a/ v o miti n g, a n d 
di ffi  c ult y br e at hi n g or s h ort n ess of br e at h; a n d e nl a r g e d, f att y 
li v er. P a n cr e atitis c a n b e lif e-t h r e at e ni n g a n d m a y c a us e p ai n 
i n  t h e  st o m a c h  a n d  b a c k,  al o n g  wit h  n a us e a,  v o miti n g  a n d  
bl o o d i n t h e u ri n e. Ris k s f or p a n cr e atitis i n cl u d e: hi g h er t h a n 
r e c o m m e n d e d  d os es  of  N R TIs,  a d v a n c e d  HI V,  a n d  al c o h ol  
us e. Th   e ris k f or p a n cr e atitis wit h zi d o v u di n e is l o w c o m p a r e d 
t o d dI.
P O T E N TI A L  D R U G  I N T E R A C TI O N S:  Bi a xi n, M y c o b uti n, a n d ri-
f a m pi n ( u n d er v a ri o us br a n d n a m es) m a y d e cr e as e zi d o v u di n e 
bl o o d l e v els. B e n e mi d ( pr o b e n e ci d), Dil a nti n ( p h e n yt oi n), a n d 
D e p a k ot e ( v al pr oi c a ci d) m a y i n cr e as e zi d o v u di n e bl o o d l e v els 
a n d d e cr e as e zi d o v u di n e cl e a r a n c e, b ut n o d osi n g a dj ust m e nts 
a r e r e c o m m e n d e d. Zi d o v u di n e a n d Z erit s h o ul d n ot b e us e d 
t o g et h er d u e t o e vi d e n c e t h at o n e li mits t h e ot h er' s eff e cti v e-
n ess.  Als o,  b o n e  m a r r o w  s u pr essi o n  s h o ul d  b e  m o nit or e d  
wit h us e of C yt o v e n e ( g a n ci cl o vi r), Val c yt e, a m p h ot eri ci n B, 
p e nt a mi di n e,  d a ps o n e,  fl u c yt osi n e,  s ulf a di a zi n e,  i nt erf er o n-
al p h a, ri b a vi ri n ( R e b et ol), a n d wit h c a n c er t r e at m e nts s u c h as 
h y d r o x y u r e a a n d d o x or u bi ci n. Ri b a vi ri n a n d zi d o v u di n e m a y 
c a n c el e a c h ot h er o ut, s o t his c o m bi n ati o n s h o ul d b e m o ni-
t or e d cl os el y. N e w Pr o crit or E p o g e n w a r ni n g: if h e m o gl o bi n 
t a r g et is a b o v e m a n uf a ct u r er' s r e c o m m e n d ati o n ( 1 2 g/ d L), t h e 
ris k f or s eri o us a n d lif e-t h r e at e ni n g c a r di o v as c ul a r c o m pli c a-
ti o ns si g nifi c a ntl y i n cr e as es. F or zi d o v u di n e p ati e nts, m e as u r e 
h e m o gl o bi n o n c e a w e e k a ft er st a rti n g t h e a n e mi a d r u gs u ntil 
h e m o gl o bi n h as st a bili z e d. N otif y h e alt h c a r e pr o vi d er if e x p e-
ri e n ci n g p ai n a n d/ or s w elli n g i n t h e l e gs, w ors e ni n g i n s h ort-
n ess of br e at h, i n cr e as es i n bl o o d pr ess u r e, di z zi n ess or l oss 
of c o ns ci o us n ess, e xt r e m e ti r e d n ess, or bl o o d cl ots i n h e m o-
di al ysis v as c ul a r a c c ess p orts. D o n ot t a k e wit h C o m bi vi r or 
Tri zi vi r, si n c e zi d o v u di n e is al r e a d y i n t h es e m e di c ati o ns.
T I P S:  I n c o m bi n ati o n wit h E pi vi r, zi d o v u di n e is r e c o m m e n d e d 
as a pr ef er r e d N R TI a g e nt i n U. S. HI V t r e at m e nt g ui d eli n es 
i n p e o pl e o n HI V t h er a p y f or t h e fi rst ti m e. Th   e n ot-s o- g o o d 
n e ws f or p e o pl e a d di n g zi d o v u di n e: t h e f ati g u e a n d t h e p o-
t e nti al a n e mi a. Y o u c a n st a rt t a ki n g er yt h r o p oi eti n ( Pr o crit 
or E p o g e n) f or s o m e a n e mi as, b ut t h at' s a d di n g a n e x p e nsi v e 
w e e kl y i nj e ct a bl e. S o m e d o ct ors w o ul d pr ef er s wit c hi n g o ut 
t h e zi d o v u di n e f or a n ot h er d r u g. Als o, s o m e cli ni ci a ns a v oi d 
t h e ™  T  d r u gs, or t h y mi di n e a n al o gs (zi d o v u di n e a n d Z erit) 
b e c a us e  of  i m pli c ati o n  i n  li p o at r o p h y.  Zi d o v u di n e  h as  f or  
y e a rs b e e n ass o ci at e d wit h ™  A Z T b utt,  a dis h e a rt e ni n g fl at-
n ess t h at h a p p e ns g r a d u all y. Ta ki n g wit h f o o d m a y mi ni mi z e 
u ps et st o m a c h. Pl e as e s e e p a c k a g e i ns ert f or m or e c o m pl et e 
p ot e nti al si d e e ff e cts a n d i nt er a cti o ns.
D o c t o r
R et r o vi r,  m or e  c o m m o nl y  c all e d  A Z T,  w as  t h e  fi rst  d r u g 
a p pr o v e d f or t h e t r e at m e nt of HI V i nf e cti o n, a n d it pr ol o n g e d 
m a n y li v es b a c k i n t h e l at e ' 8 0' s a n d e a rl y ' 9 0' s. It g ot a n e w 
lif e i n t h e f or m of C o m bi vi r aft er 3 T C b e c a m e a v ail a bl e, e x p e-
ri e n c e d a n ot h er r es u r r e cti o n as p a rt of Tri zi vi r, a o n c e p o p u-
l a r ™ t ri pl e- n u k e  c o m bi n ati o n, a n d h as b e e n a c or n erst o n e of 
t h er a p y i n t h e H A A R T er a. H o w e v er, A Z T' s ti m e h as fi n all y 
p ass e d. C o m p a r e d t o t h e n u k es w e' r e usi n g n o w ( n a m el y t e n o-
f o vi r a n d a b a c a vi r), it' s w e a k er, is d os e d t wi c e a d a y, is h a r d er 
o n t h e st o m a c h, is m or e pr o n e t o r esist a n c e, a n d c a us es a n e mi a 
a n d mit o c h o n d ri al t o xi cit y, i n cl u di n g li p o at r o p h y. I still h a v e 
a  f e w p ati e nts still t a ki n g A Z T b e c a us e of r esist a n c e t o ot h er 
d r u gs (it b e c o m es st r o n g er if y o u h a v e m ut ati o ns t h at c a us e 
r esist a n c e t o 3 T C, F T C, a b a c a vi r, or t e n of o vi r), b ut t h at m a y 
c h a n g e as n e w er, s af er a g e nts b e c o m e a v ail a bl e. S o l o n g, A Z T, 
a n d c o n g r at ul ati o ns o n a g o o d, l o n g r u n! – J o el G all a nt, M. D.
A c ti vi s t
R et r o vi r/ A Z T w as t h e fi rst d r u g d e v el o p e d f or t h e t r e at m e nt 
of HI V. I n s u bs e q u e nt y e a rs, a cti vists f o u g ht m a n y b attl es t o 
s p e e d u p t h e d r u g d e v el o p m e nt pr o c ess, b ut t h e hist or y of A Z T 
d e m o nst r at es t h at t h e m e c h a nis ms a n d a bilit y t o q ui c kl y t est 
a n d a p pr o v e d r u gs w er e pr es e nt all al o n g. W h at w as l a c ki n g, 
e x c e pt i n t h e c as e of A Z T, w as t h e will t o d o it. A Z T c ert ai nl y 
h as s er v e d a us ef ul pl a c e i n t h e hist or y of t r e at m e nt f or HI V, b ut 
it h as al w a ys c o m e at a pri c e. Th   er e is al m ost a c ult u r al m e m or y 
of t h e e a rl y a n d o ft e n s e v er e si d e eff e cts, b ut p e o pl e d o n' t al-
w a ys r e m e m b er t h at t his w as pri m a ril y t h e r es ult of o v er d os-
i n g. W h e n d os e d pr o p erl y, A Z T c a n still h a v e si d e eff e cts b ut 
t h e y a r e s el d o m s e v er e. Still, m a n y p e o pl e t o d a y b eli e v e it is 
ti m e t o r e c o nsi d er t h e w h ol e cl ass of d r u gs t h at A Z T c o m es 
f r o m. M ost of t h e m h a v e p ot e nti all y si g nifi c a nt si d e eff e cts t h at 
d eri v e f r o m t h e v er y n at u r e of w h at t h e y a r e d oi n g. It is di ffi  -
c ult t o c o n c ei v e of a d r u g of t his t y p e t h at w o ul d b e c o m pl et el y 
f r e e of si d e eff e cts. Wit h s o m a n y n e w a n d r el ati v el y n o n-t o xi c 
d r u gs b e c o mi n g a v ail a bl e i n r e c e nt y e a rs, it m a y b e ti m e t o as k 
w h et h er w e c a n b uil d f ull y e ff e cti v e r e gi m e ns t h at d o n' t r el y o n 
t h e ol d p a r a di g m of ™ t w o n u k es a n d a pr ot e as e i n hi bit or  or 
™ t w o n u k es a n d a n o n- n u k e. W h e n t his p a r a di g m fi rst b e c a m e 
st a n d a r d i n 1 9 9 6, it w as n' t c h os e n b e c a us e t his w as i n h er e ntl y 
t h e ri g ht or b est w a y t o t r e at HI V. R at h er, it w as si m pl y t h e o nl y 
ki n d of c o m bi n ati o n a v ail a bl e at t h e ti m e. – M a rti n D el a n e y
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The Figure plots the fraction of 1’s, 2’s and 3’s given to individual drugs, by expert.




















Doctor's Rating Activist's Rating
The Figure plots the average ratings of drugs over drug age, by expert.
Figure C.3: Ratings over Drug Life Cycle
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The Figure plots the distribution of drugs taken together in a combo.














Oct 1997 Oct 1998 Oct 1999 Oct 2000 Oct 2001 Oct 2002 Oct 2003 Oct 2004 Oct 2005 Oct 2006 Oct 2007 Oct 2008
Year
The Figure shows how the total number of combos (including ‘Fringe’) observed in the data evolves
over the period of analysis.
Figure C.5: Total Number of Combos over Time
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The Figure plots how the market share of the outside option, defined as taking no HIV treatment,
evolves over the period of analysis.
Figure C.6: Outside Option Market Share
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(c) Residual Ratings over Combo Age
Figure C.7 (a) shows how the average combo ratings of the two experts evolves over the age of the
combo. Figure C.7 (b) plots the evolution of objective qualities of combos, probability of no ailment
and probability of no ailment, over combo age. Lastly, Figure C.7 (c) plots residual ratings for
combo over combo age, where the residual ratings are the residual of an OLS regression of combo
ratings on two objective qualities, probability of no ailment and probability of non-decreasing CD4
count.
Figure C.7: Combo Reviews and Qualities over the Life Cycle
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The Figure shows the timeline of events studied in the paper. Market share data is available for
two six month windows, spanning from April to September and October to March. PA annual drug
guides are published in January/February of every year, which coincides with the October-March
window from the MACS data.
Figure C.8: Timeline of Events
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(b) Distribution of Differences
Figure C.9 (a) plots the percentage of disagreements between the doctor and activist about the
rating of the combo over the age of the combo, where the variable disagreement is a dummy which
is 1 if the activist and the doctor have a different rating for the combo. Figure C.9 (b) plots the
distribution of the difference in combo ratings between the activist and the doctor.
Figure C.9: Disagreements
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(b) Probability of No Ailment
Figure C.10 (a) plots the percentage difference in the probability of having AIDS in the next period
from the baseline. The baseline is the scenario in which individuals have access to both reviews.
Figure C.10 (b) plots the percentage difference in the probability of having no ailments in the next
period from the baseline. The counterfactual scenarios considered are (1) having no reviews, (2)
having only the activists’ reviews, and (3) having only the doctors’ reviews. The dotted vertical
lines denote the introduction of new drugs onto the market.
Figure C.10: Average Difference in Health Outcomes - Full Sample
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visit
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Only Doctor Reviews
(b) Probability of No Ailment
Figure C.11 (a) plots the percentage difference in the probability of having AIDS in the next period
for individuals who have AIDS in the current period from the baseline. The baseline is the scenario
in which individuals have access to both reviews. Figure C.11 (b) plots the percentage difference in
the probability of having no ailments in the next period for individuals with AIDS in the current
period from the baseline. The counterfactual scenarios considered are (1) having no reviews, (2)
having only the activists’ reviews, and (3) having only the doctors’ reviews. The dotted vertical
lines denote the introduction of new drugs onto the market.
Figure C.11: Average Difference in Health Outcomes - AIDS
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